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ABSTRACT
In its broadest sense, presidential control encompasses all the actions, in both
word and deed, whereby presidents “go it alone” to adopt policies in the absence of
congressional will to do so, and sometimes directly contrary to it. This dissertation
studies how President Obama used rhetorical and administrative tools of presidential
control to address the “wicked problem” of climate change. The “administrative
presidency” and the “rhetorical presidency” are familiar political science terms, but in the
case of climate change policy, they appear to be moving policymaking in a new and
perhaps profound direction, which this study refers to as “post-deliberative
policymaking.” Applying these two areas of scholarship together to the wicked problem
of climate change creates a helpful window through which to study how President Obama
utilized administrative and rhetorical strategies and tools during his presidency. In
particular, the study examines how he rhetorically constructed and rationalized his use of
the Environmental Protection Agency to implement federal climate change regulations
via the federal Clean Power Plan. Among the insights revealed by this analysis are how
President Obama, in an age of acute political partisanship and polarization, positioned the
role of the bureaucracy, how he invoked executive power, and what his actions reveal and
may portend about executive views of democratic institutions and norms. This
dissertation analyzes President Obama’s rhetoric through a study of his speeches from
2009 through 2015 that explicitly or implicitly reference climate change, greenhouse
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gases, and the Clean Power Plan, but also related topics, such as energy policy and
climate agreements.
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CHAPTER ONE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND WICKED PROBLEMS
Traditionally, it has been conservative Republicans who warned about the need to check
the power of a president lest he become dictatorial, while liberal Democrats lobbied for a
strong chief executive. Today the two camps essentially have switched sides.
—Gerald F. Seib, The Wall Street Journal, 1989

In its broadest sense, presidential control encompasses all the actions, in both
word and deed, whereby presidents “go it alone” to adopt policies in the absence of
congressional will to do so, and sometimes directly contrary to it. Such actions include
using the “bully pulpit” of the executive office to rhetorically set the agenda, frame
issues, and mobilize the populace.1 They also include all the tools the unitary executive
has at his or her disposal to set and shape policy, including, among other things,
executive orders, budgets, presidential memoranda, signing statements, appointment
powers, and agency rulemaking. And while partisan views on presidential power and
prerogative shift over time, as the above quote indicates, the fact remains that all modern
presidents utilize formal and informal power to their advantage. While the use or abuse of
power is frequently in the eye of the partisan beholder,2 the tools of presidential control

The term “bully pulpit” is attributed to Teddy Roosevelt who famously observed, “Most of us enjoy
preaching, and I’ve got such a bully pulpit” (Roosevelt, 1889). The term “bully pulpit” is especially
appropriate in this context because, as David Greenberg (2011) notes: “No president before him had made
such regular, skillful use of this declamatory vehicle, which Roosevelt, by naming, fairly invented; no one
to that point so acutely discerned or eagerly seized the opportunity, afforded simply by being president, to
command attention with rousing, morally laden speeches. Roosevelt used speeches about policy and
legislation to circumvent Congress—to lead from the White House” (pp. 1067-1068).
2
In reflecting on the often subjective views of power, political scientist John Gaus observed that “how one
feels about power depends on whether one has it” (as quoted in Kettl, 2000, p. 16). This is certainly true for
1

2
are valued by each modern executive entering the Oval Office. Thus, while perspectives
on presidential control change with shifting political winds, campaign rhetoric
notwithstanding, the practice of presidential control does not (Moe, 1985; Rudalevige,
2005; Lewis, 2009; Wood and Waterman, 1991; Waterman, 2009; Sousa and Klyza,
2007; Klyza and Souza, 2008; Klyza and Souza, 2013). It is precisely this enduring
presence that makes presidential control an important area of study, and what we see
from presidents today seems to be a historically significant amplification of presidential
power accompanied by a breakdown in legislative deliberation. Such a breakdown also
has implications for democratic principles in that it may lead to what this study refers to
as “post-deliberative policymaking,” where presidents continually expand their
policymaking power in a partisan fashion and Congress increasingly declines to engage
in the deliberative function it was designed to perform.
To be sure, presidential control has been extensively studied from various angles
in such diverse academic disciplines as public administration, public policy, political
science, law, psychology, and communication. The attention by scholars is well deserved.
Like few other actions by citizens and policymakers alike, the way in which presidential
control is exercised can fundamentally shape the process by which polices are adopted
and implemented. This has important implications for both governance and our
foundational democratic principles. The aspects of presidential control this study
examines are the coordinated use of the bully pulpit and control of administrative
agencies, respectively, to promote and adopt policies apart from congressional action.

the way presidential control is viewed by citizens and politicians alike who find themselves at various times
on opposite sides of the argument depending on who’s in office, the issue at hand, or both.
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Thanks to existing scholarship, we know much about how presidents frequently act
through administrative agencies in pursuit of policy goals—originally coined the
“Administrative Presidency” by Richard Nathan (1983).3 We also know a great deal
about how presidents use their position to frame policy goals, set the agenda, and “speak
over the heads of Congress” to promote those very same goals—referred to as the
“Rhetorical Presidency” by Jeffrey Tulis (1987). However, we may be missing important
insights about the interplay, or perhaps co-production, of these presidential prerogatives
because administrative action and rhetoric typically are not studied simultaneously. Only
a few scholars have connected the two in at least a general way (Milkis, Rhodes, and
Charnock, 2012; Whitford and Yates, 2009) or commented on the need to simultaneously
examine the administrative presidency and rhetorical presidency as executives continue
to entrepreneurially create and enforce public policy (Whitford and Yates, 2009; Beasley,
2010; Milkis et al., 2012).
Therefore, using the “wicked problem” (Rittel and Webber, 1973) of climate
change, this study aims to bring these two familiar phenomena together as it considers the
adoption of federal greenhouse gas regulations under the Obama Administration. 4 Such

3

The term was first used by Richard Nathan in 1976 in The Public Interest. However, Nathan is commonly
cited from his book by the same name published in 1983; thus, this author follows the ordinary
convention of citing the 1983 work.
4
The term “wicked problem” is borrowed from a study addressing complex urban planning and
infrastructure projects in the 1970s. In the study, the authors distinguish more ordinary technical or
engineering problems from “wicked problems” that by comparison are more difficult to resolve because
they are difficult to define, value-laden, divisive, expensive, and lack easily identifiable solutions. A
number of scholars have used the term in relation to natural resource conflicts, including climate change,
and it remains an apt descriptor of climate change and climate change policy. See, e.g., Nie, 2008;
McBeth, et al., 2010; Levin, et al., 2007; Lazarus, 2008. Guy Peters (2017) argues that referring to complex
policy problems as “wicked” is unhelpful and more work needs to be done in identifying whether
problems are indeed wicked or just complex (see also Coyne, 2005). Finally, wicked problems share
aspects of what Herbert Simon (1973) called “ill-structured problems” in that such problems lack clarity
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an approach offers an opportunity to take a fresh look into what the study of the
administrative and rhetorical presidencies reveal about governance. It also provides an
opportunity to consider broader implications on democratic principles. Wicked problems
are particularly useful for analysis in this regard because they tend to accentuate the
rhetoric and actions surrounding them. As the name suggests, wicked problems are
complex policy problems that are difficult to define, value-laden, divisive, and lack
poorly understood or straightforward solutions (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Nie, 2008;
McBeth et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2007; Lazarus, 2008). Unsurprisingly, they also are
politically-charged, and only a handful of wicked problems in the United States rise to
the level of climate change in this regard. In fact, so difficult has the formulation and
adoption of policy been that climate change has even been characterized as a “super
wicked problem” (see, e.g., Levin et al., 2007, 2012; Lazarus, 2008; Head et al., 2014;
Grundmann, 2016).
For this reason, climate policy offers a helpful window through which to study
how President Obama utilized administrative and rhetorical strategies and tools to pivot
away from climate change legislation that had stalled in the Senate in 2009.5 In particular,
the study addresses how Obama rhetorically constructed and rationalized his use of the

with how they are defined, are interdependent with other problems, and suffer from having poorly
understood characteristics and solutions (see also Peters, 2017).
5
The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (also called the Waxman-Markey Bill), which would
have established a federal CO2 cap-and-trade program, passed the House of Representatives on June 26,
2009 by a vote of 219-212—the first bill of its kind addressing possible threats from climate change
passed in either chamber of Congress (Broder, 2009). The bill, however, was not presented in the Senate
for either discussion or a vote. In the face of insurmountable opposition, including among Democrats,
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, a Democrat from Nevada, chose not to present the bill to the full
Senate. After pulling the bill from consideration, Reid commented, “It’s easy to count to 60. I could do it
by the time I was in eighth grade. My point is this, we know where we are. We know we don’t have the
votes [for a bill capping emissions]. This is a step forward” (Davenport and Samuelsohn, 2010).

5
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement federal climate change
regulations via the federal Clean Power Plan (Friedman and Plumer, 2017). Among the
insights revealed by this analysis are how Obama positioned the role of the bureaucracy,
particularly in an age of tremendous political polarization, how he invoked executive
power, and what his actions reveal about executive views of democratic institutions and
norms (Friedman and Plumer, 2017). Understanding such views is particularly relevant
since executive action tends to be easier to revise than congressional action, leading to a
relatively less durable and more fluid state of regulatory oversight.6 The impermanent
nature of executive action is precisely what has allowed the Trump administration to
rescind and replace the Clean Power Plan, essentially stripping it of its most impactful
regulations, through similar unilateral actions (EPA, 2019). Yet, addressing climate
change in any kind of a serious fashion will require long-term, sustainable, and adaptable
policy solutions that account for “new information and changing circumstances,”
something only a governance structure established by a legislative body can provide
(Lazarus, 2008). Clearly, presidential control is not “owned” or “abused” by any
particular political ideology, and this example underscores that control is more about
policy than it is about party (Moe, 1985; Rudalevige, 2016).
As mentioned, the “administrative presidency” and the “rhetorical presidency” are
commonly treated as two separate and distinct areas of scholarship, although they are
certainly complementary—like two sides of a coin, as some scholars have noted (Milkis,

6

While rulemakings are easier than drafting or amending new laws, they do require extensive time and
effort by agencies because of the stringent requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. However,
once promulgated, regulations have the force of law, and once implemented are often difficult to reverse.
See generally, Corenlius Kerwin and Scott Furlong (2011).
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2012). However, the two sides may have a compounding influence on one another that
alters the dynamic of presidential control in important ways. As a result, it may be more
descriptive and helpful to think about the administrative and rhetorical presidency as
notes on a sheet of music that are arranged and emphasized in various ways, at various
times, to affect the composition and adoption of policy. By viewing the administrative
and rhetorical presidency in this way, the possibility of a more interactive relationship
between the two themes of presidential control becomes easier to visualize. As this study
will demonstrate, adopting this perspective and studying the two in concert reveals
distinct shifts in rhetoric that correspond with and signal Obama’s switch to
administrative action. Such shifts are at least muted by treating the two strands of
scholarship separately. With this in mind, it is important to consider that the two
combined may very well magnify presidential influence in ways that have been
understudied (Whitford and Yates, 2009).
Importantly, as alluded to above, what we see from presidents today seems to be a
historically significant amplification of presidential power. In fact, not only did Obama
embrace and make full use of the administrative presidency beginning in 2010
(Rudalevige, 2016), but Trump has followed suit to reverse many of the executive actions
of his predecessor (Milkis and Jacobs, 2017; Konisky and Woods, 2018). Moreover,
Democrat presidential candidates have positioned themselves for the 2020 election by
proclaiming what they will accomplish in the first 100 days, not by legislation but by
executive order (Janes, 2019).
At the same time, the amplification of presidential control is accompanied by a
breakdown in legislative deliberation (Bulman-Pozen and Metzger, 2016; Milkis and
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Jacobs, 2017). Such a breakdown encourages presidents to bypass Congress and rely on
unilateral action to implement policies that avoid the crucible of scrutiny until they hit the
courtroom (Bulman-Pozen and Metzger, 2016). Following the path of least policy
resistance in this manner may normalize post-deliberative policy making—an implication
explored later in this study—where party politics and rhetoric dominate policymaking at
the federal level. Follow-on effects to this policymaking dynamic include deep political
polarization along with dramatic swings in policy, which act as both positive and
negative feedback loops (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Pielke Jr., 2018; Farina, 2010;
Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). Indeed, as this study reveals, the rhetorical presidency is
often used to rationalize the use of the administrative presidency, meaning that neither
can be examined separately if we are to understand them fully. By examining these two
areas of presidential control together as the administrative-rhetorical presidency we gain
a deeper and richer understanding about the way in which presidents—President Obama
in this case—wield these powerful policy tools (Milkis, 2012; Whitford and Yates, 2009).
Problem Definition
At its most fundamental level, the story of administrative action in the United
States is a story about the competitive control of its policies (Kagan, 2001). While this is
certainly true for policies in general, it is especially amplified for high-profile policy
problems that are by nature divisive, value laden, and therefore resist straightforward
solutions. Such problems are more than just complex or “ill-structured problems,” as
Herbert Simon (1973) referred to them, which lack clarity and possess interdependent
and poorly understood characteristics. As a result, wicked problems readily become
political in nature. Rittel and Webber (1973) originally referred to such problems as
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“wicked,” because in contrast to strictly technical problems, wicked problems are
difficult to define, defy resolution, and are teeming with often conflicting values (p. 160;
see also McBeth et al., 2010). In their original work, Rittel and Webber (1973) discussed
wicked problems in the context of urban planning. However, as is the case with certain
social policy issues (i.e., abortion, gun control, and immigration), some environmental
policy issues exhibit wicked characteristics. As described by Nie (2003), wicked
environmental problems are “value-based political conflicts grounded in deep core
human values…. [Such problems are] acrimonious, symbolic, intractable, divisive, and
expensive” (pp. 307-308). They also defy easy problem definitions and, echoing Simon,
embody poorly understood characteristics, solutions, and outcomes. Not surprisingly,
then, wicked problems are prone to political influences (McBeth et al., 2010) and, by
logical extension, presidential administrative action, or what Nathan (1976) called the
“Administrative Presidency.”
Such is the case with federal climate change regulations. This study focuses on
Obama’s shift away from a deliberative but ultimately unaccommodating congressional
process to a more favorable and responsive administrative rulemaking process, which
marked an important evolution in the development of climate policy at the federal level.
Obama’s administrative action also continues the longstanding practice of presidents
using the administrative presidency to advance policies that would otherwise be
impossible to implement through an unfriendly congressional process. The focus of this
study captures the beginning of Obama’s presidency, when he was focused on legislative
climate action, and continues through his pivot to administrative action, when he directed
the EPA to implement the Clean Power Plan by way of a relatively novel and empowered
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reading of the Clean Air Act (CAA)7. Notably, the Clean Power Plan followed a series of
international efforts, executive orders, and policy documents set forth by the Obama
Administration. It was designed to cap CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel electric generating
units and mandated a 32% reduction in CO2 emissions from 2005 levels by 2030 (Tarr,
2013). Two years later, the Trump Administration directed the EPA to rescind the Clean
Power Plan and has now replaced it with the Affordable Clean Energy rule, relying on a
more conservative and less prescriptive interpretation of the CAA (EPA, 2017; EPA,
2019). This “whipsaw” action has implications for industry, environmental and economic
interests, and the public by creating an uncertain regulatory environment, governed by
special interest lobbying and litigation instead of institutions and rules (McCabe, 2017;
Pielke Jr, 2018).
The federal climate regulation case therefore also has important implications for
democracy, including how it affects government accountability and responsibility. If
wicked problems can be resolved and modified by administrative action alone, then why
not less wicked, even ordinary problems (Lowi, 1979)? The use of administrative action
in this way not only leads to capricious policies, but it also aggrandizes the presidency,
disempowers Congress (Bulman-Pozen and Metzger, 2016), and normalizes a postdeliberative policymaking process. After all, if administrative action is all that is needed,
what then is the role of elected officials and the non-elected bureaucracy in making and
implementing public policy? A deeply divided public thus finds itself navigating evershifting policies, while different administrations devise and dismantle regulations along

7

Eric Groten (personal communication, September 7, 2017) commenting on the novel approach of using
§111(d) of the CAA to regulate CO2 emissions, as well as the difficulty in general of regulating CO2 given its
chemical properties and the current structure and content of the CAA.
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party lines. Of course, such a path frustrates important policy deliberations, encourages
partisan politics and populist appeals, and reinforces “an executive-centered party system
that relies on presidential candidates and presidents to pronounce party doctrine” (Milkis
et al., 2012). Although wicked problems such as climate change accentuate these themes
(Garsten, 2011), the expediency of post-deliberative policymaking may have spillover
effects on how all policy problems are addressed.
Importantly, the administrative actions of presidents, especially with respect to
wicked policy problems on which Congress fails to act, pose serious questions about the
proper role of the bureaucracy in America. As originally conceived by Nathan (1976), the
administrative presidency relies heavily on the belief that the president runs the
bureaucracy and should utilize it to implement policy preferences. In times of political
ossification, to modify a phrase from Clausewitz (1873), this often leads to the
continuation of legislation by other means—that is, by presidential administrative action
through the bureaucracy. Of course, the appropriate extent of administrative action has
long been debated in public administration. A central aspect of the debate is the proper
role of the bureaucracy in making and shaping policy, especially where competing values
are in conflict and interest groups seek to influence the decision-making process
(Friedrich, 1940; Finer, 1941; Frederickson, 1971; Lowi, 1979; Lewis, 2009). One
purpose of this study is to take a closer look at the administrative presidency’s use of the
bureaucracy, especially when buttressed by rhetoric, to shape policy on issues for which
Congress either lacks the appetite or ability to address.
A primary contribution this study endeavors to make is in the bringing together of
“administrative presidency” scholarship with “rhetorical presidency” scholarship in
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analyzing the EPA and the Clean Power Plan. “Rhetorical presidency” scholarship
examines how presidents use rhetoric to not only engage the public but also to define
problems, set the agenda, propose solutions, and indirectly influence political actors
(Tulis, 1987; Quirk, 2007). The term “rhetoric” is used in diverse ways by different
scholars (Garsten, 2011; Fleming, 1998), but for the purposes of this study, rhetoric is
defined in the classical, Aristotelian tradition as understanding what is persuasive and
using it to convince others under a variety of circumstances (Foss, 2009; Rapp, 2010).
Yet, the consequences of the rhetorical presidency, especially as it is evolving today,
extend beyond just the presidential use of rhetoric to persuade.
According to Tulis (2007), a president’s rhetoric concerns the “constitutional
order” and governance, and it is the vehicle by which contemporary presidents seek to
influence policy and govern the citizenry. Governance in this sense is taken to mean a
“government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services,” as well as
where the locus of control lies for such services, whether at the local or centrally
controlled, federal level (Fukuyama, 2013, p. 3). The rhetorical presidency thus describes
the willingness of presidents to bypass Congress and “mobilize the public as a routine
means of governance” (Stuckey, 2010, n.p.). Some scholars, such as Tulis (1987; 2007),
view this practice as destructive to American constitutional principles, while others see
its impact on democracy as ranging from unimportant (Edwards, 2006) to harmful (Hart,
1987; Jamieson, 1988). Regardless of how scholars have come to view it, the study of the
rhetorical presidency indicates that it is at least “a potentially potent force and a
significant political resource that needs to be understood and used wisely” (Stuckey,
2010, n.p.). It is important to point out that the “potentially potent force” of the rhetorical
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presidency described by Stuckey (2010) may very well be magnified when combined
with the administrative presidency, making the admonition to understand and use it
wisely all the more compelling. We are currently seeing that potentially potent force play
out today as President Trump’s rhetoric and administrative focus erodes and modifies
democratic norms (Milkis and Jacobs, 2017).
This dissertation lies at the intersection of these three scholarly areas: the wicked
problem of climate change policy making; the administrative presidency; and the
rhetorical presidency. Wicked environmental problems have garnered significant
attention from myriad policy scholars (see, for example, Sabatier and Jenkins, 2014;
McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan, 2014; Nie, 2003; Fahey, 2013). The administrative
presidency has been extensively studied over the years by political scientists and public
policy and administration scholars (Kagan, 2001; Moe, 1985; Moe and Howell, 1999;
Lewis, 2009; Rudalevige, 2005; Lowande and Milkis, 2014; Nathan, 1983). And the
rhetorical presidency has been studied by communication scholars and political scientists
over the past three decades (Aune, 2008; Moe and Howell, 1999; Lewis, 2009; Stuckey,
2010; Skowronek, 2002; Whitford and Yates, 2009; Kernell, 2006; Edwards, 2006; Tulis,
1987; Tulis, 2007). This dissertation aims to bring these different scholarly conversations
together in order to draw some larger conclusions about their implications on democratic
decision-making.
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Figure 1.1

Post-Deliberative Policymaking Model

As shown in Figure 1.1, this study brings these three concepts together under a
framework called the Post-Deliberative Policymaking Model, which reflects the postdeliberative nature by which modern presidents address wicked problems through the
administrative presidency and rationalize their actions through the rhetorical presidency.
The model also considers how administrative and rhetorical impulses may amplify and
co-produce each other. The framework forms the basis for this research and helps derive
richer insights about the post-deliberative policymaking process, in particular as it relates
to wicked problems. Ideally, the conclusions from this work will contribute to themes of
significant concern to public administration scholars, such as government accountability,
responsibility, and democratic principles (Lowi, 1979; Moe and Howell, 1999; Lewis,
2009; Stuckey, 2010; Tulis, 1987).
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Research Question
With Stuckey’s (2010) admonition in clear view—to better understand the
“potentially potent force” and “significant political resource” that is the rhetorical
presidency—this study begins by asking how President Obama rhetorically
constructed the role of the EPA, effectively weaponizing it to implement federal
climate change regulations.8 Importantly, the way in which presidents rationalize their
use of the administrative presidency may reveal an evolving view of the bureaucracy in
implementing policy, including under what conditions strong executive action is justified
and whether there are any limits to such action. Such an analysis may also provide
insights into whether the administrative presidency is simply one tool of executive power,
or reflects more broadly on how presidential action may be shifting how the executive
office and bureaucracy are viewed. While presidents undoubtedly push the boundaries of
their authority (Rudalevige, 2014; Milkis and Jacobs, 2017), situating Obama within the
various presidential traditions will help inform the question of whether we are seeing
something new in how governance and the role of the bureaucracy are positioned or
merely witnessing a later manifestation of earlier approaches under new circumstances.
In other words, is this a case of “old news happening to new people?”9 In any event, a
better understanding of the “potentially potent force” of a weaponized bureaucracy and
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The term “weaponized” is intended to be politically neutral, in the partisan sense of the word. In this
context, it is simply a description of how the EPA was utilized to address climate change policy that had
previously failed in Congress and would have been sidelined but for executive action via an administrative
agency. When considering a similar use of the EPA by a subsequent presidency to address the same policy
issue but in the opposite direction, the term becomes even more apt.
9
This quote comes from British journalist Malcom Muggeridge (n.d.). The entire original quote is “All new
news is old news happening to new people” (as quoted in Zacharias, 1997, p. 130).
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how presidents wield it may help reveal new insights about how the use of the
bureaucracy to implement presidential policies affects democratic principles.
With respect to this last point, Donald Kettl’s (2000) framework of how
presidents view governance and the role of bureaucracy is helpful in orienting the
analysis in various presidential traditions and will be explored in greater detail in Chapter
6. Borrowing from and modifying Kettl’s framework to augment this study will also help
anchor it within the broader public administration literature, and provide points of
comparison to previous presidencies, even as this study endeavors to extend those
boundaries.
Plan of the Dissertation
As this introduction highlights, this study brings together two strands of
scholarship in the context of the wicked problem of climate change and U.S. climate
policy at the federal level. This study focuses specifically on President Obama’s use of
the EPA to address climate change and rhetoric to rationalize his actions as a case study
in this policy area. The next chapter provides background on the progression of climate
policy at the U.S. national level and sets the stage for post-deliberative policymaking to
address climate change. In Chapter 3, the study sets forth the post-deliberative
policymaking framework, which contextualizes presidential control and rhetoric in the
wicked problem of climate change. The theoretical framework will be followed by a
more detailed literature review of presidential control and the two elements of control—
the administrative presidency and rhetorical presidency—that are the focus of this study.
In Chapter 4, the study shifts its focus to President Obama specifically by
orienting him within rhetorical and administrative presidency literature. Chapter 5 sets
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forth the methodology and highlights the contribution this study is making, in particular
as it relates to President Obama, by bringing the administrative and rhetorical
presidencies together and deriving a sum that is greater than the individual parts that have
heretofore been the focus academic scholarship. Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the
research, which identifies the key rhetorical strategies Obama employed and historically
situates how he positioned governance and the bureaucracy in his administration. In
Chapter 7, I explore implications of post-deliberative policymaking and then offer some
concluding thoughts about the study and future research pathways in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER TWO: A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. NATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY
In terms of sheer wickedness, there is perhaps no more wicked problem in
America than climate policy. So difficult has the formulation and adoption of policy been
that climate change has even been characterized as a “super wicked problem” (see, for
example, Levin et al., 2007 and 2012; Lazarus, 2008; Head et al., 2014; Grundmann,
2016). Such a characterization has been well earned, at least in part, because U.S.
climate politics have historically been hyper-partisan, and implementable policy solutions
are languishing at the federal level (Nisbet, 2009; Dunlap, McCright, and Yarosh, 2016;
Conlan and Posner, 2016). Indeed, climate change is unique in both its breadth of impact
and depth of discord, joining gun control, taxation, immigration, and abortion in the way
it hardens the partisan divide and “defines what it means to be a Republican or
Democrat” (Nisbet, 2009, p. 14). Thus, the wicked problem of climate change is among a
handful of issues that are acutely steeped in partisan politics, where presidential rhetoric
can both set the tone and amplify the way in which partisans view the problem (Zarefsky
2004). Combined with the way in which the underlying contributors of anthropogenic
climate change are embedded in the institutions, infrastructure, and economy of the
United States, such characteristics make climate change policy ripe for presidential
influence and, therefore, an ideal backdrop for studying the administrative and rhetorical
presidency.
Of course, federal environmental policy in the United States is greatly influenced
by the priority that presidents place on it at any given time (Vig, 2016). In periods of
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divided government, presidents can and do act unilaterally to push their environmental
agenda, whether seeking to expand or contract environmental protection (Vig, 2016).
Climate policy, while simultaneously being a part of and subsuming environmental
policy, is no different. While the backdrop of this dissertation is President Obama’s pivot
from the Waxman-Markey Bill to the Clean Power Plan, it is important to understand the
historical ebbs and flows of climate policy preceding the pivot. For the purpose of this
study, the historical ebbs and flows of climate policy begin in earnest in the late 1980s
and end in 2015. Like ripples in a pond, previous climate actions continue to influence
today’s climate decisions. The ripples also echo Kingdon’s (1984) pre-decisional
environment, what he calls the “the policy primeval soup,” where policies take shape
over time in a political, social, economic and, in this case, environmental struggle for life.
Understanding the pre-decisional environment of federal climate policy is thus important
for understanding how presidents act within it and sets the stage for Obama
administratively acting on climate policy through the EPA. Climate policy’s primeval
soup also provides important context for Obama’s use of rhetoric and administrative
action to advance his climate policies. With that in mind, this section describes the
historical context of U.S. climate policy, including an overview of climate change as a
policy problem, its general political context, the general policy responses available, and
the major policy responses leading up to the Waxman-Markey Bill and President
Obama’s shift to the Clean Power Plan.10
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Nathan Loewentheil (2012) has developed an helpful summary of major US climate actions that
preceded the Waxman-Markey bill, which this study has utilized and augmented to provide context for
President Obama’s decision to purse climate goals through the EPA.
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The focus of this study is primarily national. However, it is important to briefly
recognize and acknowledge the implications of the current dynamic at the subnational
level as well.11 As this study argues in Chapter 1, the congressional impasse over climate
policy has created a policy vacuum that is being filled by presidential unilateral action
through the administrative presidency. At the same time, space has been created for
subnational action through state and local governments as well (Bulman-Pozen and
Metzger, 2016). In fact, in many ways, state and even local governments have dominated
climate policy since the early 2000s (Rabe, 2011; Konisky and Woods, 2016; BulmanPozen and Metzger, 2016).
Two prominent ways state governments have dominated is by acting through
cooperative federalism and as “laboratories of democracy” in how they experiment with
regulatory oversight.12 First, federalism creates an opening for subnational action in
climate policy because, broadly speaking, although air emissions rules are set at the
federal level, states are responsible for implementing them (Konisky and Woods, 2016).
This has led to both collaboration and opposition that either expands or restricts federal
programs (Bulman-Pozen and Metzger, 2016). Second, state experimentation has led to
policies to restrict state and regional CO2 emissions through such programs as the
Regional Green House Gas Initiative, California’s cap-and-trade program, and requiring
specified amounts of electricity from zero-emission energy sources through renewable
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For a more in depth discussion of subnational climate policy, see Konisky and Woods (2016).
This phrase was originally coined by Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in his dissent of the Supreme
Court’s ruling in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (Brandeis, 1932). Although there is disagreement about
how the phrase should be understood today (see, e.g., Tarr, 2001)—as a progressive approach to bringing
about social change or a conservative approach to reinforcing states’ rights—the phrase is frequently
used to capture the idea that allowing states to experiment is helpful in sorting out complicated public
policies.
12
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portfolio standards. Elements of state programs have even worked their way into federal
programs, such as the Clean Power Plan’s trading mechanism. Notably, state actions have
cut both ways by actively promoting actions to address climate change and remaining
passively indifferent, if not entirely oppositional, to such actions, leading to a variety of
subnational policies and approaches (Konisky and Woods, 2016; Bulman-Pozen and
Metzger, 2016). Although beyond the scope of this study, these actions also have
important implications on the degree to which they either expand or restrict presidential
powers and even reinforce congressional inaction on wicked problems, including climate
change (Bulman-Pozen and Metzger, 2016).
At the national level, it is helpful to discuss the era of climate policymaking as
occurring in a series of successive periods. This is because U.S. climate policymaking
spans several decades now, is complicated by scientific, sociopolitical and socioeconomic
factors, and is dominated by divergent interests and conflicting values. Bodansky (2001)
has offered a helpful classification of the various stages of the international climate
change regime through the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 that also is useful in thinking about
the more amorphous U.S. climate regime. Although Bodansky’s stages (shown in Table
2.1 below) cover only a short period of time, they can be applied, with some
modification, to account for the period covered in this study.13
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In addition, it is worth noting that although there is some overlap with Andersen’s (1994) stages
heuristic, where public policy moves along the five consecutive stages of agenda-setting, formulation,
decision making, implementation, and evaluation, this dissertation does not examine U.S. climate policy
from a policy process perspective. The intent of identifying the phases here therefore is not to show how
they fit within the policy process, rather it is simply to point out that all policies go through stages of
development and to frame the ensuing discussion to help put the evolution of U.S. climate change policy
in context.
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As Bodansky (2001) describes it, the international climate change regime begins
with a “foundational period,” during which the scientific understanding of climate change
had progressed to a point where scientists became increasingly concerned about global
warming. The period covers the early stages of climate science through the mid-1980s.
The next stage covers the period from 1985 to 1988, which Bodansky (2001) terms the
“agenda-setting phase.” This is the stage Bodansky identifies as climate change evolving
from a scientific problem to a policy problem. Next is the “prenegotiation” period from
1988 to 1990, where national governments became seriously engaged in developing
policy solutions. The fourth stage covers the subsequent period through the May 1992
adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
and is called the “formal intergovernmental negotiations” phase. Bodansky’s final stage
is called the “postagreement” phase and covers the timeframe between the adoption of
the UNFCCC and the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, during which signatories
negotiated additional commitments codified in the Kyoto Protocol.
Table 2.1

Bodansky’s Climate Policy Stages

Stage 1: Foundational Period

Steady progression of scientific knowledge
followed by growing concern about climate
change.

Stage 2: Agenda-Setting

The evolution of climate change from a
scientific problem to a policy problem.

Stage 3: Pre-negotiation

Nations become seriously engaged in developing
policy solutions.

Stage 4: Formal Intergovernmental
Negotiation

Subsequent adoption of the UNFCCC treaty in
Rio in 1992.

Stage 5: Post-agreement

Negotiation of additional commitments codified
in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.
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While these stages are still useful today for outlining the progression of action to
address climate change on the international level, Bodansky’s approach needs to be
adapted so that it better explains national climate policy dynamics. The unsettled nature
of U.S. climate policy leaves a chasm between problem definition, possible solutions, and
politics, which continues to frustrate the adoption of an implementable policy solution at
the national level. Consequently, as will be discussed, the U.S. climate regime is out of
step with the international regime because of the strong opposition mounted by political
conservatives and economic interests to frame climate change as too uncertain to demand
action and, in any event, too expensive to do anything about it (McCright and Dunlap,
2000, 2003, 2010; Moser, 2010; Carmichael and Brulle, 2017; Brulle, Charmichael, and
Jenkins, 2012; Brulle, 2014). This opposition creates a domestic climate policy
environment that has been perpetually stuck in Bodansky’s prenegotiation stage and is
characterized by an ongoing struggle over problem definition, policies, and politics.
Considering this dynamic, then, the following borrows from Bodansky’s
international stages in setting the historical context for U.S. climate policy but accounts
for the key differences in how the two regimes have progressed. Because Bodansky’s
first two stages, the foundational period and agenda setting phase, characterize the early
stages of both international and domestic climate policy, they are incorporated as the first
two stages in this discussion. However, the similarities end there. U.S. climate policy
essentially remains in Bodansky’s third stage—prenegotiation—and resembles
Kingdon’s pre-decisional environment. As a result, this discussion refers to the third, and
current, stage as “pre-decisional policy formulation” to capture the ongoing, unsettled
nature of U.S. climate policy. Notably, because there is no U.S. equivalent to Bodansky’s
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final two stages of formal intergovernmental negotiations and postagreement, the predecisional policy formulation stage functions as the final stage, at least for the time being,
of U.S. climate policy. An additional important modification to Bodansky’s stages is in
accounting for the lack of clear breaks between the stages in the U.S. climate regime. For
example, as will be discussed, the United States essentially remains in the foundational
period because of how climate science is framed. As such, it overlaps and even interacts
with the agenda setting and pre-decisional policy formulation periods, which in turn
overlap and interact with one another. Such policy turmoil is not explicitly captured in
the clean progression of Bodansky’s stages but is an important dynamic to portray in U.S.
climate policy.
Given the wickedness of U.S. climate policy, the “messiness” of these stages is
expected and serves to highlight the primeval soup from which climate policy has been
unable to emerge (Kingdon, 1984). To accommodate the messiness, I first address the
foundational period, which covers early climate science through the introduction of the
Waxman-Markey Bill in 2009. I then recount the agenda setting period that ran from the
late 1980s through 2009 and the pre-decisional policy formulation period that ran from
the mid-1990s through 2015, when EPA issued the Clean Power Plan. Additionally, as
mentioned, because no climate policy has been adopted at the federal level, Bodansky’s
final two stages are yet to be determined in the U.S. federal climate regime and therefore
are not addressed.
The Foundational Period
As described by Bodansky (2001), the foundational period covers the timeframe
of when the accumulation of scientific evidence and understanding about climate change
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rose to the level of scientific concern and began attracting the attention of policymakers.
Almost from the beginning the policy implications of addressing climate change,
especially its economic considerations, led to a deep political divide in the United States
(Dunlap and McCright, 2008; Antonio and Brulle, 2011). As Antonio and Brulle (2011)
argue, the divide was intensified by a growing neoliberal hegemony, where political
conservatives sought to blunt the effects of environmental regulation in general and
climate policy in particular. However, before addressing the politicized dimensions of
climate change, it is first important to address the physical dimensions that gave rise to it
as a problem to begin with. In this section, I will first outline the history of climate
science by highlighting some of its key early milestones and focusing primarily on the
late-1980s through 2009. Importantly, scientific work on climate change is ongoing and,
while I briefly touch on recent climate science developments, the study takes a historical
approach to the state of climate science leading up to the rise and fall of the WaxmanMarkey Bill and Obama’s subsequent pivot to Clean Power Plan.
Preparing the Foundation
Our scientific understanding of climate change has advanced considerably since
its earliest origins and especially after the first coordinated international efforts to better
understand global warming and assess climate risk began in the late 1980s. Much of that
advancement has come from international efforts stemming from the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established in November 1988 (Bodansky, 2001). A
multitude of university scientists, scientific institutes, think tanks, and governmental
efforts, such as the U.S. National Climate Assessment, have also contributed significantly
to the climate change body of knowledge. In addition, international agreements beginning
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with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol have prompted various experiments on policy responses to
address climate change. Although not a comprehensive treatment of the science, the
following captures the major advances in climate science to provide a baseline of what is
meant by global warming and climate change, as well as why CO2 is the primary focus of
actions to mitigate potential harmful effects from it.
From a geologic perspective, the climate has been changing for as long as it has
been in existence (Hulme, 2016). However, the science of global climate emerged in the
nineteenth century through the scientific endeavors of a number of influential scientists.
In his 1824 essay to the Academie Royale des Sciences in Paris, French physicist JeanBaptiste Joseph Fourier was the first scientist to publish the asymmetric relationship
between solar heat entering and leaving the earth’s atmosphere, later referred to as the
“greenhouse effect” (Hulme, 2009). Later in the nineteenth century, British scientist John
Tyndall pioneered the theory that the accumulation of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other
gasses trap heat in the atmosphere preventing the earth from freezing (Selin and
VanDeveer, 2016). Tyndall concluded that the earth’s temperature is maintained at a
warmer temperature with increased levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. In 1896, Swedish
scientist Svante Arrhenius studied the effects of increasing levels of CO2 in the
atmosphere and, while his conclusions are mixed, advanced the scientific understanding
of climate sensitivity related to CO2 emission in the atmosphere (Hulme, 2009). The next
significant advancement in climate science came in 1938 when British engineer Guy
Stewart Calendar hypothesized human-caused (anthropogenic) climate change from CO2
emissions (primarily from burning coal as heat and fuel for power plants) (Hulme, 2009).
Calendar’s work was followed in 1956 by American Scientist Gilbert Plass, who
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concluded that increasing levels of CO2 in the atmosphere would contribute to significant
heat-trapping properties that warm the earth’s climate (Selin and VanDeveer, 2016).
Then, in 1960 Charles David Keeling began measuring CO2 levels in the
atmosphere from the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii. The Keeling curve (Keeling,
1960), as it became known, has remained one of the few undisputed facts in climate
science and was responsible for raising the level of concern and scientific consciousness
in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Bodansky, 2001). From this foundation, scientific
theory and advancements on climate change have progressed through continued
observations and modelling to measure and project the impacts of increasing levels of
CO2 in the atmosphere (Hulme, 2009). From the 1970s through the 1980s, substantial
improvements in technology and computing capability allowed the development of
increasingly sophisticated atmospheric computer models that contributed to increasing
scientific confidence in global warming projections, although computer modeling
remains inherently uncertain and a significant point of contention (Bodansky, 2001;
Tangney, 2019). Nonetheless, the modelling advancements led the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences in 1979 to conclude that if CO2 continued increasing in the
atmosphere “there is no reason to doubt that climate change will result and no reason to
believe that these changes will be negligible” (National Research Council, 1979, p. viii;
see also Bodansky, 2001).
Laying the Foundation
Although these early decades of the foundational period led to increasing
scientific warnings, the American public and policymakers remained mostly unconcerned
about climate change—that is, until the summer of 1988, which ushered in the hottest
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recorded year since the mid-1800s, a year in which two thousand temperature records
were set in the United States alone (Hulme, 2009; Leiserowtiz, 2005; McCright and
Dunlap, 2011). It was during that summer that Dr. James Hansen, climatologist and
director of the NASA Goddard Institute of Space Studies, testified before the U.S. Senate
Energy and Natural Resources Committee hearing about the projections of climate
modeling and the looming dangers of climate change. During his testimony, Hansen
announced “with 99 percent confidence” that global warming was indeed real, dangerous,
and changing the climate right now (The Greenhouse Effect, 1988, p. 39; Leiserowitz,
2005; Besel, 2013). Such claims were supported by atmospheric scientist and Nobel
laureate Stephen Schneider, who pioneered important improvements in climate modeling
and effects of climate change on biological systems (Ehrlich, 2010). Like Hansen,
Schneider openly engaged the public about his findings and argued that, despite inherent
modeling uncertainty, the response to the risk of dangerous climate change is predicated
on a value judgment and calls for caution in impacting the climate system through human
activities (Schneider, 1994; Nuzzo, 2005). Thus, an important development in the
growing scientific alarm during the foundational period was an increasing willingness of
scientists, who were normally more cautious and measured about projections (Besel,
2013), to begin going public about their concerns. These public declarations of scientific
revelations, combined with a careful examination of historical temperatures that indicated
an increasing trend since mid-century, led many in the policy community, including
scientists, interests groups, and elected officials, to push for United States action to
address climate change (Bodansky, 2001).
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In fact, the late 1980s and early 1990s were marked by increasing alarm about
global environmental issues, ranging from depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer,
deforestation, and loss of biological diversity to ocean pollution, acid rain, and increasing
levels of hazardous waste and hazardous waste sites affecting the public (Dunlap, 1995;
Vig and Kraft, 1997). So profound were the culmination of influences of global
environmental concerns that in 1988 Time magazine named the beleaguered planet Earth
“Planet of the Year” (Sancton, 1989). This was also an important time period for climate
change policy. The discovery of the ozone hole above the Antarctic and scientific
confirmation that it was related to chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) demonstrated in dramatic
fashion that anthropogenic effects on a global scale were indeed possible (Bodansky,
2001). Consistent with these trends, public perceptions about anthropogenic global
warming and eventually climate change began shifting, with increasing levels of the
public accepting that global warming was both worrisome and human-caused
(Leiserowitz, 2005). For example, a May 1989 Gallup survey asked the American
public: “How much do you personally worry about the greenhouse effect or global
warming?” The Gallup poll found that fully 63% of respondents worried either “a fair
amount” or “a great deal” about global warming (Leiserowitz, 2005). While subsequent
polls showed a decline in worry to just 50% by 1997, Gallup polls in 2000 and 2002
revealed an increase to 72% and 58% respectively (Brewer, 2002). As Leiserowitz (2005)
observes, virtually all polls taken between 1997 and 2005 found that a large majority of
Americans believed global warming was real. In fact, a Harris Interactive poll conducted
in September 2002 found that 74% responded they “believe the theory that increased
carbon dioxide and other gases released into the atmosphere will, if unchecked, lead to
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global warming and an increase in average temperatures” (PIPA, 2003, as cited in
Leiserowitz, 2005, p. 1435).
Such anthropogenic factors are, of course, complicated by natural variability.
Changes in climate, even dramatic ones, including rising temperature and CO2
concentrations, are normal and have occurred in both directions over the course of
millennia. A number of factors contribute to these changes, including solar cycles,
volcanic eruptions, and variability related to the Earth’s orbit (Hulme, 2009). As a result,
global mean surface temperatures rise and fall on an annual basis. However, natural
cycles and phenomena that interact with anthropogenic factors, such as increasing CO2
emissions, may be cause for alarm if such interactions mean increasing the global mean
surface temperature above what otherwise would occur naturally. Scientists observed just
such a trend during the foundational period. From 1906 to 2005, for example, the global
mean surface temperature increased by 0.74°C (IPCC, 2007). Importantly, in terms of
both science and climate policy, every year except one between 1995 and 2006 ranked as
one of the twelve warmest years on record (IPCC, 2007).14 The trend elicited substantial
alarm within the scientific and environmental communities. In 2007, referring to
increases in global air and ocean temperatures and rising sea levels, among other things,
the IPCC (2007) concluded, “warming of the climate system is unequivocal” (p. 2).
According to the IPCC, such warming was the result of anthropogenic forcing from the
combustion of fossil fuels, along with land use changes, resulting in increased greenhouse
gas and aerosol emissions. The IPCC also concluded that global greenhouse gas
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While there are more current statistics on temperature, I focus on this period because it coincides with
the timeframe studied in this dissertation, including the transition from the Waxman-Markey bill to the
Clean Power Plan.
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emissions from human activities increased by 70% between 1970 and 2004 (IPCC, 2007).
Such conclusions would be validated and punctuated in subsequent reports.
For example, in 2014, the IPCC updated its assessment with an even more dire
observation when it concluded in its Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014) that
“[h]uman influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases are the highest in history” (p. 2). The most recent U.S. National
Climate Assessment (Wuebbles et al., 2017) echoed the IPCC report in its affirmation
that the planet has experienced a global average temperature increase of about 1.8°F from
1901 to 2016 “and observational evidence does not support any credible natural
explanations for this amount of warming; instead, the evidence consistently points to
human activities, especially emissions of greenhouse or heat-trapping gases, as the
dominant cause” (Hayhoe et al., 2018, p. 73). Using the highest relative concentration
pathway (RCP 8.5), the report described the Earth’s climate system as “now changing
faster than at any point in the history of modern civilization, primarily as a result of
human activities” (Jay et al., 2018, p. 34) with projected impacts intensifying overtime,
the severity of which depends on actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
As the foundational period progressed, international concerns about climate
change grew more intense when policies to reduce greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
seemed mostly ineffective. Because of these growing concerns over anthropogenic
forcing, the IPCC developed the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) to
analyze the effect of increasing levels of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere
(Nakicenovic et al., 2000). According to the IPCC, “high agreement and much evidence”
exists that without changes to current policies, greenhouse gas emissions will increase by
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as much as 90% from 2000 to 2030 (Nakicenovic et al., 2000), leading to a projected
increase of global mean temperature of 1.1 to 6.4°C by the end of the 21st century. As a
result, the IPCC and others at the time projected increases in the frequency and severity
of extreme weather and sea level rise (IPCC, 2007), changing ecosystems (Leemans and
Eickhout, 2004), impacts to water resources, human migration (Barnett and Adger, 2003),
and ocean acidification (Caldeira and Wickett, 2003). Subsequent IPCC reports, such as
AR5 in 2014 and Global Warming of 1.5° C in 2018, also reaffirm previous findings and
raise a higher degree of concern for immediate action to dramatically reduce CO2
emissions to avoid the most harmful effects of climate change (IPCC, 2018). Recent
reports from the U.S. National Climate Assessment provide further scientific justification
for action and sound the direst warning to date that climate change is a clear and present
danger that must be addressed (Hayhoe et al., 2018).
Such projections created alarm during the foundational period among many in the
scientific and policy community. For example, the Stern Review (Stern, 2006) concluded
that the economic cost of doing nothing, or marginally helpful policies, outweighs the
disadvantages of significant and meaningful early action. Others called for significant
decreases in the use of fossil fuels to curb CO2 emissions and behavioral changes toward
the threat of climate change (O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Rising Tide, 2007).
However, CO2 emissions rose during this time period and climate change narratives, with
some exceptions to certain population segments, generally failed to engage the public and
spur action (O’Neil and Nicholson-Cole, 2009). In fact, climate change policy has been
plagued by somewhat of a paradox in the United States, where climate change
knowledge, awareness, and concern about its effects remain high, yet broad-based policy
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support and meaningful federal action remain illusory (Leiserowitz, 2006; Marquart-Pyatt
et al., 2011; Sarewitz and Pielke Jr., 2001; Lahsen, 2008).
The paradox is at least partly explained by the wicked nature of the climate
change problem. In other words, firmly held values and varying perceptions of what
“dangerous” climate change (Leiserowitz, 2005) means have overwhelmed the national
discourse. This is especially true in light of how such values and perceptions are
promoted and manifest in dueling movements, and even dueling scientific understandings
(McCright and Dunlap, 2000, 2003, 2010; Lahsen, 2008). The paradox also helps explain
why the foundational stage has yet to end—that is, while the policy remains unsettled, the
scientific foundation on which future policies will rest (even in the case of no policy)
continues to be built. It is also important to note that not only has the study of climate
emerged and scientifically evolved over the past two centuries, it has transcended normal
scientific process and entered a post-normal phase where it has taken on social, cultural,
ethical, and political dimensions as well (Funtowitcz and Ravetz, 1993; O’Neil and
Nicholson-Cole, 2009; McCright and Dunlap, 2000). As noted by Selin and VanDeveer
(2007), climate change policies in the United States are “social processes shaped by
participants’ interests and actions, as well as knowledge, norms, and ideas” (p. 2). Such
social processes, including perceptions of risk, are an active and vibrant component to
agenda setting, which is Bodansky’s second stage and a topic to which this study now
turns to continue setting the context for U.S. climate policy.
The Agenda-Setting Period
According to McCright and Dunlap (2011), climate change became a fixture on
the U.S. national agenda in the late 1980s and, by the early 1990s, had been well
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established by the environmental community and scientists as a problem deserving
significant attention from policymakers. However, like so many environmental policy
problems in the United States, there was little consensus among policymakers on the
severity of the problem or the policy solutions to address it. Indeed, virtually
simultaneous with the emergence of climate change as a problem on the national agenda,
it faced serious challenges from a countermovement determined to resist United States
action to address it (Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman, 2008; Dunlap and McCright, 2000,
2003; McCright and Dunlap, 2011; Brulle, 2014). To this day, the politicization and
polarization that defines the divide is represented on one side by left leaning and
predominantly Democratic political elites, environmental interests, and a substantial
majority of university and agency scientists who advocate for immediate, decisive, and
sustained mitigation to prevent the more extreme effects of climate change (McCright
and Dunlap, 2011; Alm et al., 2010). And on the other side are the right leaning and
Republican political elites, conservative think tanks, industry associations, and those
concerned with the economic consequences of policies addressing climate change
(McCright and Dunlap 2011; Alm et al., 2010; Layzer, 2007; Brulle et al., 2012;
Carmichael and Brulle, 2017; Brulle, 2014). As will be discussed, this has led scholars to
observe a deep ideological division in the United States breaking along political lines.
This division is characterized by an ongoing competition in framing and defining the
problem of climate change, which only served to harden the divide and create a lasting
policy sclerosis (Nisbet, 2009; Dunlap and McCright, 2008; Hamilton et al., 2015; RoserRenouf et al., 2014; Hart and Nisbet, 2012).

34
As McCright and Dunlap (2011) observe, climate change’s problem status has
been intensely contested through agenda setting, as well as framing, since it first emerged
on the U.S. national agenda in the late 1980s (Pralle, 2009; McCright and Dunlap, 2000).
Agenda setting is the process of gaining or losing the attention of the public and policy
community, and agendas exist to identify and prioritize the set of issues policymakers
will consider for disposition (Birkland, 1997). The protracted conflict that would come to
characterize climate policy agenda setting began to emerge during the summer of 1988
when a heat wave raised considerable alarm, prompting congressional hearings and a
defensive posture within the energy industry (Bodansky, 2001; Kolk and Levy, 2001). A
year later the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) was formed to represent major fossil-fuel
interests and to lobby against new federal regulations by calling into question the
reliability of scientific studies related to global warming (Layzer, 2007). Efforts also
involved undermining the legitimacy of the fledgling IPCC, which was created in 1988 to
advance the scientific understanding of climate change (Kolk and Levy, 2001).
While there has historically been a well-established opposition to the
environmental movement in general and environmental protections in particular, mainly
at the local or regional level, it was not until the mid-90s that the opposition moved from
a relatively diverse set of interests to a distinctively conservative movement, which
manifested in what has been called a “green backlash” (Switzer and Vaughn, 1997, pp.
xii-xiii; Brulle, 2000; McCright and Dunlap, 2000). As a result, “the global frame of
environmental problems” (McCright and Dunlap, 2000, p. 517) created by climate
change generated a strong conservative counter movement to delegitimize its status as a
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policy problem worthy of significant attention. As McCright and Dunlap (2000)
conclude,
[T]he controversy over global warming—and the resulting difficulty its advocates
have in keeping it on the public agenda—is not simply a function of waning
media attention, the ambiguities of climate change signals, or the complexities of
climate science, but stems, in large part, from the concerted efforts of a powerful
countermovement. (p. 517)
Part of the countermovement was the presentation of science that conflicted with the
growing consensus science of the IPCC. The movement sought to cast doubt on the
existing scientific evidence for climate change by emphasizing the inherent uncertainty
and potential bias of modeled climate projections, as well as the economic consequences
of being wrong on the policy (McCright and Dunlap, 2000, 2003, 2010; Lahsen, 2005,
2008; Layzer, 2007; Oreskes and Conway, 2010).15
Republican policymakers in particular sought to cast doubt on climate science to
preempt the adoption of national and international policies intended to address it. As
Lahsen (2008) observes, “Democrats and Republicans alike have contributed to the
gridlock that has undermined preventive national climate policy, but Republicans have
been particularly vehement in their opposition to the Kyoto Protocol in particular, and to
preventive policy on the issue in general” (p. 205). For example, congressional
Republicans, after gaining control of Congress in 1994, advanced an array of conflicting
views on climate change in congressional hearings (McCright and Dunlap, 2000, 2003,
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Such economic concerns were not without warrant, with Nobel economist William Nordhaus (2018)
recently finding that the optimal temperature target for climate policy is 4.5 C, more than twice as high
as the 2 C temperature target advocated by the IPCC and others. Nordhaus, while still arguing for swift
climate action, also found that targets lower than the optimal were both unlikely to be achieved with
current technology and economically harmful.
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2010; Oreskes and Conway, 2010; Lahsen, 2005, 2008). As a result, the conservative
counter movement was able to successfully oppose the climate change movement,
redefine the problem, and frame the ongoing debate in terms of uncertainty, doubt, and
economic imperatives threatened by preventive climate action. These simultaneous
actions of sounding and dampening the alarm of climate change during the foundational
period embody the heart and soul of agenda setting.
Agenda setting exists to identify and prioritize the set of issues policymakers
consider and is influenced greatly by the level of attention issues attract in the public
sphere (Birkland, 1997). Two important ways of attracting attention are through problem
definition and framing. As Schattschneider (1960) keenly observed, the ability to define
an issue “is the supreme instrument of power,” because it sets the terms for how it will be
addressed by policymakers (p. 68). Issues that are defined as immediate, catastrophic, and
proximate will find a higher place on the governmental agenda than issues that are
defined as uncertain, economically expensive, socially undesirable, or occurring in the
distant future (Litfin, 1994; Jasanoff, 1995; Leiserowitz, 2005; Pralle, 2009). Not
coincidentally, this was a dividing line in the climate change debate during the
foundational period, which was often dichotomously characterized, on one hand, as an
existential threat and the “defining issue of our time” and, on the other, as a “hoax” that is
too expensive and too uncertain to worry about.16 Both views are frames that played a
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The statement “the defining issue of our time” was used in reference to climate change in the February
26, 2014 report jointly issued by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Royal Society in the
United Kingdom, which sought to provide a clearly written reference document for policy makers,
educators, and others about the current state of climate change science. Senator James Inhofe stated in
July 28, 2003 speech on the Senate floor that “catastrophic global warming is a hoax” and went on to
highlight the expense of climate change mitigation and inherent uncertainties of climate change science.
See 149 CONG. REC. S10021 (July 28, 2003). Donald Trump, prior to being elected President of the United
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crucial role in shaping perceptions about climate change, and which created a
particularized and lasting impression based on a definite perspective (Goffman, 1974).
Importantly, framing also acts to increase or decrease issue salience, which affects an
issue’s agenda status and, in turn, both the level and type of attention it garners from
policymakers (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994, as cited in Pralle, 2009).
Such framing was pivotal in President Bush rejecting the Kyoto Protocol in 2000
on the basis of lingering scientific uncertainties and vital economic considerations
(Lahsen, 2008). The conservative countermovement subsequently was able to offer
powerful resistance to IPCC findings, international agreements, and arguments for
climate action set forth by President Obama, thereby forestalling climate action at the
federal level. The media was both eager and quick to pick up on the conflict and
counterclaims and amassed a substantial number of articles that framed climate change in
the conservative movement’s terms of “debate, controversy or uncertainty” (Antilla,
2005). Because of the way the media was presenting scientific frames and counter
frames, it contributed to an overall sense that the science was far less settled than was
actually the case among consensus views (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004). In other words,
in attempting to present a balanced view, the media presented a biased view of greater
controversy among scientists than was actually the case (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004).
As argued by McCright and Dunlap (2011), “Conservative think tanks and their allied
climate change contrarians successfully exploited American news media norms—
especially the ‘balancing norm,’ or the equation of ‘objectivity’ with presenting ‘both

States, echoed Inhofe’s characterization when he tweeted, “Global warming is a total, and very expensive,
hoax!” on December 6, 2013, as well as in in a number of subsequent tweets (Trump, D. (2013, December
6). Twitter. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/408977616926830592.
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sides of the story’—to achieve a level of media visibility incommensurate with the
limited scientific credibility of their claims” (p. 159).
The framing and defining of climate change during this period had important
implications on how the contrasting views of the conservative movement and climate
change advocates manifested in U.S. politics. As McCright and Dunlap (2011) argue, the
actions of the conservative counter movement have contributed to a deep division, falling
along ideological and political lines, among the public and elected officials that prevents
federal action to address climate change. For example, from a strictly ideological
standpoint, Democrats tend to support strong environmental protections, while
Republicans tend to oppose them for a variety of reasons (Layzer, 2007; Alm et al.,
2010). Although the classification is oversimplified and political views fall along a
continuum, American political affiliation is divided dichotomously among conservative
and liberal views, with independents acting as swing votes in the soft middle. Such a
dichotomy has deep roots in the core ideological foundations of members of both
political parties (McCright and Dunlap, 2011; Layzer, 2007). For example, political
conservatives place a high value on limited government, free markets, personal liberty,
and the preservation of private property right (Brulle, 2011). Political liberals, on the
other hand, are less averse to government intervention (including in free markets) and
place a high value on social responsibility and justice related to marginalized groups (i.e.,
collective welfare), limited access to and preservation of natural resources, and
environmental protection (McCright and Dunlap, 2007). Environmental protection in
particular infringes on conservation values through market intervention and restrictions
on property rights. However, liberal values see such protections as not only necessary but
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imperative to protecting collective welfare in both social and environmental terms
(McCright and Dunlap, 2007). Moreover, as Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) observe,
over the period from 1972 to 2007, there was an increasing relationship between
ideological views and party affiliation leading to a “marked increase in ideological
polarization between Democratic and Republican identifiers” (p. 547).
Like other wicked problems that have come before it, this polarization also
shaped climate policy. As Nisbet (2009) confirms, polling on climate change views
during this time reflected a deep polarization of opinions, “resulting in two Americas
divided along ideological lines” (p. 14). Not surprisingly, the divide broke along
predictably political lines, with Republicans questioning the certainty of the science of
climate change and urgency of its effects and Democrats endorsing climate science
findings and reacting with growing concern about possible deleterious effects on the
environment and society (Nisbet, 2009). Notably, the partisan divide was unaffected by
education or knowledge. Roser-Renouf et al. (201417), find that Americans held a slightly
more diverse, albeit similarly divided view, of global warming, resulting in six discrete
groups they refer to as “Global Warming’s Six Americas” (p. 5). However, despite a
more refined parsing of views on global warming, their data reflects a similar break along
the same ideological lines described by Nisbet. Thus, when considering U.S. climate
policy during the agenda setting period, whether one saw two or six Americas, the
conclusion is the same: climate policy was characterized by deeply divided and firmly
held ideological views that reflected its inherent wickedness.
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The original study was published in 2009.
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The nature of climate change also ensured that solutions would not materialize.
For those seeking to limit action on climate change, a stalemate during this time was a
win because the status quo preserved their underlying economic and political goals
(Layzer, 2007). On the other hand, those seeking immediate action were able to maintain
significant levels of scientific, public, and political support for addressing climate change
(Moser and Dilling, 2007). Therefore, while actionable solutions existed, such as capping
and/or taxing emissions and, as will be discussed next, were promoted on a near constant
basis, none were able to gain the broad and lasting support of policymakers and the
American public. Such a dynamic has preserved the salience of climate change despite
decades of federal inaction and without it falling victim to Downs’s (1972) issue attention
cycle. The reason for this persistent salience despite the “prolonged limbo” are generally
attributable the existence of either significant “benefits to a majority or a powerful
minority” (Downs, 1972, p. 41-42). Arguably, as highlighted above, majorities and
powerful minorities existed on both sides of the climate policy divide during the agenda
setting period thus making climate change both steadfastly salient and stubbornly
resistant to solutions.
The Pre-Decisional Policy Formulation Period
As discussed above, climate change policy has been and remains one of the most
complicated topics on the U.S. policy agenda. Not only is it characterized by deeply
divided views, it also is complicated by a multitude of both domestic and international
social, environmental, economic, and national security priorities. There are many actions
nations can take to regulate or reduce greenhouse gas emissions within their borders, and
the various actions nations implement contribute to the dynamics of U.S. policy
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considerations. While there are many possible starting points for addressing policy
formulation, some beginning in the 1970s and earlier, the 1987 Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) provides a helpful place to
begin. Although the Montreal Protocol addresses ozone depletion and not CO2, it marks
an important step in the formal, coordinated international effort to address atmospheric
emissions. And, importantly for this study, it is the international component of climate
change that formed both the impetus and basis for Obama’s domestic administrative
actions (Outka, 2016). The Montreal Protocol, which grew out of the Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, was signed in 1987 and eventually ratified by 198
countries including the United States (Montreal Protocol, 1987). The Montreal Protocol
provided the framework from which individual nations have acted to phase out the
production and use of ozone depleting substances (Litfin, 1994).
Policy Formulation’s Early Years
Following the lead of the Montreal Protocol effort and hoping to emulate its
success, international governments signed the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCCC) at the Rio Earth Summit in June 1992 to coordinate and
compel intergovernmental efforts to reduce the risk of climate change (UNCED, 1992).
The UNFCCC established the framework by which the now 195 signatory governments
agreed to the ultimate objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations, as defined
in Article 2, “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human induced)
interference with the climate system.” The UNFCCC was signed and ratified by the
United States under the George H.W. Bush administration. Countries that have ratified
the UNFCCC treaty (referred to as Parties to the Convention) meet annually in what is

42
called Conferences of the Parties (COP) to assess the effectiveness of climate action and
agree to future actions to limit the impact of climate change. Notably, the UNFCCC
treaty itself is not legally binding nor does it set mandatory greenhouse gas limits or
allow for any enforcement mechanisms. Rather, the UNFCCC is a framework that allows
for periodic amendments. As will be discussed, the first such amendments came in 1997
via the Kyoto Protocol, which established the first legally binding mandatory CO2
emission limits for agreeing parties. Therefore, while the UNFCCC encouraged
industrialized nations to reduce greenhouse gases, the Kyoto protocol was intended to
compel its signatories to do so, something the United States was unwilling to do then and
has proven unwilling to do to this day (Christoff, 2006; Nordhaus, 2010; Gupta, 2010).
And therein lies the rub for U.S. climate policy. From the nascent policies of the 1990s to
the well-formed domestic and international options that exist today, the U.S. Congress
remains stubbornly resistant to implementing any kind of federally mandatory
greenhouse gas reductions. While the myriad reasons for this are beyond the scope of this
research, the types of policy responses themselves are nonetheless helpful in setting the
context for the various attempts at implementing a United States response at the federal
level.
In 1993, at about the same time that international efforts to reduce CO2 emissions
were getting off the ground, President Clinton was attempting to initiate a British thermal
units (BTU) tax on domestic energy production (Greenhouse, 1993). The so-called BTU
tax was aimed at the heat content (measured in BTUs, which is the amount of heat
required to raise one pound of water one degree Fahrenheit) of various sources of energy,
such as coal, natural gas, petroleum, gasoline, nuclear, hydropower, and imports.
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Proponents favored the tax because it would have boosted conservation efforts they saw
as lagging, while critics saw the tax as unfair and having too harmful of an impact on the
economy and employment (Rosenbaum, 1993; Adler, 1996). Clinton reportedly favored a
BTU tax because of the revenue it would raise—$71.4 billion over 5 years and $22
billion per year thereafter—and the cachet it would garner amongst environmentalists
(Arndt, 1993). Clinton also believed the tax would be more equitably distributed around
the nation than other alternatives (Arndt, 1993). The tax narrowly passed along a strictly
party line vote in the House but died in the Senate. So unpopular was the BTU tax that
Republicans swept the ensuing 1994 House elections, removing 28 Democrats who had
supported the tax in what became known as “getting BTU’d.” (Wessel, 2009;
Loewentheil, 2013). The outcome of the 1994 House elections had a chilling effect on the
reception of the Kyoto Protocol in the ensuing years.
With echoes of the BTU tax and fallout of Democrats who supported it, the
Senate voted 95-0 in July 1997 to adopt the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which expressed the
sense of the Senate that the United States should not sign onto any protocol or agreement
related to the UNFCCC during the Kyoto or subsequent negotiations that would mandate
new CO2 limits for developed nations without also mandating commitments for
developing nations or that would seriously harm the U.S. economy (Byrd-Hagel
Resolution, 1997). In other words, the resolution made “meaningful” participation of
developing countries a conditio sine qua non for ratification (Byrd-Hagel Resolution,
1997). In December of the same year, the UN Conference of the Parties adopted the
Kyoto Protocol, which became the first international treaty to place a cap on greenhouse
gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol was based on the understanding that global warming
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was occurring and extremely likely to be caused by human activity (Kyoto Protocol,
1997). As a result, it was intended to address the UNFCCC objective to ameliorate global
warming by reducing greenhouse gas atmospheric concentrations to "a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (Kyoto Protocol,
Article 2, 1997). The first commitment period was 2008—2012, and reductions were
predicated on the basis of common but differentiated responsibilities that obligated
developed countries to shoulder the responsibility for reducing emissions by 5% below
1990 levels by 2012 (Kyoto Protocol, 1997). Vice President Al Gore and Senator Joe
Lieberman (D-CT) helped lead the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol, and the Clinton
Administration signed on to it but never submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification
because it did not conform to the requirements specified in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution
(McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002). The level of support for the Byrd-Hagel Resolution
during this time period, combined with ratification requiring a 2/3 majority vote in the
Senate, marked the beginning of the end of the Kyoto Protocol in the United States.
The Bush Years and Climate Policy Retrenchment
Opponents of the Kyoto Protocol rejected it as a “deeply flawed agreement that
manages to be both economically inefficient and politically impractical” (McKibbin and
Wilcoxen 2002, p.107). In fact, after years of detailed negotiations on its concrete
implementation, the protocol became more of a symbol than a solution since it
accomplished very little in terms of global emission reductions and lacked the requisite
enforcement mechanisms to make it meaningful (Barret, 2008; Nordhaus, 2010; see also
Buchner et al., 2002 and Springer, 2003 for historic surveys of Kyoto assessment
studies). Indeed, such views led President George W. Bush to officially remove the
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United States’ signature from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, calling it “fatally flawed” and
“exempting 80% of the world, including major population centers such as China and
India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the US economy’’ (White
House, 2001; C-Span, 2001). Later referring to the Kyoto Protocol as too costly and
unfounded in science, Bush called for additional research and new voluntary measures to
curb greenhouse gas emissions (Pizer and Kopp, 2003). Currently, the US, China, and
Canada (which withdrew in 2012)—3 of the 4 largest greenhouse gas emitters in the
world—are not part of the Kyoto Protocol. While the protocol was at the center of
climate policy during this era, its weak enforcement mechanisms, absence of
commitments from countries with the largest CO2 emissions, and general inability to
incentivize reductions from signatory nations, made the treaty more of a symbol than an
effective tool against increasing CO2 emissions. (Nordhaus, 2010; Hulme, 2009). In the
immediate years after the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated and abandoned, a number of
climate bills were introduced into Congress, most of which never made it to the floor of
the House or Senate for a vote. For example, the most noteworthy of the climate bills at
the time was the Clean Power Act (S. 556) sponsored by Senator Jeff Jeffords (I-VT).
The bill would have mandated reductions of multiple emissions from electric generating
units, including CO2, SO2, NOX, and mercury (C2ES, n.d.). With respect to CO2, the bill
would have required CO2 to be reduced to 1990 levels by 2008, which would have placed
in line with Kyoto Protocol goals (C2ES, n.d.). While the Clean Power Act was reported
out of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, it was never voted on by
the full Senate (C2ES, n.d.).
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These early 2000 events signaled an important dynamic in the evolution of U.S.
climate policy as the Bush administration sought to disrupt the policy formulation process
by forestalling not only international action on climate change but domestic
administrative and legislative action as well (Byrne, et al., 2007; Rosenbaum, 2016). As
the international community struggled to develop cooperative policies that would lead to
actual CO2 reductions, the United States under Bush prioritized technological
advancement of both fossil fuel (to reduce CO2 intensity) and nuclear energy over all
other options, including support for renewable resources like wind and solar (White
House, 2004; Byrne, et al.,2007). At the same time, the George W. Bush administration
continued to question the urgency and need for immediate solutions to address climate
change (Antonio and Brulle, 2011; Brulle, 2014; Layzer, 2007; Rosenbaum, 2016). For
example, EPA administrator Stephen Johnson determined that CO2 was not a pollutant
and therefore the agency was not required to regulate it under the CAA (Rosenbaum,
2016). A coalition of states then sued EPA to compel it to regulate CO2 in a case that
eventually went to the Supreme Court. In 2007, in a landmark decision for climate policy,
the Supreme Court agreed with the states in Massachusetts v. EPA and ruled that CO2
could endanger human health or the environment under the CAA (Massachusetts vs.
EPA, 2007). Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed the EPA to determine whether
CO2 did pose such a risk, called an endangerment finding, which after a series of lawsuits
EPA later did in 2009 under the Obama administration.
It is worth noting that these Bush era actions did not occur in isolation from the
agenda setting influences discussed in the previous section. On the contrary, they
reflected the conservative movement’s energy policy priorities endorsed by the National
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Energy Policy Development Group, led by Vice President Cheney, which promoted
‘‘dependable, affordable and environmentally sound’’ energy resources predicated on
expanding natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy (National Energy Policy Development
Group, 2001). Importantly, these policy priorities not only reflected the influence of the
conservative movement’s agenda setting activities, they also foreshadowed and shaped
how climate policy formulation would proceed over the next decade.
The 2000s: A Legislative Dead End for Climate Policy
Despite these efforts by the Bush administration, Congress continued to explore
opportunities to legislate greenhouse gas emissions as several pieces of legislation
continued to evolve. For example, from 2003 to 2004, five major climate bills were
introduced in the House and Senate. Notably, several of the more prominent
environmental interest groups, such as Environmental Defense Fund and Natural
Resources Defense Council, began working with Republicans on climate legislation
(Loewentheil, 2013). The result was the McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act (S.
139) in 2003 (Symons, 2003). The bill was also co-sponsored by then Senator Obama and
Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME). The bill would have set an economy-wide cap on CO2
emissions to year 2000 levels by 2050 and required reductions in CO2 and other
greenhouse gases emitted by electric generating units, refineries, and other industrial
sources (Climate Stewardship Act, 2003). The bill also would have created an emissions
cap and allowed market-based trading of emissions allowances to ease impacts on the
U.S. economy (Climate Stewardship Act, 2003). Also of note was the stated purpose of
the bill that, along with reducing greenhouse gases, would have promoted scientific
research on climate change and a reduction of United States dependence on foreign oil,
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foreshadowing the energy independence and American exceptionalism that Obama would
later articulate in promoting his climate policies (Besel, 2012).
The McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act was ultimately defeated 55-43
but was reintroduced in 2005 as the Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act (Symons,
2003; Climate Stewardship Act, 2005). The 2005 version of the bill (S. 1151) was similar
in nature to the 2003 bill but also added provisions for government-led research and
development to commercialize new energy technologies, in particular for nuclear energy.
The bill also called for a cap of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions at year 2000 levels with
no additional reductions and a trading scheme to reduce economic impacts (Climate
Stewardship Act, 2005). The bill was ultimately defeated in the Senate on a vote of 3860. The Senate was able to muster enough votes in June 2005 to pass a resolution calling
for the enactment of greenhouse gas legislation to reverse the impact of climate change
without also harming the U.S. economy (reminiscent of the Kyoto Protocol). The
resolution also encouraged major U.S. trading partners to take comparable action
(Kintisch, 2005).
In January 2007, McCain and Lieberman reintroduced the Climate Stewardship
and Innovation Act one last time. The 2007 version of the bill collected additional bipartisan co-sponsors and modified the previous versions by adding a provision that would
gradually lower the greenhouse gas emission cap to an amount equivalent to about onethird of 2000 levels by 2050. Similar to the previous versions, the 2007 bill would have
allowed regulated entities to address compliance costs and operational requirements
through trading, banking, and borrowing emissions credits. The bill also would have
allowed the creation of “offset” credits by inducing non-covered entities to reduce their
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emissions as well or capture and store greenhouse gases (Climate Stewardship Act,
2007). Multiple other climate change bills were floated in both the House and Senate
during this timeframe but none manage to garner enough support to be seriously
considered. For example, some of the more notable pieces of legislation included bipartisan support for federal renewable energy portfolio standards, or minimum generation
requirements, which established targets ranging from 10%—20% by 2020 to 20% by
2027 (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2005, as cited in Byrne et al., 2007). The
Republican-led Senate also passed bills containing national renewable portfolio standards
(RPS) targets of 10% by 2020 in 2002, 2003, and 2005 (Belyeu, 2005, as cited in Byrne
et al., 2007).
The Rise and Fall of the Waxman-Markey Bill
The policy formulation activity throughout the decade culminated in the most
consequential and historic climate policy action in the United States. In the wake of
floundering policy options, the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) formed in
2006 as a collaboration between businesses and major environmental organizations to
compel the federal government to take action on climate change (USCAP, 2006). In
advocating for its policy solutions, USCAP developed an aggressive blueprint in January
2009 for legislative action to help guide the drafting of legislation (Loewentheil, 2013).
Then, in March 2009, Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Ed Markey (D-MA) unveiled draft
climate legislation, which largely reflected the USCAP blueprint (Loewentheil, 2013).
The bill was introduced into the House as the American Clean Energy and Security Act
(H.R. 2454), commonly referred to as the Waxman-Markey Bill.
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Among the more notable provisions of the Waxman-Markey Bill were the
creation of two cap-and-trade programs that would have utilized market incentives to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, primarily from CO2, and mandated that 20% of
electricity sales by 2020 be met by renewable energy and energy efficiency transitions
(CBO, 2009). The cap-and-trade program would have limited the total amount of
greenhouse gases that could be emitted by reducing emissions over the 2012 to 2050
period. Reductions of 3% would have been required in 2012, and further reductions
would have occurred incrementally until 2050, when an 83% reduction would have been
required. After an initial, partial distribution of allowances, regulated entities then would
be able to buy or sell allowances on the market, which also would have been established
by the bill (CBO, 2009). In addition, the Waxman-Markey Bill included an expansion of
savings from energy efficiency, including improvements to building codes, appliance and
lighting standards, and more expansive residential and commercial retrofit programs.
Incentives would have been collected from the sale of allowances and made available for
certain energy efficiency initiatives (CBO, 2009). The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO, 2009) projected at the time the Waxman-Markey Bill would have a net economic
benefit, increasing revenues by $873 billion from 2010 to 2019 and direct spending by
$864 billion over the same period. Moreover, the CBO (2009) estimated that enacted
legislation would reduce budget deficits by $9 billion from 2010 to 2019 and limit the net
tax burden of households to an average of 0.2% of after-tax income. According to the
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (Select Committee, 2009), the
Waxman-Markey Bill may have resulted in as much as $350 billion of net energy bill
sales and 424,000 new jobs by 2030.
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The Waxman-Markey Bill passed the House of Representatives on June 26, 2009,
by a vote of 219-212—the first bill of its kind passed in either chamber of Congress to
address climate change (Broder, 2009). However, the bill was not presented in the Senate
for either discussion or a vote. In the face of insurmountable opposition, including among
Democrats, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, a Democrat from Nevada, chose not to
present the bill to the full Senate. After pulling the bill from consideration, Reid
commented, “It’s easy to count to 60. I could do it by the time I was in eighth grade. My
point is this, we know where we are. We know we don’t have the votes [for a bill capping
emissions]. This is a step forward” (Davenport and Samuelsohn, 2010).
Despite the step forward, there was no meaningful additional legislative action on
climate change in the years 2009-2016. The primary reason for this was an expansion of
conservative representation in Congress, which eventually led to Republicans’ controlling
both the House and Senate during the time period (Lowande and Milkis, 2014;
Rudalevige, 2016a). However, the rise and eventual fall of the Waxman-Markey bill also
underscores the continuing policy debate surrounding the regulation of CO2. On the one
hand, as noted by law scholar Rachel Brewster (2010), many of the bill’s proponents
specifically tied it to broader efforts to regulate CO2 at the international level and, thus,
saw the legislation as a means of laying a foundation and creating momentum for a future
international agreement on climate change. On the other hand, opponents were clearly
opposed to the policy implications of CO2 legislation, either because of costs imposed on
industry or out of fear that it would open the door to more comprehensive climate change
regulations, even though it was tied to the same market mechanisms that were
successfully implemented to regulate sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions in the 1990s
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(Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). Schmalensee and Stavins (2013) observe that it is
painfully ironic that the same broadly supported and successful market approach used to
reduce SO2 failed to garner support from conservative legislators, who tend to favor
market mechanisms, to reduce CO2. Of course, one of the primary reason CO2 cap-andtrade failed was an underlying opposition to climate change regulation, rather than
opposition to the mechanism of regulation itself (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). This
irony underscores the influence of agenda setting and framing on climate change policy
formulation and is yet another manifestation of its wicked nature.
Obama’s Administrative Shift
Having failed to move climate legislation through Congress, among other
legislative priorities, Obama shifted to an administrative presidency strategy, in this case
relying on administrative agencies to advance his climate policy agenda (Lowande and
Milkis, 2014; Rosenbaum, 2016). Following a series of presidential memos to agency
heads that directed greenhouse gas reductions through agency rules, including a memo
from the Council on Environmental Quality requiring climate change assessments as part
of federal environmental reviews, federal agencies began taking incremental steps to
address climate change (Harris and Davenport, 2015). The most significant of these
actions became the cornerstone of Obama’s national and international climate policy
when CO2 cap-and-trade was revitalized in 2013. Leveraging his Climate Action Plan
and an empowered reading of the Clean Air Act following the 2007 Massachusetts v.
EPA Supreme Court decision, Obama directed the EPA to promulgate regulations to
reduce CO2 emissions from existing power plants using a somewhat obscure section of
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the Clean Air Act, referred to as the Clean Power Plan by the administration (Presidential
Memo, 2013; Rudalevige, 2016; Groten, 2015).
Following several years of rulemaking activity in which over 4 million public
comments were received on the proposed rule, the EPA released the Clean Power Plan in
final form on August 3, 2015, thereby establishing the first ever nationwide limits on
carbon pollution (EPA Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 2015). The Clean Power
Plan was designed to allow states as much flexibility as possible to achieve the CO2
standards established for them, including the opportunity to design their own plans,
submit multi-state plans, and establish interstate trading programs (EPA Carbon Pollution
Emission Guidelines, 2015). Enforceable CO2 emissions limits would begin in 2022 and
gradually become more stringent until full implementation of the rule by 2030 (EPA
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 2015). The rule relies on section 111(d) of the
CAA, which authorizes EPA to establish emission guidelines for existing sources that are
based on the “best system of emission reduction,” or BSER (EPA Carbon Pollution
Emission Guidelines, 2015). States then are required to establish performance standards
that reflect the BSER for regulated categories. In setting the BSER, EPA developed a
minimum performance level for existing fossil fuel plants, which established mandatory
emissions reductions for each state. EPA then identified three building blocks that could
be utilized to achieve reductions: 1) improving heat rates at power plants, resulting in
lower CO2 emissions rates; 2) shifting energy generation from higher-emitting sources
(such as coal and oil generating units) to lower-emitting combined cycle natural gas
plants; and 3) switching from fossil fuel-fired electricity generation to renewable energy
generation (EPA Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 2015).
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To allow states and power plant owners time and flexibility to achieve emissions
reductions, EPA provided an interim period to phase in the reductions that consisted of
three successive compliance steps—2022 to 2024, 2025 to 2027, and 2028 to 2029—with
full compliance by 2030 (EPA Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 2015). States were
also given the option of defining state-specific interim milestones as long as the state
could demonstrate that its plan would achieve the interim period reduction requirements.
To encourage early action, EPA offered incentives in the form of reduction credits for
early investments in renewable energy and low-income energy efficiency programs (EPA
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 2015). EPA projected the Clean Power Plan
would achieve a 32% reduction in electric sector CO2 emissions by 2030, relative to 2005
levels (EPA Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 2015).18 EPA analysis also indicated
that implementing the rule could save the United States $20 billion in climate-related
costs and provide anywhere from $14 billion to $34 billion in public health benefits (EPA
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 2015). The EPA estimated that the average
household would see annual savings of $85 on electricity bills in 2030 (EPA Carbon
Pollution Emission Guidelines, 2015).
Trump’s Administrative Rebuttal
Given the wickedness of climate change and especially climate policy in the
United States, it is only fitting that the significant and historic move by the Obama
administration to unilaterally act on climate change would face its own headwinds. In
fact, the Clean Power Plan faced an onslaught of court challenges by way of 15 separate
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The base year of 2005 was chosen because it represented the peak year of CO2 emission in the U.S. at
that time (EIA, 2017).
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cases originating from a variety of parties, including 26 states from various coalitions and
a multitude of industry parties (Tsang and Wyatt, 2017). The challenges were primarily
centered on EPA’s statutory interpretation of the CAA, legislative history of the relevant
portions of the act, and what was characterized as an intrusion on state and FERC
jurisdiction over energy matters (Tsang and Wyatt, 2017)
One coalition was led by West Virginia, the largest coal-producing state in the
nation, which argued that the Clean Power Plan exceeded the EPA’s authority under the
CAA and violated states’ rights over the regulation of electrical power within their
borders (Scobie, 2016). In addition, numerous state, municipal, and industry parties sided
with EPA and intervened on behalf of the agency. Among the intervenors supporting
EPA was a coalition of 18 states and cities comprised of all of the states with CO2 caps
and emissions trading programs (Clancy, Harrington, and Witte, 2016). The cases were
consolidated into a single case by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (D.C.
Circuit), West Virginia v. EPA, which denied a request to suspend the implementation of
the Clean Power Plan pending the outcome of the case (Scobie, 2016). In an unusual
procedural step, states and industry parties then applied to the U.S. Supreme Court for a
stay of the rule (Tsang and Wyatt, 2017). In an equally unusual response without
explanation, the Supreme Court agreed and ordered that the rule should be paused until
all legal challenges have been heard (Tsang and Wyatt, 2017). This was a significant
blow to Obama’s administrative pivot, since never before had the Supreme Court issued a
stay on regulations prior to an initial review by a federal appeals court (Scobie, 2016).
Because the D.C. Circuit would not be able to conclude the case before a new
presidential administration took office in 2017, the Supreme Court’s decision meant the
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Clean Power Plan could be rescinded if the next administration were opposed to the
regulations. As it turned out, the next administration was indeed opposed to the
regulations.
Shortly after coming into office, President Trump signed Executive Order 13783,
Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Strength, which specifically called out
the Clean Power Plan for regulatory review and possible rescission. The executive order
directed executive-level departments and agencies to, among other things:
[R]eview existing regulations that potentially burden the development or use of
domestically produced energy resources and appropriately suspend, revise, or
rescind those that unduly burden the development of domestic energy resources
beyond the degree necessary to protect the public interest or otherwise comply
with the law. (White House, 2017, n.p.)
Trump’s executive order also rescinded multiple Obama-era executive orders and policies
related to climate change and made it the policy of the United States “to take appropriate
actions to promote clean air and clean water for the American people, while also
respecting the proper roles of the Congress and the States concerning these matters in our
constitutional republic” (White House, 2017, n.p.). As the EPA applied it, Executive
Order 13783 required the agency to “prioritize the protection of jobs and energy security,
while also ensuring that [its] policies provide clean air and clean water for all of our
citizens” (U.S. EPA, 2017a, n.p.).
The full effect of the executive order on climate policy was felt in October 2017,
when EPA proposed a rule rescinding the Clean Power Plan in its entirety and leaving
open the possibility of replacing it with another rule (U.S. EPA, 2017b). EPA’s proposal
was largely legal in nature, focusing on arguments that the Obama EPA exceeded the
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agency's statutory authority under section 111(d) of the CAA,19 while its current
proposed interpretation was the most appropriate reading of the statute (EPA Repeal of
Carbon Emission Guidelines, 2017). In fact, the EPA entirely avoided discussing climate
change, climate science, or any scientific basis for the rulemaking, using the terms
“climate change” and “climate” in only a few instances in the proposal. Instead, the EPA
argued the CAA “text, context, structure, purpose, and legislative history,” along with the
agency’s prior “understanding and exercise of its statutory authority,” were incorrectly
interpreted and inappropriately applied in the Clean Power Plan (p. 48036). The EPA also
argued that its proposed rule was consistent with Supreme Court precedent in UARG vs.
EPA that an interpretation having “vast ‘economic and political significance’” (i.e., the
Clean Power plan) required a clear statement of congressional intent assigning such
authority to an agency, which it argued the CAA does not (U.S. EPA, 2017b, p. 48042).
According to the Regulatory Impact Analysis included in the proposal, the repeal would
result in forgoing an estimated $18.8 billion in energy efficiency benefits in 2030 and
$500 million in unrealized climate benefits, while avoiding up to $33 billion in
compliance costs in the same year (U.S. EPA, 2017b).

19

In terms of the costs and benefits of the proposal, according to the accompanying Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA) (U.S. EPA, 2017c), while the CPP relies on global costs and co-benefits in its cost-benefit
analysis, the repeal proposal limits its analysis to potential impacts of climate change anticipated to occur
within U.S. borders. Thus, EPA is comparing domestic costs with domestic benefits in the repeal proposal,
whereas the CPP compared domestic costs with global benefits, plus an adder for co-benefits of reducing
other pollutants. EPA’s methodology was heavily criticized (and applauded) but is not directly
challengeable in court, although opponents nonetheless sought to discredit it in making broader
arguments against the validity of EPA’s justification of the proposal. According to the RIA (U.S. EPA,
2017c), the repeal would result in forgoing an estimated $18.8 billion in energy efficiency benefits in 2030
(p. 9) and $500 million in unrealized climate benefits (p. 12), while avoiding up to $33.3 billion in
compliance costs in the same year (p. 12).
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Then, in August 2018, the EPA proposed the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE)
rule as a replacement of the Clean Power Plan (EPA Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse
Gas Emissions, 2018).20 The ACE rule was proposed under the same section of the CAA
as the Clean Power Plan but with a dramatically different regulatory framework. While
the ACE rule defined the best system of emissions reduction (BSER) as certain types of
heat rate improvements, called “candidate technologies,” similar to the Clean Power Plan,
the EPA did not establish emissions standards for each state or build generation shifting
to low- or no-CO2 emitting resources (EPA Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, 2018). Instead, EPA applied a more conservative interpretation of section 111
by establishing a “guideline” that identifies the BSER to use in setting standards of
performance. States then would be required to submit a plan to EPA that includes
standards of performance (i.e., amount of CO2 reductions achievable) for each affected
source, which only included coal plants in the ACE rule (EPA Emission Guidelines for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 2018). Thus, the EPA took a less prescriptive approach than
the Clean Power Plan and gave states more flexibility in developing plans to comply with
the ACE rule (Detterman, Tolley, and Barnes, 2019). EPA projected power sector-based
CO2 reductions from full implementation of the ACE rule of 1% to 2% percent from a
“no CPP” baseline, or an increase in CO2 emissions of about 1% to 3% above the Clean
Power Plan (U.S. EPA, 2018a, p. 3-15).
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The final rule, which was published in the Federal Register July 8, 2019 in substantially similar form as
the proposal, retains the key components of the proposed rule in that CO2 reductions are not mandated,
but instead EPA provided guidelines for limiting emissions based on the proposed BSER “candidate
technologies” (EPA Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, 2019).
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Notably, the reductions are similar not because the ACE rule achieved similar
reductions but because of power sector changes that have been driving a transformation
in the U.S. power sector over the past 16 years (U.S. EIA, 2017). Such changes include
the retirement of older coal units, increasing environmental compliance costs, renewable
energy policy, low electricity growth, and, the most significant change, a steep drop in
the price of natural gas resulting from the shale gas boom in the mid-2000s (U.S. DOE,
2016). Based on its modeled projections of the proposed ACE rule, EPA (2018b)
concluded that “when states have fully implemented the proposal, U.S. power sector CO2
emissions could be 33% to 34% below 2005 levels, higher than the projected [32%] CO2
emissions reductions from the [Clean Power Plan]” (n.p.). While EPA’s statement was
intended to preemptively address criticism that the ACE rule would do little or nothing to
reduce CO2 emissions compared to the Clean Power Plan, it is actually emblematic of the
larger power sector transformation. As a result, regardless of regulatory action, energyrelated CO2 emissions in the United States have been trending downward since 2007 and
are now approaching 1990 levels, although emissions are expected to increase in future
years (U.S. EIA, 2019b, p. 19421).
Conclusion
In many ways, the pre-decisional policy formulation period reflects the agenda
setting period that preceded and overlapped it. Beginning in the 1990s, U.S. climate

21

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2019b), “energy‐related CO2 emissions
account for about 98% of U.S. CO2 emissions. The vast majority of CO2 emissions come from fossil fuel
combustion, with smaller amounts from the non‐combustion use of fossil fuels, as well as from electricity
generation using geothermal energy and non‐biomass waste. Other sources of CO2 emissions include
industrial processes, such as cement and limestone production. Data in the U.S. Energy Information
Administration's (EIA) Monthly Energy Review (MER) Tables 11.1–11.6 are estimates for U.S. CO2
emissions from energy consumption, plus the non‐combustion use of fossil fuels” (p. 203).
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policy has been torn between international and domestic efforts to adopt policies
addressing the scientific concern over climate change and economic and industry efforts
to limit such policies. As a result, Congress has been gridlocked and powerless to address
climate change. As Bulman-Pozen and Metzger (2016) observe, some of the “legislative
paralysis” is related to institutional factors, but the widening ideological gap among both
policy elites and the electorate is a primary factor (p. 308). In fact, American voters have
become more consistent in their policy views within each party and thus have become
“more homogeneously partisan” (Bulman-Pozen and Metzger, 2016, p. 311; see also
Abramowitz, 2010; Jacobson, 2013; Persily, 2015). Similarly, policymakers have become
more ideologically consistent within their own parties, leading to enhanced legislative
powers when the government is unified but dysfunction when it is not, since there is little
incentive to compromise (Mann and Ornstein, 2012; Persily, 2015; Bulman-Pozen and
Metzger, 2016). The ideological consistency was reflected in actions to promote and
forestall legislative action throughout the pre-decisional policy formulation period.
As legislative action on important policy issues wanes under what some have
called hyperpolarization (Pildes, 2014), presidential action expands as partisan will is
expressed through agency discretion (Lowande and Milkis, 2014; Milkis et al., 2012). In
this way, although decisions are officially derived from federal agencies, they are
instrumentally shaped by presidential control (Heinzerling, 2014; Saiger, 2011; Watts,
2015). Importantly, the inability to formulate policy through legislation given the
polarized nature of politics makes administrative action through the presidency “all the
more likely, and all the more significant (Bulman-Pozen and Metzgar, 2016). This was
certainly the case during the pre-decisional policy formulation period when President
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Obama pivoted away from Congress to formulate climate policy through the EPA.
However, even this significant act was challenged by a subsequent presidential
administration using the same agency and the same process. The pre-decisional policy
formulation period thus has been characterized by move and countermove, leading only
to stalemate during this time and illustrating the super wicked nature of climate change.
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW
As Chapter 2 illustrates, the dynamics of federal U.S. climate policy have been
complex, deeply polarized, and punctuated in recent years by executive action through
the administrative presidency. These very dynamics make rhetoric an essential element in
framing the problem, shaping the debate, and rationalizing positions. They also make the
rhetorical presidency an indispensable tool for presidents as they seek to shape and
implement policies to take, or delay, action to address the wicked problem of climate
change. By bringing together the three concepts of administrative presidency, rhetorical
presidency, and wicked problems, this study is creating a new framework for analyzing
their implications on democratic decision-making.
As discussed in Chapter 1, we know a great deal about the administrative and
rhetorical presidencies as separate and distinct phenomena. However, because studying
the two simultaneously has received little attention up to this point, there remains a gap in
the literature about how they interact and what implications their interaction may have on
governance, the bureaucracy, and democratic principles (Whitford and Yates, 2009;
Beasley, 2010). Introducing wicked problems into the mix offers a helpful window
through which to examine the two together because such problems tend to accentuate the
actions and rhetoric surrounding them. In the following chapter, I lay the theoretical
foundation for bringing the three concepts together into a single framework, called PostDeliberative Policymaking, and review the administrative presidency and rhetorical
presidency literature. In doing so, this chapter first sets forth the theoretical framework
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and describes the relationship between the three concepts of administrative presidency,
rhetorical presidency, and wicked problems. Next, wicked problems and presidential
control are addressed at a high level, including the various ways in which presidents have
positioned governance within their administrations. The chapter then concludes by
describing the treatment of the administrative presidency and the rhetorical presidency in
the literature.
Post-Deliberative Policymaking
The Post-Deliberative Policymaking Model (Figure 3.1 below) depicts the way in
which democratic principles are impacted by how the administrative presidency and
rhetorical presidency are used to solve wicked problems. Of course, as shown by the
Venn diagram, the way in which administrative action, rhetoric, and policy problems
interact varies depending on the problem being addressed. Some policy problems are so
straightforward and routine that they are easily dealt with by executive action with little
or no controversy. For example, presidential memoranda and executive orders directing
agencies in administrative matters or priorities that are not policy consequential. Others
are only dealt with rhetorically because they either are not a priority for action, not ripe
for action, or not politically expedient to act upon. Some policies related to foreign
policy, human rights, immigration, gun control, and abortion, along with legislation
Congress is considering, would fall into this category. Wicked problems occur at the
center of the intersection and represent how executive action and rhetoric combine to
address them. Importantly, the area of the diagram devoted to wicked problems is not
simply a function of the nature of the problems themselves, rather it is also a function of
how presidents prefer to solve problems. In other words, if policy problems are treated
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like wicked problems for the sake of expediency, then the total area of problem solving to
which the administrative presidency and rhetorical presidency are devoted will expand.
This, of course, translates into the expansion of post-deliberative policymaking, which in
turn has implications for democratic decision making.

Figure 3.1

Post-Deliberative Policymaking Model

The last component of the model is presidential control and governance. As
discussed in more detail below, presidential views of governance can be expressed in four
general categories linked to the political philosophies of Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison,
and Wilson (Kettl, 2000). According to the framework, presidents exhibit governance
characteristics consistent with the category in which they fall, a topic that is explored in
much more detail later in this study. These characteristics form the foundation for how
presidents position presidential control and governance within their administrations and
provides a starting point for considering how they exercise presidential power. Although
the model captures all the tools of presidential control available to today’s executives,
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this study is focused on the bureaucracy and the way in which it is wielded to implement
policies that appear beyond the capacity of Congress.
Ultimately, how Congress and the courts respond to post-deliberative
policymaking can either check or enable its expansion. As a result, these two branches of
government provide an important feedback mechanism to presidents. If Congress and the
courts do not check presidential power, then a post-deliberative policymaking process
may become normalized, which will in turn aggrandize the presidency at the expense of
deliberation and a disempowered Congress (Bulman-Pozen and Metzger, 2016). Such an
outcome is bound to encourage presidents to bypass Congress and reinforce the use, if
not the expansion, of unilateral action (Bulman-Pozen and Metzger, 2016; Milkis et al.,
2014; Milkis and Jacobs, 2017).
Wicked Problems, Super Wicked Problems, and Presidential Control
As discussed in the previous chapters, almost from the beginning climate change
has been a wicked problem in America. The original construct of wicked problems was
first developed in the planning literature by Rittel and Webber (1973). In their
construction, wicked problems were juxtaposed to “tame” problems (p. 160). And, even
though some tame problems might be complex and challenging to solve, they fit neatly
within generally agreed upon definitions and solutions with known outcomes. Tame
problems also lack the political or social complexities that vex their wicked cousins. In
addition to their political and social characteristics, wicked problems also involve
multiple actors and conflicting values (Nie, 2003; Peters, 2017). As originally conceived
by Rittel and Webber (1973, pp. 161-167), wicked problems demonstrate the following
characteristics:
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1. Indefinite formulations leading to ambiguous definitions;
2. No stopping rule or clear point when the problem is solved;
3. Solutions are value based, not true or false;
4. No immediate or ultimate test for solutions;
5. No opportunity to learn from trial-and-error;
6. No exhaustively describable set of solutions;
7. Every wicked problem is unique;
8. The representation of wicked problems is subjective; and
9. No flexibility for a wrong solution.
Clearly, problems that embody the above characteristics pose unique challenges for
policymakers. Such characteristics also make them particularly susceptible to political
influences, including presidential rhetoric.
Some scholars have noted that certain wicked problems, such as climate change,
exceed others in their complexity and divisiveness and therefore should inhabit a unique
classification as “super wicked problems” (Levin et al., 2012; Lazarus, 2008). According
to Lazarus (2008), these types of problems up the ante on complexity to such a degree
that current laws and governance structures appear insufficient to handle them (see also
Peters, 2017). In addition to the original conception of wicked problems, super wicked
problems introduce the element of time. For example, as the IPCC Special Report: Global
Warming of 1.5º C concludes, immediate action to reduce CO2 emissions is necessary to
prevent the most severe climate effects (IPCC, 2018). And not acting in a timely fashion
carries exponentially harmful consequences in the form of escalating economic burdens
on society as the duration of inaction extends further into the future (Rose, Richels,
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Blanford, and Rutherford, 2017). Super wicked problems also are inherently long-term
problems with impacts on large scales. As such, short-term, geographically-limited
solutions are ineffective because meaningful solutions require long-term, comprehensive,
flexible, and enforceable measures, something the public sector in democratic regimes
may be too ill-equipped to address (Jacobs, 2011; as cited in Peters 2017). A final,
important point on super wicked problems is that the solutions to such problems are
frequently dependent on those who are creating and benefitting from the problem in the
first place (Lazarus, 2008). This last point underscores the wicked nature of climate
change since society in general reaps both substantial benefits and costs from the
activities that produce CO2 emissions (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014), meaning even the
calculation of tradeoffs is oftentimes a divisive endeavor.
Climate change thus exhibits “wickedness” that is unique in its breadth of impact
and depth of discord and joins a handful of issues in the U.S. that are characterized to
such a partisan degree that they virtually draw the dividing line between Republicans and
Democrats (Nisbet, 2009). Of course, with such characteristics, climate change is
saturated in partisan politics where presidential rhetoric sets the tone for how their
constituents view the wicked problem (Zarefsky, 2004). As described above, such tone
setting provides an ideal backdrop for examining the administrative and rhetorical
presidencies.
Importantly, part of setting the tone involves the way in which climate change is
defined and framed as a policy problem, which also contributes to its utility as a focus of
the study. For example, who defines the problem has important implications as well. As
noted by Pralle (2009), issue salience waxes and wanes with how a problem is defined.
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Issues that are defined as immediate, catastrophic, and proximate will find a higher place
on the public and governmental agenda than issues that are defined as uncertain,
economically expensive, socially undesirable, or occurring in the distant future (Zarefsky,
2004). As discussed in the preceding chapter, such definitions create a dividing line in the
climate change debate. On one side are those that are alarmed and motivated by urgency
to take immediate and determined action. On the other side are those that dismiss the
science, the severity, or the certainty and are determined to forestall any action that
entails significant economic consequences. This dynamic creates positive and negative
feedback loops, and when combined with crises, or focusing events, can lead to either
long periods of equilibrium as the status quo is maintained or punctuated moments of
dramatic change (Baumgartner and Jones, 2012). Arguably, climate change policy has
experienced high degrees of both positive and negative feedback loops, yet with little
change.
One reason for this, as Nisbet (2009) argues, is revealed in recent polling on
climate change views that reflect a deep polarization of opinions, “resulting in two
Americas divided along ideological lines” (p. 14). The divide breaks along predictably
political lines, with Republicans increasingly questioning the certainty of the science of
climate change and urgency of its effects, while Democrats increasingly endorse climate
science findings and react with growing concern about possible deleterious effects on the
environment and society (Nisbet, 2009). Notably, the partisan divide is unaffected by
education or knowledge (Nisbet, 2009). Roser-Renouf et al. (2014), find that Americans
hold a slightly more diverse, albeit similarly divided view, of global warming, resulting
in six discrete groups they refer to as “Global Warming’s Six Americas” (pp. 6-8).
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However, despite a more refined parsing of views on global warming, their data reflects a
similar break along the same ideological lines described by Nisbet (2009). Thus, when
considering climate change, whether one sees two or six Americas, the conclusion is the
same: climate change is characterized by deeply divided and firmly held ideological
views, making it among the most wicked of not only environmental problems but social
problems as well. It also makes it susceptible to the influences of the party in control of
the bureaucracy.
Mapping Presidential Control
In order to understand how presidents view their authority and the role of
bureaucracy, it is helpful to place the various views on the matter in historical context.
Notably, political control of the bureaucracy is the quintessential element underlying the
politics-administration dichotomy.22 While this study does not focus on the dichotomy
per se, the familiar refrain of its principal arguments certainly echoes in the background.
From a normative standpoint, an important question is how active executives should be in
directing administrative agencies to shape public policy, especially where Congress has
not specifically acted to fill a policy void by statute or clarified the implementation
standards of how more ambiguous statutes should be implemented. In other words, what
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The roots of the bureaucracy-democracy tension extend to Woodrow Wilson and his articulation of the
politics-administration dichotomy. In its most basic construction, the politics-administration dichotomy
argues for a distinction between politics and administration. Views in favor of a dichotomy during the
Progressive Era were motivated by the belief that a better practice of public administration, one that was
separated from the influence of politics, would lead to better outcomes. Thus, government could be
improved to the extent its career bureaucrats were insulated from “political meddling.” See, e.g., Kettl
(200). As Wilson (1887) asserted, “[A]dministration lies outside the proper sphere of politics…. [a]lthough
politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices” (p. 210). For
historic representations and helpful modern discussions of the politics-administration dichotomy, see also
James C. Charlesworth (1968); Nicholas Henry (1975); Leonard White (1926); Frank Goodnow (2017);
James Pfiffner (1967); Kenneth Meier and Laurence O’Toole Jr. (2006).
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role should administrative agencies play when there is both a legal and policy vacuum?
And since presidents direct the actions of agencies, how proactive should executives be in
filling the void of congressional inaction? Perhaps a more fundamental question is how
do presidents themselves view their use of presidential control? How one views
presidential control goes a long way in answering these questions and whether valueladen, polarized, and unsettled policy problems, like climate change, should be addressed
through administrative action rather than through a deliberative, congressional process.
Another important consideration is the sense of urgency, and even opportunity, motivated
by values, priorities, and politics, presidents feel when Congress leaves a void that creates
space out of which policies can be adopted through administrative action. Such occasions
grant executives freedom to pursue policies that are controversial and unsettled (i.e.
wicked in nature), albeit not without legal, congressional, and political challenges. After
all, wicked problems like climate change remain wicked because of the vigor with which
policies addressing them are promoted, defended, and opposed (Nisbet, 2009). At the
same time, presidents will utilize policy voids to pursue their own political and policy
ends.
For example, scholars have long noted, some more approvingly than others, that
administrative actions via the bureaucracy, as well as the independent actions of
administrators themselves, are a means to social, economic, and political ends that may or
may not reflect broader and more diverse public values (Frederickson, 1971; Lowi,
1979). As such, it matters greatly who does the influencing and how it occurs. As noted
by Lewis (2009), using the bureaucracy to achieve political ends is frequently a factor of
either agency capture or the influence of interest groups, neither of which tend to be
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broadly representative of the public interest. In a similar vein, Lowi (1979) describes how
the influence of special interest groups leads to “the atrophy of institutions of popular
control” (p. 58), which describes what happens when policy becomes untethered from
“clear standards of implementation” (p. 298), leaving the priorities of institutions to those
with the greatest influence over them.23 The same principle holds for the executive office.
Even though the president is formally in control of executive agencies, his views are not
necessarily representative of even a majority of the populace (Farina, 2010). Therefore,
whether presidents or special interests control the bureaucracy, narrowly defined
priorities may frustrate the realization of broader social values.
These insights are helpful in better understanding the criticism associated with
unilateral administrative actions that deviate from clear legislative priorities and
requirements. However, as noted above, legislation is rarely so clear or prescriptive,
especially where wicked problems are concerned, leaving executives and administrative
agencies to set policies or to sort out Congress’s intent through administrative rulemaking
(Wilson, 1990). Naturally, such actions are not universally welcome. And one clearly
observable result has been an expansion of litigation surrounding agency rulemaking and
priorities (Spence, 1999).
The Clean Power Plan is representative of such a dynamic, as it has been in
litigation since the Obama Administration EPA’s final order implementing it in 2015.24
Now that the Trump Administration EPA has rescinded and replaced the Clean Power
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For an in depth discuss, see also James Q. Wilson (1990, 1991).
As noted by the Environmental Defense Fund (n.d.), “Opponents of the Clean Power Plan have been
suing since before the rule was even finalized in August 2015, and EDF has been defending it in court
every step of the way” (n.p.).
24

72
Plan, the regulatory landscape will change but the prevalence of litigation will not, since
those favoring stronger CO2 regulation have already sued EPA for weakening it
(Environmental Defense Fund, n.d.).25 As this dynamic plays out, EPA’s interpretation of
the relevant statute and views of its own interpretive discretion, while appearing
schizophrenic, are merely symptomatic of the climate change policy void coupled with
strikingly divergent policies of the Obama and Trump administrations.26 In the light of
expanding litigation regarding agency rulemaking, numerous scholars have observed that
administrative agencies have become “gun-shy and produced an ‘ossified’ agency
decision-making process that is less flexible, less rational, and less effective” (Spence,
1999, p. 426, see also Lipsky, 1980; McGarity, 1991, Sunstein, 1995). It is likely this
predicament is in some fashion exacerbated by presidential control over agency agendas,
priorities, and even the rules they promulgate, leading to more constrained agency action.
Some scholars would argue this outcome speaks to the need for enhanced agency
discretion to more fully represent societal values and mitigate negative, or unforeseen,
consequences of implemented policies (Frederickson, 1971; Friedrich, 1940), while
others would argue for clearer legislation to limit agency discretion (Finer, 1941: Lowi,
1979), not to mention presidential control.
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On the same day the Trump EPA’s Affordable Clean Energy rule was published in the Federal Register
(July 8, 2019), the American Lung Association and American Public Health Association filed a joint lawsuit
challenging EPA’s action. In a press release signaling their lawsuit, the American Lung Association stated,
“In repealing the Clean Power Plan and adopting the ACE rule, EPA abdicates its legal duties and
obligations to protect public health under the Clean Air Act, which is why we are challenging these
actions” (American Lung Association, 2019, n.p.).
26
See, e.g., Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 2017 and the EPA’s updated interpretation finding the Obama Administration EPA
exceeded the agency's statutory authority under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act.
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Regardless of the merits of either view of bureaucratic discretion, the fact remains
that agencies, as well as presidents, frequently interpret congressional intent (Wilson,
1990). Of course, there is typically ample room for interpretation, since it is virtually
impossible to draft legislation that contemplates all possible future conditions. This is
particularly true when technology, goals, implementation, future conditions, and
overlapping tasks—first described as polycentric tasks by philosopher Michael Polanyi
(1951)—cannot be defined, let alone identified, upfront (Wilson, 1990, see also Fuller
and Winston, 1978). 27 This legislative ambiguity may even allow, if not invite, executive
action to fill the void, or at least shape it to fit their policy preferences (Moe and Howell,
1999). Given the prominent role presidents play in this regard, contextualizing how they
have done so historically provides valuable insights about executive actions. Here, Kettl
is helpful in sorting out the main ways in which presidents have approached governance,
in particular the way in which they position the bureaucracy as a means for promoting
policies. Kettl’s framework also provides a systematic way of thinking about how and
where a post-deliberative presidency might fit within historical constructions of
bureaucracy’s role in making and shaping policy.
Although Kettl (2000) developed his framework as a way of categorizing the
main academic and practitioner views on “administrative ideas and political philosophy”
(p. 14) (i.e., the politics-administration dichotomy), it also functions well as a typology of
presidential approaches to the question of the role of bureaucracy. As shown in Table 3.1,
the first type is the Madisonian tradition, which maintains that governance is predicated
on political power as opposed to administrative efficiency (Kettl, 2000). As described by
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For a good general discussion on this topic, see also Aligica and Tarko (2012).
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Kettl (2000), the Madisonian view is “rich . . . in balance-of-power politics” (p. 15),
where politics is very much a part of administration.
Table 3.1

Typology of Presidential Control in the U.S. (Kettl, 2000)
Wilsonian
(Hierarchical)

Madisonian
(Balance of Power)

Hamiltonian
(Strong-Executive/ Top-Down)

Strong-executive
Top-down accountability
Hierarchical authority

Centered on non-bureaucratic
institutions
Focus on political power
Top-down accountability

Jeffersonian
(Weak-Executive/ Bottom-Up)

Weak-executive
Bottom-up responsibility
Responsive to citizens

Centered on non-bureaucratic
institutions
Focus on local control
Bottom-up responsiveness

The second type is in the Hamiltonian tradition, which is best characterized by the
Federalist Alexander Hamilton, who argued that “energy in the executive is a leading
character of the definition of good government” (Kettl, 2000, p. 15). In other words,
Hamiltonians are characterized by a strong executive branch actively seeking to serve the
public interest but “held in check by popular institutions” (Kettl, 2000, p. 16). The third
type rests in the Jeffersonian tradition, which is characterized by the preservation of
individual autonomy through grassroots, bottom-up governance that is limited in scope
and power, and situated at the lowest possible level of government (Kettl, 2000). In the
Jeffersonian tradition, the bureaucracy, if there is any at all, should be as small as
possible. Finally, no typology of public administration would be complete without the
Wilsonian tradition. The Wilsonian tradition adheres to the politics-administration
dichotomy and is characterized by a competent and professional bureaucracy separated
from the influence of politics (Kettl, 2000; Wilson, 1887). In other words, Wilsonians
believe in an accountable, technically capable bureaucracy unencumbered by politics and
nonthreatening to democracy (Kettl, 2000).
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To summarize Kettl’s theoretical framework, then, the Hamiltonian and
Jeffersonian types are contrasted with one another and capture views of government
hierarchy. Thus, the Hamiltonian type represents a “strong-executive/top-down”
construct, while the Jeffersonian type represents a “weak executive/bottom-up” construct.
The Wilsonian and Madisonian types are contrasted with one another and capture the
way in which the bureaucracy is viewed respectively as “hierarchy, authority, process,
and structure” versus “political balance-of-power” (Kettl, 2000, pp. 16-17). Because the
typology represents the dominant ideas in public administration and governance since the
late nineteenth century (Kettl, 2000), it provides a useful way to begin assessing how
Obama positioned the respective roles of government and the bureaucracy and, as I
discuss in Chapter 5, was used to inform the coding of presidential statements.
Notably, the role of the bureaucracy in making and shaping policy is a central
aspect highlighted by the typology, and it is important to keep in mind that the typology
is more than a mere abstraction. On the contrary, each type represents a dominant theme
in the history of American public administration and governance. Which theme is the
most appropriate depends on ideological views of the role of government as well as more
pragmatic views of who’s in charge of it. Thus, it may be that ideological purity fades
into the shadow of expediency. Ultimately, as described by Kettl (2000) referencing an
argument made by John Gaus, “how one feels about power depends on whether one has
it” (p. 16, see also Gaus, 2006). To apply the same sentiment to this study, how one feels
about administrative action depends on which administration is acting and how such
actions are rationalized through presidential rhetoric, making both the administrative and
rhetorical presidency important concepts for further analysis.
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Zeroing in on the Administrative and Rhetorical Presidencies
In the following, this study takes a closer look at the administrative and rhetorical
aspects of presidential control and more precisely delineates their application by various
presidents. While the two aspects of control are frequently exercised somewhat
independently of one another, their joint use is particularly noteworthy when presidential
priorities meet congressional resistance. However, regardless of the level of resistance to
policies, occupants have, without exception, entered the Oval Office intent on advancing
their favored policies (Vig, 2012). To that end, presidents have framed and promoted
issues through campaign speeches, press conferences, inaugural and State of the Union
addresses, and now through the social media venue of Twitter (Vig, 2012).28 By doing so,
each president has played an important role in signaling policy intentions. In the
environmental policy arena, there arguably was no president more actively engaged in
promoting environmental policies than Teddy Roosevelt, who put the power and energy
of the president fully behind the conservation movement through his rhetoric and actions
(Vig, 2012). Indeed, according to historian Paul Cutright (1985, as cited by Dorsey,
2004), meaningful strides in the conservation movement were achieved only after
Roosevelt applied his presidential heft to what he saw as a moral, even religious,
response to the mismanagement of natural resources.29 In more recent times, presidents
have framed issues and employed their powers to both expand and restrict environmental
regulations, sometimes with the help of Congress but often on their own (Vig, 2012,
2016; Kraft, 2016). Thus, presidents have played an integral role by word and deed in
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For a helpful discussion of Donald Trump’s use of Twitter during his presidency see Ott (2017).
For a general discussion of presidential environmental rhetoric see also Cutright (1985) and Peterson
(2004).
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shaping and implementing polices since the inception of the environmental movement
and will continue to do so in the climate change era as well.
To illustrate the point, in the modern era, presidents Richard Nixon, Jimmy
Carter, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama used the executive office to
advance environmental protections, in such diverse areas as the establishment of the
EPA, energy conservation, acid rain, environmental justice, and greenhouse gas
reductions (Vig, 2012; Kraft and Vig, 2016). On the other hand, presidents Gerald Ford,
Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and Donald Trump have used the same office to blunt
or even reverse the actions of prior presidents, punctuated by Reagan’s and Trump’s
deregulatory activities (Layzer, 2012; Vig, 2012). The effort of presidents in this regard
has attracted the attention of scholars interested in both environmental policy and
presidential studies, although not commonly at the intersection of the two (Moe, 2009;
Vig, 2012). Scholars also have devoted considerable effort studying environmental policy
disputes, with their highly politicized and polarized nature, conflicting values, and
intractable positions (Alm et al., 2010; Jasanoff, 1990; Litfin, 1994; Jenkins-Smith et al.,
2014; Williams and Matheny, 1995).
As noted, such problems also are prone to rhetorical influences, making rhetoric a
potent force in agenda setting. Although agenda setting is not a topic of this dissertation,
it bears mentioning that presidential rhetoric plays a prominent role in framing wicked
problems and therefore an instrument role in agenda setting. This is particularly
important because the U.S. legislative system tends to reinforce the status quo, and
implementing policy solutions requires the aid of focusing events, policy entrepreneurs,
executive action, or all the above (See generally Baumgartner and Jones, 2012; Birkland,
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1998; Kingdon, 1984; Litfin, 1994; Skodvin and Anderson, 2009).30 Such is the context
for climate policy and legislative action intended to mitigate harmful impacts attributed to
a warming planet. Consequently, future policies to address such impacts, or maintain the
status quo of not addressing them, are influenced and rationalized by the rhetorical
presidency and the way in which problems and solutions are framed.
Therefore, unilateral presidential action remains prominently at the heart of
making and shaping environmental policy (Vig, 2012). For example, from 1970 to 1990
in a unique act of bi-partisan cooperation on environmental policy, Congress passed
nearly every prominent environmental law on which today’s regulations are based (Vig,
2012). Since the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, however, Congress
has had extremely limited success in enacting or amending any nationally significant
environmental laws, making the unilateral, administrative action of the president one of
the primary means of implementing environmental reform and advancing new policies
(Kraft and Vig, 2016; Vig, 2012). While some scholars, such as Richard Neustadt (1990)
and John Burke (2009), have pointed out that the fragmented, polarized, and systemic
structural constraints in the U.S. political system contributes to a weak executive office,
presidential studies—especially recent studies—point to growing presidential powers
through executive management of the bureaucracy and an increasing willingness to rely
on such power rather than an uncertain legislative process (Neustadt, 1990; Burke, 2009;
Vig, 2012; Rabe, 2007; Lowande and Milkis, 2014). This primarily has taken the form of
centralizing power in the White House and politicizing the bureaucracy to circumvent an
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For a description of the policy process that is more dynamic and interpretive, yet leading to similar
conclusions, see Stone (2002).
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uncertain, and sometimes hostile, legislative process by attempting to control policy
outcomes through administrative action (Moe, 1985; Vig, 2012, 2016). According to Vig
(2012), scholars have thus focused presidential studies “increasingly on the rational
exercise of administrative powers, especially during periods of divided government,
gridlock in Congress, and national emergency” (p. 308, see also Moe, 1985; Lewis, 2009;
Moe and Howell, 1999; Waterman, 2009). Of course, seeking to influence outcomes and
direct policy through the bureaucracy gets at the heart of the administrative presidency, a
subject to which this article now turns in more depth.
Describing the Administrative Presidency
As described by Kagan (2001), writing prior to her Supreme Court appointment,
“[t]he history of the American administrative state is the history of competition among
different entities for control of its policies” (p. 2246). These entities include the president,
Congress, and the courts, all of which possess potent constitutional powers that make it
unlikely that any single entity will emerge ultimately triumphant, although at various
points in history each seems to hold sway on important policy matters (Kagan, 2001).
According to Kagan (2001) and other scholars, the rise of the administrative presidency
since the 1970s means the executive office currently enjoys a more dominant
policymaking position than either Congress or the courts (see also Moe and Howell,
1999). In fact, since the initial expansion of presidential powers under President Nixon,
executive influence over administrative agencies has increased with each subsequent
presidency, leading to increasingly greater influence over policy matters either
unilaterally or by directing agency activities (Kagan, 2001; Moe and Howell, 1999). In
addition to the gridlock and divided government noted above, scholars have observed that
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the ongoing shift is due to a number of factors, including a deeply divided electorate, an
inordinate focus on re-election, and Polanyi’s polycentric circles resulting from an
increasingly complex political and bureaucratic system (Aberbach and Rockman, 1988;
Moe and Howell, 1999; Kagan, 2001).
In the light of such factors, the expansion of the administrative presidency is
understandable, especially since presidential success is often defined by presidential
competence in implementing policies (Kagan, 2001). Presidents also are concerned with
their legacies. They want to be “regarded in the eyes of history as strong and effective
leaders” and, in order to succeed, they must exert administrative control over policies and
priorities to achieve desired outcomes (Moe and Howell, 1999, p. 136). As noted by a
number of scholars, such demands are overwhelming and actually surpass the power of
the executive office to realize presidential goals, thus, incentivizing the expansion and
exertion of power and control over agencies (Lowi, 1985; Moe and Howell, 1999).
However, while the rise of administrative presidencies in this context is perhaps
predictable, it has neither come easily nor without controversy.
From the beginning, presidents have endeavored to shape and control the
outcomes of administrative agencies (Kagan, 2001; Rudalevige, 2016). Not surprisingly,
such endeavors have historically been difficult to accomplish. Presidents through the
decades have frequently commented on the difficulty of prompting a recalcitrant
bureaucracy to implement presidential will or a resistant Congress to consider policy
solutions. In speaking of the difficulty of controlling agencies, President Harry Truman is
quoted as exclaiming, "I thought I was the president, but when it comes to these
bureaucrats, I can't do a damn thing" (as quoted in Kagan, 2001, p. 2272). Similarly,
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President John F. Kennedy is said to have once remarked about a request for
administrative action, "I agree with you, but I don't know if the government will" (as
quoted in Kagan, 2001, p. 2272). Similar quotes can be added for Carter, Reagan, and
others (Kagan, 2001). Of course, it is not just the bureaucracy that sometimes frustrates
presidents. With respect to legislation, one recent example occurred during President
Obama’s last term, when he eschewed an uncooperative Congress in favor of executive
action predicated on a “We Can’t Wait” policy (Lowande and Milkis, 2014, pp. 5-6).
Again, this mindset is neither novel nor uncommon—it extends back to Theodore
Roosevelt, who argued that presidents have the duty, unless explicitly prohibited by the
Constitution, to take whatever steps necessary to promote the nation’s interest (Moe and
Howell, 1999).31
While presidents have justified their exercise of power, expansion of executive
control has largely occurred at the expense of legislative control (Aman, 1988). Yet,
Congress has done little in reaction, despite the many substantive changes enacted by
presidents in addition to merely clarifying policies and priorities (Aman 1988;
Rudalevige, 2016). As Nathan (1983) and others argue, the expanding administrative
presidency highlights the tension in the traditional public administration model of a
distinction between politics and administration (see, e.g., Svara, 1999). Notably, after
four years in office, Nixon favored the view that the president, as the chief executive,
should employ a more managerial approach to agency action, undercutting the Wilsonian
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In employing his “stewardship theory” Roosevelt observed, “Under this interpretation of executive
power I did and caused to be done many things not previously done by the president and the heads of
departments. I did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power” (Moe and
Howell, 1999, p. 157).
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view of an administration free from the influence of politics (Nathan, 1983; Kettl, 2000;
Riccucci, 2010).32 In writing about the administrative presidency, Nathan (1983) agrees
and argues, "[t]he basic premise is that management tasks can and should be performed
by partisans. This concept is not only appropriate, but necessary, to a functioning
democracy in a large and technologically advanced nation such as the United States” (p.
7, see also West, 2006). For those who hold this view, it is not a question of whether a
president should intervene in administrative agencies, it is rather a question of how, how
much, and to what end (Kraft and Vig, 1984).
In this light, it is interesting to note that ever since its inception, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) purportedly has either been captured by
industry or colluded with environmental activists, depending on which party occupies the
Oval Office (Mintz, 2005; Tyson, 2014).33 Regardless of the veracity of such claims, the
view that the EPA is weaponized to achieve policy goals reflects the common
understanding that natural resource agencies in general and the EPA in particular are
subject to the policy priorities of whichever presidential administration is in power (Vig,
2012, 2016). As Durant (2009) argues, there is a longstanding practice of using
administrative mechanisms for policy implementation by other means as a way for
presidents to achieve policy goals in the face of recalcitrant political adversaries. By way
of example, Durant (2009) highlights the greening of the government (a frame) during the
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See generally Woodrow Wilson’s (1887) discussion about bureaucracy and political control.
For example, during the Obama Administration, the U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works (EPW) conducted oversight on the role of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and
other environmental groups, in what the EPW Majority Staff Report (2015) concluded was an improper
influence of “policy options, technical support, legal rationale, and public relations campaign” for the
Clean Power Plan (p. 2).
33

83
Clinton Administration through executive orders and government-wide administrative
reform (pp. 95-96). The Obama and Trump administrations have taken similar
approaches in recent times, albeit from different perspectives on the role of government.
Perhaps not coincidentally, then, presidents Clinton, Obama, and now Trump have
employed similar administrative tactics after multiple-term presidencies of the opposite
party. In the cases of Obama and Clinton, the environmental agencies emerged from eight
and twelve years, respectively, of significant pressure to limit or constrict environmental
regulatory activity (Layzer, 2012; Freeman and Vermeule, 2007). With new
administrations and new priorities more aligned with environmental agency missions,
administrative mechanisms became an expedient way of implementing previously
neglected regulations and policies, especially in the absence of bipartisan cooperation
(Rossi, 2001; Freeman and Vermeule, 2007).
In practice, then, the administrative presidency cuts both ways across the political
spectrum and is a common tool among modern presidents. Indeed, history has shown and
scholars have noted that every modern president since Nixon has employed any means
necessary to advance his policy goals (Kagan, 2001; Kraft and Vig, 1984). The relevant
point is that where roadblocks exist, administrative presidencies will find a way around.
In fact, as already mentioned, legal ambiguity may even allow, if not altogether invite,
executive action to fill the void. As a result, administrative presidencies play an active
role in establishing values and priorities, especially when there is no clear direction from
Congress, or at times of deep political divide when legislatively addressing an existing
void is impossible (Tulis, 1987). However, presidents do not just act, they rather mobilize
the public and set the governmental agenda by signaling their intentions to act through
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formal and informal proclamations through the rhetorical presidency (see generally Tulis,
1987; Dorsey, 2004; Carcasson, 2004). In so doing, presidents are able to embark on a
process of policy change through the rhetorical presidency, whereby they bypass
Congress in pursuit of political ends (Tulis, 1987). As discussed in the following Part, the
rhetorical presidency covers the bully pulpit of the executive office. However, the
rhetorical presidency is more than just arousing sentiment, setting the agenda, and
signaling priorities; it is also mobilizing public support in an effort to displace the less
certain, less expeditious, and more methodical process of congressional deliberation.
Describing the Rhetorical Presidency
As originally conceived by Tulis (1987), the rhetorical presidency encompasses
the way in which presidents use rhetoric to bypass Congress and engage the public to
define problems, set the agenda, propose solutions, and indirectly influence political
actors (see also generally Quirk, 2007; Whitford and Yates, 2009). Yet, the rhetorical
presidency is much more than just the presidential use of rhetoric to persuade; it concerns
the “constitutional order” and governance, and it is the vehicle by which contemporary
presidents seek to influence policy and govern the citizenry (Whitford and Yates, 2009).
At its most basic level, it describes the willingness of presidents to bypass Congress and
“mobilize the public as a routine means of governance” (Stuckey, 2010, p. 43).
While Tulis’s work formally marks the beginning of the rhetorical presidency as a
branch of study, Neustadt’s seminal and influential study, Presidential Power, is an
important beginning point for presidential studies in general. As Skowronek (2002)
points out, the aspirations of the progressive era to create a government with the president
at the center was complicated by the institutional barriers against sweeping reform.
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Neustadt (1990) describes the resulting environment as one where presidents are limited
by a constitutional system designed to allow incremental change but frustrate sweeping
reform. Because of this, according to Neustadt (1990), presidents must rely on their
personal skills and become adept at bargaining and persuasion to successfully meet the
often-overinflated public expectations of the office. Echoing Moe’s criticism of
Neustadt’s approach, Tulis argues that viewing the presidency from the president’s
perspective ignores more prevailing institutional factors. Indeed, viewing the presidency
“from over the President's shoulder,” as Neustadt (1990, p. xxi) does, creates an
impression of an institutionally weak executive office.34 However, presidential studies
indicate increasing presidential powers and the liberty with which presidents wield them
(Neustadt, 1990).
With this in mind, Skowronek (2002) observes that Tulis identifies a trend by
modern presidents to become policy activists as they “attempt to displace the original
constitutional structures that had supported the politics of the past” (p. 745, see also
generally Moe, 1985; Tulis, 1987). Under the original constitutional order of governance,
as Tulis (1987) argues, the U.S. Constitution proscribed demagoguery, or popular
leadership, and favored deliberation among the elected representatives of the people. The
modern presidency, on the other hand, ushered in by the Progressive leadership of
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, placed more energy in the executive by
prescribing popular appeals to the public, marking the beginning of a “second
constitution” under which presidents now govern (Tulis, 1987, p. 18; Whitford and Yates,
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2009).35 The effect of the transaction is that presidential appeals to the public subvert the
original constitutional order, which leads to a decline in policy deliberation and ascension
of demagoguery (Tulis, 1987).
In addressing the state of deliberation, Kernell (2006) observes that presidential
rhetoric, by way of “going public” as a policy strategy, has a destabilizing effect on
deliberative processes—that is, traditional pluralistic bargaining processes are discarded
in favor of insular and unilateral decision making (pp. 3-4, see also Whitford and Yates,
2009). The result of this political exchange means policy is made and rationalized by
public opinion (Kernell, 2006). Scholars have mixed views on what this means for
democracy. As previously discussed, some view this practice as undercutting
constitutional principles (Ceaser et. al., 1981; Hart, 1987; Jamieson, 1988; Milkis, 2012;
Tulis, 1987), while others view it as inconsequential (Edwards, 2006) or even expected
(Garsten, 2011; Stuckey, 2010).
However, as Edwards (2006) argues, the rhetorical presidency may be more
limited in its power to persuade than conventional wisdom suggests. Edwards (2006)
finds little support in the literature for the power of presidential rhetoric to significantly
move public opinion. Indeed, after examining public opinion polls assessing presidential
actions and approval, as well as legislative initiatives, Edwards (2006) finds no systemic
evidence that presidential rhetoric significantly influences public views on either the
president or the president’s initiatives (see also Barrett, 2004). However, subsequent
studies suggest that presidential rhetoric can be influential in certain respects, such as
when presidents go public on congressional appropriations or simply to improve their
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standing (Canes-Wrone, 2004; see also Cohen and Powell, 2005; Wood, Owens, and
Durham, 2005). In any event, while presidential appeals to the public have some effect, it
may not be the overwhelming influence of the bully pulpit that is frequently assumed,
leading some scholars to sound the death knell of the rhetorical presidency. Although, to
paraphrase Mark Twain, the reports of the rhetorical presidency’s death may be greatly
exaggerated.36
Conclusion
After placing the framework of post-deliberative policymaking on the foundation
of administrative presidency, rhetorical presidency, and wicked problems, this study now
focuses on President Obama. An understanding of the ongoing debate about the
importance and influence of the rhetorical presidency and the propriety of the
administrative presidency form a backdrop for this dissertation. Both were
unquestioningly relied upon by Obama to address the wicked problem of climate change.
The aim of this study, therefore, is to better understand and explicate the way in which
Obama made full use of the post-deliberative policymaking process and rationalized his
use of the administrative presidency through the rhetorical presidency. A deeper
understanding may reveal important insights about the post-deliberative policymaking
process and what implications it has on democratic principles. Finally, the study strives to
uncover insights into whether the administrative presidency is simply a tool of the
executive or a reflection of the way in which a president positions the role of the
bureaucracy. Taken together, the deeper understanding and explication of the potentially
potent force of a weaponized bureaucracy may help ensure that it is used wisely in the
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preservation, rather than deterioration, of democratic principles. The next step in arriving
at that deeper understanding is to orient Obama within the broader rhetoric and
administrative presidency literature, something that is taken up in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ORIENTING PRESIDENT OBAMA IN ADMINISTRATIVE AND
RHETORICAL LITERATURE
Because this dissertation focuses on President Obama, it is important to first
orient his presidency within the broader administrative and rhetorical literature to provide
some background for context. Like all presidents, Obama has attracted a great deal of
scholarship in both areas. On the administrative side, researchers have examined the
constitutional efficacy of presidential control over the bureaucracy (see, for example,
Strauss, 2014; Shapiro and Wright, 2010; Coglianese, 2009 and 2017; Farina, 2010;
Farina, Newhart, and Heidt, 2012), policy implementation through rulemaking
(Rudalevige, 2014, 2016; Lowande and Milkis, 2014), and the unitary executive (Schier,
2011; Lowande and Milkis, 2014; Milkis et al., 2012; Milkis and Jacobs 2017). On the
rhetorical side, Obama’s speeches have been fertile ground for an abundant and diverse
array of scholarship, ranging from racial (Atwater, 2007; Teasley and Ikard, 2010; Harrel,
2010; Aden et al., 2016), to political (Rowland and Jones, 2007; Bostdorff, 2017; Coe
and Rietzes, 2010; Vaughn and Mercieca, 2014), to policy-oriented (Ivie and Giner,
2009; Ivie, 2011; Frank, 2009; Rowland, 2011; Jamieson, 2013), among many others.
One study cannot capture the myriad views on Obama as both president and rhetor.
However, in the section below, I identify a number of themes that help situate this
dissertation’s work on Obama in existing literatures. This brief review provides a
backdrop for this research and especially the analysis. It also begins filling a gap in the
scholarship by viewing Obama’s rhetorical and administrative presidencies
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simultaneously to better understand the way in which they interact and potentially
amplify each other (Whitford and Yates, 2009; Beasley, 2010). With that in mind, the
following section highlights the way scholars have generally viewed Obama’s
presidency, first with respect to his rhetoric and then through his administrative actions.
Obama’s Rhetorical Approach
It is not surprising that multiple rhetorical themes would emerge from the
literature. After all, Obama’s impressive and diverse array of rhetorical approaches
throughout his presidency are well documented, as noted above. Among the more
dominant themes are Obama’s use of American political myths in the forms of American
Exceptionalism and the American Dream that, according to Rowland (2011), were often
woven together and combined to create a “rhetoric of hope” (Atwater, 2007). Much of
Obama’s rhetoric is also infused with polysemy, especially through strategic ambiguity
(Ivie, 2011), which allows diverse audiences to attach different fundamental
understanding to a single, unifying message (Ceccarelli, 1998). As with many of his
speeches during his time in office, Obama sought to finesse strategically ambiguous
arguments about race, war, the economy, energy, and climate change, rather than
attempting to debunk opposing viewpoints altogether (Ivie, 2011; Aden et al., 2016).
Obama’s more circumscribed arguments were calculated to channel attention away from
divisive positions, shape perceptions, and create unity through his careful framing of
policy choices. Notably, all presidents maintain a persona that is a symbolic reflection of
the office they hold. With that persona in mind, presidents are “perpetually attempting to
create an idea of ‘the people’ with collective identity and common cause” (Beasley, 2014,
p. 271, as quoted in Aden et al., 2016). Because Obama saw himself as a transcendent
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figure, much of his rhetoric was aimed toward convincing Americans to be transcendent
as well by setting aside differences, finding common ground, and replacing division with
unity (Ivie and Giner, 2009; Chirindo and Neville-Shepard, 2015). This section now turns
to the scholarly treatment of these dominant themes.
To begin with, Obama’s affinity toward “rational argument and his professorial
persona,” is well documented but frequently panned as lacking a personal connection
with the public (Rowland, 2011, p. 704). However, according to Robert Rowland (2011),
“faith in public reason is at the very core of Obama's commitment to an exceptionalist
vision of America and to his aim to revitalize the American Dream” (p. 704). Public
reason is thus an essential and complementary component to Obama’s rhetorical
approach and helps make the case for American Exceptionalism and the American Dream
to both liberal and conservative America (Rowland, 2011). Faith in public reason,
therefore, forms a foundation for American Exceptionalism and of the American Dream,
where the American Dream is dependent upon a community coming together to make a
better life. The American Dream thus is only possible when the community rises above
its unproductive differences to make the dream possible for individuals within the
community (Rowland, 2011). And American exceptionalism is only possible when the
community is able to rise above its circumstances with the help of the nation’s values and
institutions. Public reason is what brings the two together. As Rowland (2011) describes
it,
Achieving the American Dream ultimately depends upon the capacity of the
community to use the resources of public reason to choose good policies. A
revitalized sense of the power of public reason, of the possibility of ‘civil
conversation’ in which facts and reason are valued, is also essential for achieving
American Exceptionalism. (p. 716)
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Both Martin Medhurst (2012) and David Frank (2009) argue that Obama relies on
American civil religion to inform his rhetoric, in particular through a cosmopolitan
representation of Christianity, which elicits a less personal and more abstract depiction of
God. Although this approach to Obama’s rhetoric will only be touched upon in this
dissertation, it is important for further contextualizing his reliance on public reason and
how it manifests in his rhetoric. According to Medhurst (2012), Obama’s 2009 inaugural
address sets the stage for his “rhetorical signature” throughout his presidency. In that
speech, Obama uses the terms “faith,” “hope,” and “courage” most frequently and, when
combined with “journey,” these form a persuasive narrative that both describes Obama’s
rise to the White House and how he intends to govern (Medhurst, 2012; Frank, 2011).
Further, incorporating the notion of American civil religion means that Obama is also
embracing a “composite audience” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971) of varying
views on theology and religious experiences. Thus, when Obama speaks of his own
journey, he is also addressing the “composite journey” of his audience, which allows him
to speak to both political conservatives and political liberals in a way that focuses on
what they have in common, rather than on what they disagree (Frank, 2011). Obama also
offers the hope of reconciliation. As Ivie (2011) notes, “Obama’s rhetorical quest would
draw upon religion to reconcile differences, seek common ground, and recognize a
common humanity in an interdependent world to remake the world in the image of
justice—gradually” (pp. 738-739).
From a policy standpoint then, political liberals believe that properly designed and
managed programs are able to produce an exceptional nation through common values and
reasoned discourse. For political conservatives, America is “exceptional simply because
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God willed it” (Rowland, 2011, p. 705). Yet, there remains work to do, primarily through
the effort of free individuals acting in good faith rather than through government
intervention. As Rowland (2011) describes it, “[C]onservatives can embrace a variant of
the American Dream that privileges the heroic individual and views the government and
community as impediments to be overcome” (p. 705). In contrast, although a place exists
among political liberals for divine intervention, God’s role in creating an exceptional
nation is less important than the role of government institutions in implementing policy
choices that are settled upon by public reason. According to Frank, “The crucial point is
that faith in public reason underlays the belief that better policy choices could solve the
nation's problems. It was by focusing on the stronger arguments that the better policy
would be identified” (p. 707). This in essence also summarizes a common theme in
Obama’s rhetorical approach.
Notably, the themes of hope, change, emancipation, and unity remained fixtures
of Obama’s rhetoric throughout his time in office (Coe and Rietzes, 2010). These themes
invoke patriotic, American traditions linked to the founding of the nation where unity is
emphasized over diversity (Riehl, 2008). This emphasis is a continuation of Obama’s
campaign speeches where he de-emphasized the differences among Americans and
instead argued that their core identity is simply that of being an American (Riehl, 2008).
In this manner, Obama’s articulation of national security, immigration, and energy
incorporated a more sweeping and less dichotomous vision of American exceptionalism
(Coe and Rietzes, 2010; Ivie and Giner, 2009; Dorsey and Díaz-Barriga, 2007). As Harrel
(2010) concludes, Obama’s challenge to Americans was to find the common ground at
“[t]he core of American experience….that makes our improbable experiment in
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democracy work” (p. 173). Obama’s rhetorical approach, therefore, had something for
everyone, and his polysemous message to the American public captured Obama’s version
of the American Dream, where community is emphasized over individualism (Atwater,
2007).
The dominant themes in Obama’s rhetoric generally fall within American
Exceptionalism and the American Dream. In fact, compared to his predecessors, Obama
overwhelmingly emphasized American exceptionalism in his speeches (Gilmore, Sheets,
and Rowling, 2016). However, like Obama’s approach to policy formulation, his rhetoric
does not fall into clearly delineated binary categories. Instead, Obama frequently relies on
convergence and consilience through public reasoning to move a composite audience
away from the differences that divide and toward mutual agreement on universal values
(Frank, 2011). To this he adds the complementary element of polysemy to re-envision
what is possible and drive home the point that there is something in his policies for
everyone. As Chirindo and Neville-Shepard (2015) conclude, “The lynchpin of the
Obama doctrine, then, was not minimalism, interventionism, isolationism, idealism, nor
realism alone, but mutuality,” up against which he “juxtaposed the follies of isolationism
and balkanization” (p. 217-218). As I now turn toward a review of how Obama is situated
in the administrative presidency, it is notable that his diplomatic instincts were closely
aligned with those of Thomas Jefferson and Woodrow Wilson (Mead, 2010), reflecting
an “exceptionalist ethos” (Edwards, 2012, p. 342, as quoted in Chirindo and NevilleShepard, 2015) that was more “egalitarian” in its orientation (Chirindo and NevilleShepard, 2015, p. 217). As the analysis in this study reveals, Obama’s diplomatic
instincts appear to be closely aligned with his administrative impulses in that they both
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mirror those of Woodrow Wilson, a comparison to which I will return later in this
dissertation.
Obama’s Administrative Approach
To begin with, Obama was viewed by his supporters as using presidential control
in a much more sparing fashion than his predecessors (Rudalevige, 2016). Obama even
presented himself during his campaign “as a transcendent leader who could imbue the
policy state with new causes and moral fervor” (Milikis and Jacobs, 2017). Ostensibly,
such an outcome would be one in which Congress would set aside partisan differences
and deliberate the successful resolution of the important causes of the time. Yet, upon
reaching office, the grand vision of bi-partisan policymaking had dissipated in a cloud of
hyper-partisan rancor (Milkis and Jacobs, 2017). Not being able to stand apart from the
entrenched partisan reality that divided Congress, Obama had little choice but to fully
embrace the administrative presidency in pursuit of his progressive policies (Jacobs and
King, 2009; Coglianese 2009; Skocpol and Jacobs, 2012; Milkis and Jacobs, 2017). This,
however, is not to say that Obama reluctantly embraced the use of executive powers.
Indeed, despite his attempts to separate his presidential style from his predecessors,
Obama unreservedly acted in similar fashion to “ensure that executive branch agencies
act in ways consistent with his priorities” (Coglianese, 2009, p. 637). To ensure that
agencies would be responsive to the policy priorities of the executive branch, Obama
took great care to appoint advisors and policy czars, without Senate confirmation, for the
express purpose of ensuring that agency policymakers worked diligently and consistently
to advance the president’s agenda (Shapiro and Wright, 2010; Coglianese, 2009).
Significantly, in policy fields such as energy and climate change that were unlikely to
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attract bipartisan support, Obama followed the lead of his predecessors to act
administratively to “convey the impression that [he is] personally responsible for the
conduct of domestic governance” (Strauss, 2007, 702). Shapiro and Wright (2010) also
observe that Obama “adopted the same approach to controlling the federal bureaucracy
that his predecessors employed” (p. 577). In other words, presidents are loathe to give
away power and control, and the administrative presidency is the most effective way of
centralizing power in the White House through the extensive use of political appointees
to monitor and control agency actions (Shapiro and Wright, 2010).
Milkis, Rhodes, and Charnock (2012) have written about the dualism in Obama’s
administrative style as an attempt to reconcile his Progressive Era impulse to mobilize a
nonpartisan administration to promote social welfare with the partisan reality of
accomplishing his own party objectives. In this manner, they explain,
[Obama] sought to navigate the complex terrain of a ‘new American party
system,’ characterized by high expectations for presidential leadership in a
context of widespread dissatisfaction with government, strong and intensifying
political polarization, and high-stakes battles over the basic direction of domestic
and military programs. (p. 58)
As a result, Obama assertively recalibrated Bush-era rules through executive action to
more aggressively apply environmental regulations to air and water pollution, including
the authority to regulate greenhouse gases as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act.
Through his efforts, Obama sought to establish “a new regulatory era that could
significantly expand the role of the executive branch” (Milkis et al., 2012, p. 67). Such
calculated and assertive action did not go without notice. As Andrew Rudalevige (2016)
documents, although Obama’s commitment to executive action was a tactic his opponents
rarely failed to stress, Obama’s allies defended his executive centered action by claiming
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that he had issued the lowest number of executive orders in the modern presidential era
(Rudalevige, 2016). White House Senior Advisor Dan Pfeiffer even underscored the
point by highlighting that Obama was “issuing executive orders at the lowest rate in 100
years.” Obama himself later made similar statements, claiming that “[t]he history is that I
have issued fewer executive actions than most of my predecessors, by a longshot . . . .
[T]ake a look at the track records of the modern presidency, I’ve actually been very
restrained” (as quoted in Rudalevige, 2016, p. 3-4). However, while it is true that Obama
issued fewer executive orders than his predecessors, it is a demonstrable exaggeration to
claim that he “issued fewer executive actions…by a long shot.” In fact, Obama did issue
the fewest executive orders per year since Grover Cleveland, including only 20 in 2013
(Rudalevige, 2016). However, “executive actions,” including all the tools available to the
administrative presidency, are far more expansive than the narrow category of executive
orders. Moreover, the quantity of executive orders says nothing about their policy
significance. As Rudalevige (2016) observes, “many of those orders served as significant
policy tools,” ranging from reversal of Bush Administration policies to promoting social
reform by requiring private contractors to the federal government to pay higher minimum
wages, not discriminate against sexual orientation and identity, and strengthen
compliance with laws governing business integrity and ethics (p. 15). In fact, despite both
his and his allies’ disavowals of the unitary tools of the office, Obama willingly
embraced executive orders, presidential memoranda, and signing statements, among
others, when it was convenient and efficacious to do so (Schier 2011).
This is a good place to pause and reflect on all the tools presidents have at their
disposal to influence policy through administrative actions. Executive orders tend to
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garner the most attention because they are a very high-profile way of setting policy.
Executive orders are typically published in the Federal Register and are often aimed at
pressing policy problems, making them both very public and frequently controversial
(Rudalevige, 2016). However, as Rudalevige (2016) points out, the number of executive
orders published since the 1930’s has declined steadily from a peak of 573 in 1933, 80 in
1953, and 62 in 1963 to an average of 30.7 per year over from 2005 to 2015. With the
expansion of the bureaucracy under FDR and rise of the administrative presidency under
Nixon, the decline in the routine use of executive orders has been supplanted by a variety
of other unilateral actions, including memoranda, proclamations, formal findings,
designations, letters, signing statements, regulatory discretion, guidance documents, and
rulemakings (Relyea, 2008; see also Cooper, 2014; Rudalevige, 2016). In fact, as a result,
focusing on executive orders and not all the other tools available to presidents is a poor
representation of executive action, and this dissertation considers all the tools by which
Obama pursued climate policy through the administrative presidency.
Obama’s “sustained reliance on the executive administrative” led his detractors to
frequently and stridently accuse him of making unprecedented and improper use of
executive action by taking unilateralism to new and more perilous unilateral heights
(Milkis and Jacobs, 2017, p. 588). On the other hand, his defenders wondered how a
president who showed great restraint by making such little use of executive orders could
be accused of so greatly abusing executive action. So which, if either, is correct? As
Rudalevige (2016) observes, neither position is entirely true:
Despite his early rhetoric disclaiming unilateralism, Obama fully inhabited the
institutional structure of the administrative presidency he inherited from his
predecessors, and their reliance on ‘creative lawyers’ to boot. In some areas, he
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built extensions on their work. In general, though, these were changes in degree
and not in kind. (p. 13)
While it is true that Obama did show somewhat less interest in the actual management of
the administrative state, he was nonetheless extremely interested in wielding “the power
of the administrative state” to influence both foreign and domestic policies (Rudalevige,
2016). This was particularly the case after important legislative victories (e.g., the
Affordable Care Act) and the loss of Democratic control of Congress in 2010. At the
time, David Axelrod, a key Obama political aid, remarked, “[T]he next phase is…less
about legislative action than it is about managing the change that we’ve brought about”
(as quoted in Rudalevige, 2016). Managing the change occurred, in part, through the
bureaucracy that implemented the statutes but which also relied on “creative lawyers” to
interpret the statutes using executive orders, memoranda, and informal guidance
documents to allow Obama’s polices to move forward (Rudalevige, 2016). Such actions
are not new, but as Martha Derthick (2011) notes about regulating nicotine in the 1990s
using the 1938 Food and Drug Act, “Much of the activity of American policymaking
consists of attempts not to pass new laws but to invest old ones with new meanings” (p.
56). This is, of course, precisely what the Obama administration attempted to do by
regulating CO2 emissions under a novel legal interpretation of the Clean Air Act, which
even EPA attorneys admitted was “challenging” (Davenport, 2014, n.p.). The Supreme
Court later took the unprecedented step of staying EPA’s existing power plant CO2 rule
over concerns that the agency went too far in creatively interpreting the Clean Air Act
(UARG v. EPA).
In a broader sense, as Milkis and Jacobs (2017) note, once the 112th Congress
“ground to halt” after the midterm elections flipped the power away from congressional

100
Democrats, Obama consciously pivoted to a strategy that would free himself from the
expectation that he would be held hostage by the gridlock of a now oppositional Congress
(Savage 2012). As will be discussed in more detail later in Chapter 6, it was at this point
that Obama initiated his “We can’t wait” policy. In other words, where Congress would
not act, or act consistent with his policies, Obama would go it alone through the
administrative presidency (Lowande and Milkis, 2014). Such an approach was
encouraged and supported by John Podesta, White House senior counsel, who had been
urging Obama to more aggressively focus on executive authority to bypass Congress, in
particular with regard to climate change (Allen and Brown, 2013). To this end, the
Obama Administration eagerly embraced the role of regulator, taking a centralized role in
the process and issuing approximately 3,500 rules in his first term, 10% of which were
regulatorily significant and subject to the Office of Management and Budget review
process (Rudalevige, 2014). Obama also eagerly embraced the use of signing statements
to circumvent the vicissitudes of legislation that work in often unwelcome ways for
sitting presidents (Crouch, Rozell, and Sollenberger, 2013). Regardless of rhetoric,
presidents clearly are not going to abandon the institutional power of their office. They
are also not going to be held hostage by an oppositional congress and, when possible,
“will govern without direct congressional involvement” (Savage, 2012, n.p.; see also
Crouch et al., 2013).
Thus, like every other president, especially Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush,
Obama took full advantage of the administrative presidency to “exploit national
administrative power for partisan purposes” as he sought to implement his policies in
spite of a gridlocked Congress (Milkis and Jacobs, 2017, p. 609). However, unlike his
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predecessors, as Milkis and Jacobs (2017) observe, Obama wielded his executive tools in
a much more subtle and creative way that “framed administrative partisanship as more
routine and less visible” (p. 609). By doing so, he was able to surpass the “institutional
strategies” of his predecessors and push the bounds of the more informal tools of the
office, such as memoranda and waivers, that were often more difficult to translate into
existing law but, once in force, were “policy-consequential” and carried the full force of
law (Milkis and Jacobs, 2017, p. 589). After all, as he and his allies correctly
underscored, Obama’s use of executive orders was relatively restrained. Yet, as noted
above, the tools of the administrative presidency are diverse, and Obama took “full
advantage” of all the other mechanisms by which a president can exert executive power,
in particular through agency rulemaking (Rudalevige, 2016, p. 28). In fact, as
Rudalevige (2016) concludes, “President Obama has taken full advantage of [the
administrative presidency]. His Administration has clearly been aggressive in utilizing
both its administrative discretion under existing law and its regulatory authority to
implement new law in ways that suit presidential preferences” (p. 36). Notably, such
efforts were focused on wicked problems like health care, immigration, and climate
change where Obama found Congress unwilling or unable to act (Lowande and Milkis,
2010; Rudalevige, 2014 and 2016; Milkis and Jacobs, 2017; Coglianese, 2017; Milkis et
al., 2012). All of this serves to confirm what Nathan (1983) originally argued about the
administrative presidency: “In a complex, technologically advanced society in which the
role of government is pervasive, much of what we would define as policymaking is done
through the execution of laws in the management process” (p. 83).
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CHAPTER FIVE: OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY AND SUITABILITY OF
QUALITATIVE APPROACH
Insights from approaches used in qualitative social science and rhetorical analysis
(typically used in the humanities) informed the methodological approach used in this
study. In particular, the study employed an iterative grounded theory approach to analyze
how President Obama rhetorically rationalized his use of the administrative presidency to
implement climate policy. Obama’s shift away from a deliberative but ultimately
unaccommodating congressional process to a more favorable and responsive
administrative rulemaking process marked an important evolution in the development of
climate policy in the U.S. at the federal level. His administrative action also continues the
longstanding practice of presidents using an administrative presidency to advance
policies that would otherwise be impossible to implement through a less friendly
congressional process. The study of the administrative and rhetorical presidency has a
rich history, and the grounded theory approach used in this study provides a way of
examining them together and allowing for the emergence and consideration of new
theories by which to understand these common practices. In addition, rhetorical analysis
was used to examine the distinct rhetorical strategies employed by Obama to make the
case for his administrative action to the American public. As explained below, this hybrid
approach not only allows for a richer understanding of Obama’s administrative actions, it
also allows for the consideration of emergent questions, insights, and ongoing assessment
of the method of analysis (Charmaz, 2006). The data analyzed covers Obama’s speeches,
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presidential memos, executive orders, and agreements, collectively referred to as
presidential statements.
While the administrative presidency and rhetorical presidency have been
extensively studied over the past several decades, there has not been any research
combining the two ideas and examining them in the context of the wicked problem of
climate change. The lack of knowledge specific to this area of study makes it well suited
generally for qualitative analysis and specifically for grounded theory, whereby the data
are analyzed inductively to identify emergent themes that are “grounded” in the data, as
opposed to being deductively verified by existing frameworks (Glaser and Stauss, 1967;
Charmaz, 2006; Luker, 2009; Tracy, 2013). Such an approach is similar to the approach
scholars might take when doing discourse analysis to reveal patterns in human
communication (Cresswell, 2013; Starks and Trinidad, 2007; Wertz, 2011). Because an
overarching goal of the study is to generate new knowledge and form a deeper
understanding of how presidents explain and promote their policy choices and rationalize
their use of the administrative presidency, an important element of this dissertation is that
it incorporates rhetorical analysis as a system of investigation rather than as a specific
methodology (Medhurst, 2006).37 Rhetorical analysis also facilitated the iterative nature
of the research—that is, when a particular rhetorical strategy emerged from the data (e.g.,
locus of the irreparable and strategic ambiguity), I was able to identify it in the literature,
code it, and expand on it in relation to Obama’s administrative actions in the findings.

37

As Medhurst (2006) explains, “…I am interested in substantive matters, which I choose to study through
the instrumentality of rhetoric. To focus on matters of public affairs is to incur the responsibility to
understand, as best one can, the factors that contribute to those affairs” (p. 381).
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The approach therefore was not purely inductive, but instead it relied on existing theory
to inform interpretations of the data.
It is worth noting here that the field of public administration scholarship has not
historically borrowed from methodologies developed in the humanities, such as rhetorical
analysis, making this study unique within public administration scholarship. However, by
incorporating the investigative attributes of rhetorical analysis, this study brings a fresh
perspective to the field by augmenting and animating traditional understandings of the
discipline. By incorporating rhetorical analysis therefore, I was able to introduce a new
perspective on an old theme by using it to critically examine and explicate arguments for
specific policies, such as the Clean Power Plan, and rationalizations of administrative
action to implement them (Benson, 1989; Medhurst, 1996; Medhurst, 2006).
Because rhetorical analysis is unusual in public administration scholarship, it is
worth pausing to elaborate on some of its key elements to ensure a good understanding of
the approach. Rhetoric itself is defined in various ways in popular writing, often with a
negative connotation, but scholars typically define rhetoric in its classical, Aristotelean
sense as communication that persuades (Croucher and Cronn-Mills, 2014; Foss, 2009).
According to Foss (2009), rhetoric involves the use of symbols in communication—both
verbal and visual—that represent ideas and are intended to influence the audience or
create a better understanding of the author’s or speaker’s perspective. Similarly, Cathcart
(1991) offers that “rhetoric…refers to a communicator’s intentional use of language and
other symbols to influence or persuade selected receivers to act, believe, or feel the way
the communicator desires” (as quoted in Croucher and Cronn-Mills, 2014, p. 312).
Lastly, Kuypers (2005) defines rhetoric as “the strategic use of communication, oral or
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written, to achieve specifiable goals” (p. 5). Rhetoric thus is a powerful tool used to shape
how audiences perceive reality in order to sway their views (Foss, 2009) and plays an
important role in defining policy problems and their solutions, including how they are
prioritized and rationalized.
From an empirical standpoint, methods of rhetorical analysis provide a systematic
way of evaluating rhetoric and involve the study of written and spoken texts to analyze
how they are crafted and how effectively they persuade (Jasinski, 2001; Foss, 2009).
Such methods are diverse and multifaceted, ranging from traditional, or neo-Aristotelean,
approaches to feminist, Marxist, and ideological criticism, among many others (Kuypers,
2016; Foss, 2009; Croucher and Cronn-Mills, 2014). Generally speaking, rhetorical
analysis is interested in what is going on in the text, why certain rhetorical moves (i.e.,
strategies) are being used, and how the audience is affected (Foss, 2009; Kuypers, 2005,
2016). Although all three of these elements are commonly addressed in rhetorical
analysis, this study focuses only on the rhetorical strategies used to rationalize
administrative action. As a result, this study relies on one aspect of traditional rhetorical
analysis that focuses on the reasoning, arguments, and evidence that make up the corpus
of how Obama rationalized his use of the administrative presidency to implement climate
policy through the EPA. Ultimately, regardless of methodological approach, rhetorical
analysis enables researchers to “begin making statements about messages rather than
statements about…feelings” (Foss, 2009, p. 6). It also facilitates a more sophisticated
understanding of communication that enables richer, deeper, and more discerning
analysis of the symbols used in communication (Foss, 2009, Kuypers, 2005, 2016). As a
result, rhetorical analysis in this study serves an important function in illuminating the
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interaction of presidential action and presidential rhetoric to better understand their
implications on policy and, in a broader sense, the way in which policy is both developed
and implemented.
In policy studies in particular, rhetorical analysis captures the inherently rhetorical
nature of policy (Medhurst, 2006). It also elucidates the strategic and systematic use of
rhetoric to persuade the public to adopt a particular view of a policy problem and support
a particular course of action instead of other possible actions (Majone, 1989). As
Giandominico Majone (1989) argues, “Every politician understands that arguments are
needed not only to clarify his position with respect to an issue, but to bring other people
around to this position….We miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making
solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and
argument” (p. 2). Viewed in this light, rhetoric is a powerful and instrumental tool in the
hands of policymakers to “construct policy problems, craft solutions, and promote
policies to citizens” (Asen, 2010, p. 122). Rhetorical analysis thus allows for a greater
consideration of the “role of rhetoric as a constitutive force” (Asen, 2010, p. 128) in U.S.
policymaking and enhances our understanding of the choices of policymakers in framing
problems and contingent solutions. It is in this respect in particular that I use rhetorical
analysis as a system of investigation to better understand and contextualize Obama’s
rhetorical presidency as a complementary, if not co-productive, tool of his administrative
presidency.
Using rhetorical analysis in such a hybrid manner also recognizes David
Zarefsky’s (2004) insightful observation that the study of presidential rhetoric necessarily
incorporates perspectives from the humanities and social sciences. In other words, a
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humanities perspective opens the study to observations about the uniqueness and
recurrent patterns of presidential rhetoric, while at the same time analyzing specific
actions from a social science perspective that give rise to the rhetoric in the first place
(Zarefsky, 2004). As Zarefsky (2004) argues, “[Presidential rhetoric] increasingly is what
the presidency is about...” (p. 607). After all, just as a president makes calculated policy
choices so does he, as rhetor, make calculated rhetorical choices intended to promote
those policy choices in the most convincing manner possible (Zarefsky, 2004).
Importantly, given rhetoric’s potential to persuade and “shape the world's appearance
such that we make this move rather than that choice" (Murphy, 2001, p. 260),
incorporating rhetorical analysis also enabled a more sophisticated consideration of the
role of rhetoric in enhancing the tools of presidential control.
A deeper and richer understanding about the way in which presidents—President
Obama in this case—wield these powerful policy tools is thus facilitated by seeing them
as inextricably linked through the administrative-rhetorical presidency (Milkis, 2012).
With that in mind, Obama’s rhetoric was viewed, in the words of rhetoric scholar Martin
Medhurst (2006), as “both a strategic and productive art directly related to leadership in
public contexts” (p. 381). In the case of this study, understanding Obama’s administrative
presidency and the policies proceeding from his “leadership in public contexts” was
significantly aided by also understanding the rhetoric that brought them to life (Medhurst,
2006). As a result, analyzing Obama’s statements through rhetorical analysis provided
helpful insights about how he rhetorically constructed the role of the EPA to implement
climate policy, thereby connecting executive action with the rationalization behind that
action.
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As discussed in more detail below, the analysis for this study began by analyzing
Obama’s presidential statements with an emphasis on context and rhetorical strategies.
While staying open to emergent themes, the study also analyzed presidential statements
for how Obama framed the role of bureaucracy in implementing climate policy. As
mentioned above, this approach is similar to inductively analyzing data from the “bottom
up,” rather than deductively from the “top down,” such as by superimposing external
criteria onto the content of their statements. However, sensitizing concepts from previous
research on governance and the bureaucracy (see, for example, Kettl 2000; Tulis, 1987;
Bertelli and Lynn, 2006; Edwards III, Kessl, and Rockman, 2009; Friedman and
Friedman, 2012; Rudalevige, 2006; Milkis, 2007) were used to inform “initial but
tentative” impressions of the data, as described by Charmaz (2014, p. 30). These
impressions added richness and depth to the analysis by creating opportunities to explore
connections between how Obama rationalized his use of the EPA and how scholars have
described the various approaches presidents have taken toward governance. In particular,
these impressions were helpful in considering how to situate Obama in historical context
with previous presidents. Notably, such impressions were not locked in as “definitive
concepts” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 31). Instead, they were treated as leads to evaluate and
pursue or discard, depending on how they fit with the data (Charmaz, 2014).
As rhetorical themes and governance leads emerged, they were examined more
closely in the literature, which allowed the study to draw upon and anchor the data to
existing scholarship. At the same time, the analysis explored areas where such literature
may be expanded or revised. For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, Kettl’s (2000)
theoretical framework, which organized the various views on governance and the
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bureaucracy into a framework consisting of Madisonian, Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, and
Wilsonian ideals (Kettl, 2000), both informed the analysis and provided a way of
situating Obama among other presidents. In addition, although not pursued by Kettl,
categorizing the main academic and practitioner views on “administrative ideas and
political philosophy” (i.e. the politics-administration dichotomy) functions well as a
typology of presidential approaches to the role of bureaucracy (see Table 5.1). Using the
framework as a typology in this way was helpful in explicating Obama’s administrative
and rhetorical strategies. As explored later in this study’s findings, those strategies
suggest a Progressive Era orientation that falls within the Wilsonian type. In this manner,
then, the research progressed from an inductive to deductive understanding (and
sometimes back) through iterative analysis (Tracy, 2013). Such an approach allowed for
the systematic, comparative, and interactive testing of both established and emergent
understandings to arrive at a richer description of what Obama’s executive actions and
rhetoric reveal about his approach to governance and use of the bureaucracy. Thus, in
addition to focusing on the emergent themes, the research also creatively engaged with
the data to consider additional theoretical applications (Charmaz, 2006; Luker, 2009;
Tracy, 2013).
Table 5.1

Typology of Presidential Control in the U.S. (Kettl, 2000)
Wilsonian
(Hierarchical)

Madisonian
(Balance of Power)

Hamiltonian
(Strong-Executive/ Top-Down)

Strong-executive
Top-down accountability
Hierarchical authority

Centered on non-bureaucratic
institutions
Focus on political power
Top-down accountability

Jeffersonian
(Weak-Executive/ Bottom-Up)

Weak-executive
Bottom-up responsibility
Responsive to citizens

Centered on non-bureaucratic
institutions
Focus on local control
Bottom-up responsiveness
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Data Collection and Sample Size
Because the study uses climate policy and EPA’s Clean Power Plan as a window
through which to analyze Obama’s administrative and rhetorical actions, the study used a
total population sample of Obama’s oral presidential statements related to these two
areas. As described in more detail below, the presidential statements were gathered from
“The American Presidency Project,” an online database of public presidential documents
maintained at the University of California Santa Barbara (Wooley and Peters, 2020). As
shown in Tables 5.2 below, the data included a full range of Obama’s formal and
informal rhetoric from January 2009 through December 2015, including speeches,
addresses, remarks, interviews, news conferences, and debates, which specifically
referenced greenhouse gases, climate change, clean energy, or the Clean Power Plan, as
well as related topics such as energy policy and climate agreements when relevant. 38
Using a total population sample was appropriate in this study given the relatively small
population of possible presidential statements and being able to reach saturation with the
available data (i.e., finding no new information in the data) (Creswell, 2013; Tracy,
2013).

38

“Clean energy” was added as a search term after reviewing the data because Obama commonly used it
in conjunction with his statements on climate policy (e.g., “a clean energy economy”). Additional search
terms, including “global warming,” “extreme weather,” “carbon pollution,” and “CO2” were explored but
either did not yield additional results or returned documents that made only a passing reference to the
term and could not be coded or analyzed for this study.
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Table 5.2

Document Categories and Key Word Search Terms

Campaign Documents, Convention Speeches, Elections and
Transitions, Correspondent’s Association, Debates, State of the
Document Categories
Union Addresses, Spoken Remarks and Addresses, Interviews,
News Conferences, Miscellaneous Remarks

Key Words

Climate, Climate Change, Clean Power Plan, Carbon, Carbon
Pollution, CO2, Greenhouse Gases, Extreme Weather, Clean
Energy

The time period was chosen because it captures the lead up to the rise and
subsequent fall of the Waxman-Markey Bill in Congress, Obama’s pivot to implementing
climate policy through administrative action via the EPA, and EPA’s finalization of the
Clean Power Plan in 2015. Notwithstanding Obama’s use of executive powers during his
final year in office (a common occurrence among all modern presidents), the year 2016
was not included because it falls outside the time period of this study’s primary
emphasis—that is, when Obama was focused on implementing the Clean Power Plan
through the administrative presidency. As a result, the presidential statements analyzed in
this study tracked the beginning of Obama’s efforts to rally Congress and the American
public to embrace legislative climate action and continued through his subsequent pivot
and rationalization for going it alone through administrative action when legislative
efforts failed. The time period thus captured a rich and full range of Obama’s rhetoric on
climate policy and included a diverse range of formal and informal remarks, foreign and
domestic addresses, State of the Union addresses, major speeches articulating energy and
climate policy, and his pivot to a “We Can’t Wait” campaign (Lowande and Milkis,
2014) in the face of an uncooperative Congress.
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To arrive at the total population sample, I conducted multiple searches of “The
American Presidency Project” database using key words in the literature that are often
connected with climate change and EPA’s Clean Power Plan. A helpful feature in the
database is its use of “document categories” that organize the records by types of written
and oral presidential statements. Table 5.2 includes a list of the document categories and
key words used to obtain the total population sample. By using key words in each of the
oral document categories, I was able to focus on Obama’s oral presidential statements
without having to separate them from the written records, as well as to search in each
category independently to provide context for where the statements were delivered. The
initial key word searches included “climate,” “climate change,” and “Clean Power Plan.”
Subsequent searches included “carbon,” “carbon pollution,” “CO2,” and “extreme
weather” but yielded very few additional records. In addition, after reading through
several documents, I refined the search by adding “clean energy” (as in “clean energy
economy”) which is a term that Obama commonly incorporated into his rhetoric when
discussing climate change and the Clean Power Plan. Notably, searches on “climate” and
“climate change” also returned all of Obama’s remarks on the Paris Climate Agreement,
which was important to capture because of the Clean Power Plan’s role in meeting
international climate agreements (Schreurs, Selin and VanDeveer, 2016). Once I reached
a point of saturation where no new terms were found in the text and additional search
terms returned no new records, I determined the search had returned as close to a total
population sample as possible. In all, as shown in Table 5.3, the searches returned a total
of 1,084 out of a possible 14,192 records related to Obama’s presidential statements on
climate change and the Clean Power Plan.
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Table 5.3

Number and Type of Presidential Statements Collected

Presidential Statements

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Total

Campaign, Convention,
Fundraising, and
Elections Speeches

15

4

33

132

6

27

15

231

Correspondent’s
Association

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

1

Debates

-

-

-

2

-

-

-

2

State of the Union
Addresses

-

1

1

1

1

1

1

6

Spoken Remarks and
Addresses39

20

18

20

11

10

12

9

103

Interviews

7

11

6

6

5

7

9

51

New Conferences

20

15

15

6

7

12

16

91

Miscellaneous
Remarks40

136

167

51

46

54

56

90

596

All Presidential
Statements

198

216

126

204

83

115

141

1084

Each record then was reviewed to ensure it contained the above key words in
relation to climate change and the Clean Power Plan, or references to broader energy
policy and climate agreements. Records that did not pertain substantively to these areas
were eliminated from the study. For example, records that made only a passing reference
to the search criteria were not further evaluated because they could not be coded or

39

“Spoken Remarks and Addresses” include presidential statements delivered at commencements,
inaugurals, legislatures, major to nation, Congress, toasts, and United Nations general assembly.
40
“Miscellaneous Remarks” includes presidential statements delivered at bill signings, appointments,
budget submissions, citations, conferences, deaths, informal, National Prayer Breakfast, nominations,
resignations, swearing-in, and town hall/discussion/Q&A.
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analyzed for their rhetorical import. Because the study was interested in the rhetorical
content and not the instances of occurrence, as is sometimes the focus of content analysis,
records that were duplicative in nature also were eliminated from the study. However,
duplicative with respect to this study does not simply mean repeating the same theme,
rhetorical strategy, or use of the same language in various statements. Indeed, the
repetitive use of such statements was an essential element in identifying Obama’s
overarching rhetorical themes and strategies. Rather, records were eliminated as
duplicative when the same speech, such as campaign or fundraising speeches, was
repeated successively to multiple audiences. In such cases, one representative record was
coded and analyzed. As a result, identifying passing references and duplicative records
led to eliminating an additional 937 records, leaving a total of 147 records that were
selected for analysis, as shown in Table 5.4. In terms of length, generally speaking,
Obama’s speeches ranged from 7 to 16 pages, depending on whether they were major
policy speeches; remarks ranged from 3 to 10 pages; interviews were 2 to 12 pages; and
news conferences were 1 to 9 pages.
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Table 5.4

Number and Type of Presidential Statements Analyzed

Presidential Statements

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Total

Campaign, Convention,
Fundraising, and
Elections Speeches

5

1

7

1

3

-

1

18

Correspondent’s
Association

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Debates

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

State of the Union
Addresses

-

1

1

1

1

1

1

6

Spoken Remarks and
Addresses41

3

3

2

1

2

4

2

17

Interviews

1

6

-

-

2

3

3

15

New Conferences

5

-

1

-

-

3

2

11

Miscellaneous
Remarks42

35

11

6

4

10

7

7

80

All Presidential
Statements

49

22

17

7

18

18

16

147

Data Analysis
As discussed above, the study employed a grounded theory approach that began
by inductively analyzing the presidential statements in order to identify emergent themes
that were “grounded” in the data. However, the approach was not purely inductive, since
the emergent themes were then identified in the literature and used to explicate Obama’s

41

“Spoken Remarks and Addresses” include presidential statements delivered at commencements,
inaugurals, legislatures, major to nation, Congress, toasts, and United Nations general assembly.
42
“Miscellaneous Remarks” includes presidential statements delivered at bill signings, appointments,
budget submissions, citations, conferences, deaths, informal, National Prayer Breakfast, nominations,
resignations, swearing-in, and town hall/discussion/Q&A.
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rhetorical strategies. Also as previously discussed, Kettl’s (2000) framework was used to
historically situate Obama’s combined usage of executive action and rhetoric in the
various traditions of governance and views of the bureaucracy. As a result, the emergent
concepts were not initially generated from or compared to existing theory. Instead, they
were allowed to emerge from the data. These emergent concepts generated codes that
were drawn from the presidential statements themselves. The method of analysis relied
on an iterative approach (Tracy, 2013), whereby the presidential statements were read
through multiple times each. As explained below, the first time through was to become
familiar with the topic and delivery of each statement, with subsequent readings leading
to two rounds of coding that were documented in a code book (see Appendix A). The
code book was developed during the initial read through of the data and was updated and
refined as necessary during the coding cycles. In addition to capturing and refining the
emergent codes, the code book facilitated making consistent comparisons, scrutinizing
the data, generating substantive theoretical findings, and ensuring a proper degree of
analytical rigor and explanation (Tracy, 2013; Charmaz, 2014).
In terms of actual coding, the data were coded manually through two rounds of
coding.43 The study relied on manual coding for two primary reasons. First, the data was
of a manageable size, which obviated the need to rely on computer aided coding. Second,
and more importantly, manual coding facilitated a closer interaction with the data and
enabled a deeper and more intimate understanding of Obama’s rhetorical choices. It also
called attention to any tensions the coding created and uncovered nuances that were

43

The author was the sole coder of the data. Being the sole coder provided two primary benefits of
facilitating a more intimate connection with the data and ensuring there were no discrepancies in how
the data was analyzed and interpreted.
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important to the analysis. For example, as discussed in more detail below, Obama’s
statements revealed a consistent use of strategic ambiguity, morality, and economic
rationality that were eventually grouped together as polysemy to capture the way in
which he appealed to a broad cross section of society. Computer aided coding may not
have revealed how Obama was using these strategies, and the study therefore would have
missed an important finding.
The first, or initial, round of manual coding involved interacting closely with the
data to define and label what is “going on” or being expressed in the statements,
including what is said and left unsaid (Charmaz, 2014, p. 115). For example, shortly after
returning from the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen,
Obama (December 19, 2009) delivered a message in Washington D.C. in which he stated
the following:
So even though we have a long way to go, there's no question that we've
accomplished a great deal over the last few days. And I want America to continue
to lead on this journey, because if America leads in developing clean energy, we
will lead in growing our economy and putting our people back to work and
leaving a stronger and more secure country to our children. That's why I went to
Copenhagen yesterday, and that's why I will continue in these efforts in the weeks
and months to come.
In this statement, Obama touches on a number of important and recurring themes
in his rhetoric, including recognizing the difficult path ahead, American leadership, the
economic rationality of developing clean energy, and safeguarding the future for “our
children.” Early in the coding process, these were interesting ideas that were flagged as
leads, or potentially important concepts, to keep in mind during subsequent coding. Initial
coding thus was essentially a familiarizing process with the content of the presidential
statements and the first step by which descriptive characteristics were attached to the
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data, which included identifying, labeling, grouping, and describing phenomena found in
the text of the statements (Charmaz, 2006; Tracy, 2013; Cresswell, 2013). Initial coding
also formed the basis for identifying patterns and groupings that were an essential part of
making sense of the data (Tracy, 2013). In this manner, as ideas such as “American
leadership,” “economic prosperity through clean energy,” and “safeguarding our
children” emerged from the data and recurred in subsequent speeches, I began forming
color-coded groupings as leads that warranted deeper analysis. As the analysis
progressed, the color-coded groupings became more refined and uniquely associated with
the focused codes.
The second, or focused, round of coding deepened the analysis by synthesizing
and focusing the key analytical direction of initial codes (Charmaz, 2014, pp. 138-140).
In other words, during the second round of coding the data were viewed from a
theoretical perspective, rather than descriptively, and brought together under “umbrella”
categories that connected the codes conceptually (Tracy, 2013, p. 195). In this manner,
using the above examples, the grouping of concepts related to American leadership to
address climate change became the second-level code, “Leading the Way.” Concepts
related to economic prosperity and clean energy were grouped under the second-level
code of “Clean Energy Utopia,” and those concepts related to safeguarding future
generations were coded as “Transgenerational Trust.” Ultimately, these leads were
followed to a review of rhetorical literature dealing with economic rationality (see, e.g.,
Aune, 2001), morality (see, e.g., Condit, 1987; Lakoff, 2002; Rhodes and Hlavacik,
2015), and strategic ambiguity (see, e.g., Burke, 1969; Eisenberg, 1984; Ivie, 2011).
Notably, E.E. Schattschneider (1960) also addressed the benefits of strategically
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expanding the scope of conflict in order to increase the level of support for policies that
were either losing or struggling for attention. Following these leads, among others,
eventually led to identifying polysemy, or attaching different fundamental understandings
to a single, unifying message (Ceccarelli, 1998), as one of Obama’s key rhetorical
strategies for rationalizing his administrative action related to climate policy. The
outcome of the second round thus facilitated the connection of the data to theory and
opened the way for a richer and deeper understanding of the way key rhetorical elements
were rendered in the data.
In addition, during the coding cycles, analytic memos were written to capture
observations, insights, and reactions to the data, as well as to identify and explore
theoretical connections. These memos served as “reflective forms of analysis…that
articulate mental processing of the data that have been collected” (Saldaña and Omasta,
2018, p. 255). In other words, the analytic memos formed the basis for synthesizing the
data and established the foundation for building to the findings and outcome of the
research (Cresswell, 2013; Saldaña, 2013). As such, they played a complementary and
contemporaneous supplement to coding and were instrumental in explicating the
underlying themes in the presidential statements, as well as connecting the coding,
analysis, and findings portions of the research (Tracy, 2013). The analytic memos
therefore formed an integral part of the data analysis process and research outcome by
capturing observations, insights, comparisons, and reactions to the data that ultimately led
to the theoretical connections of Obama’s presidential statements. Figure 5.1 captures the
fundamental purpose behind analytic memos, although not all elements are included in
each memo.
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Analytic Memos
A) Define the code as carefully as possible.
B) Explicate the code’s properties.
C) Provide examples of raw data that illustrate the code.
D) Specify conditions under which a code arises, is maintained, or changes.
E) Describes a code’s consequences.
F) Show how codes relate to one another.
G) Develop hypotheses about the code.
Figure 5.1

Fundamental Purpose of Analytic Memos (Charmaz, 2006)

To offer an example, Figure 5.2 shows an analytic memo that was drafted after
coding Obama’s 2010 State of the Union address. In this memo, several first-level codes
are highlighted, including the need for a diverse energy portfolio, climate change
skepticism, prosperity through domestic clean energy development, safeguarding future
generations, and pragmatism. Contextualizing and describing these codes aided in
developing what would later become the second-level codes in which they were
ultimately grouped. Capturing candid reactions to the data is an important element in
coding, and my reactions and impressions of the speech, which are included at the end of
the memo, were instrumental in linking the codes to rhetorical theory. For example, I
comment in the memo about how Obama was appealing to multiple interests and
positioning himself as a voice of reason. The lead generated by this memo eventually
resulted in identifying polysemy as one of Obama’s key rhetorical strategies. Moreover,
Obama’s use of polysemy to make what is arguably a populist appeal for climate action
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was later used to argue for compelling similarities between Obama’s and Wilson’s use of
the administrative and rhetorical presidencies.
Analytic Memo Example
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union
January 27, 2010
Analytic Memo: 7/15/2018
In his 2010 SOTU speech, Obama emphasizes the need for a clean/green energy
economy through bipartisan legislation (Waxman-Markey Bill), acknowledging
passage of the bill in the House and looking forward to a similar bill in the senate.
Notably, Obama also advances an all of the above energy strategy by mentioning “safe,
clean nuclear power plants,” “making tough decisions about opening new offshore
areas for oil” (I see this as a tone of compromise to the oil industry for support of the
W-M bill), biofuels, and clean coal technologies (primarily CCS).
Obama also broaches the topic of various views on the science of climate change by
stating, “I know that there are those who disagree with the overwhelming scientific
evidence on climate change.” However, he says it in more of a passing way in order to
make the point that science is almost beside the point because building a clean energy
economy is the “right thing to do for our future” regardless, because of the domestic
and global benefits of a “clean energy economy.” He also notes that (because of
Copenhagen) the U.S. has “gone from a bystander to a leader in the fight against
climate change.” However, this is significantly separated from the clean energy portion
of the speech.
Finally, Obama talks about the messiness of democracy at the end of the speech
stating, “Democracy in a nation of 300 million people can be noisy and messy and
complicated. And when you try to do big things and make big changes, it stirs passions
and controversy. That’s just how it is.” He also mentions the children and
grandchildren in the context of keeping the American drive alive for them.
As I read this SOTU address, I’m struck by the fact that Obama is treading carefully on
the subject of climate change and making climate action more about the economy and a
green energy revolution that will allow the US to compete for what he sees as the
inevitable expansion of renewables. His argument is that America must step up in order
to compete and take advantage of what is an emerging market with opportunities to
grow the economy, increase jobs, address national security and have the side benefit of
saving the planet for our children. Who could argue with that? It’s clear that Obama is
attempting to appeal to moderate Republicans who could provide the votes needed in
the Senate without stirring the ideological pot. He is the “voice of reason” in this
speech. Notably, there’s a little in the speech for everyone, including coal interests
because of the mention of CCS.

122

Obama clearly steers clear of flexing his executive muscle by pointing to the “messy
and complicated” process of democracy. He also disavows “going it alone,” stating that
he “never suggested that I could do it alone” and that change would not be easy. This
appears to be a president at this time focused on legislative solutions and doing his best
to encourage Congress to pass the W-M bill because it’s the “right thing to do” for a
whole bunch of reasons. This is a clear step back from the AP and signaling his
intention to support legislation on the matter.
Emerging codes are “right thing to do” and “pragmatism.” Obama also is attempting to
come across as the “voice of reason” that he was at Copenhagen. There is really
nothing controversial or provocative in the speech, just a president laying out his
legislative priorities and attempting to seek some common ground.
I keep thinking about Obama’s eventual pivot to the AP and wondering what will
emerge as his rationalization of that pivot. It seems that much of the foundation is
being laid here.
 Taking climate action is the right thing to do for the economy, America’s future
economic growth and jobs, competing with other nations and winning, lots of
energy alternatives…just not coal without CCS.
 Those who argue with such an approach are unreasonable, anti-progress,
backward thinking Luddites who support technology that is passing them by
from an economic and environmental standpoint.
 Transitioning to a clean energy economy is what makes sense for America and
the future of our children.
Figure 5.2
Analytic Memo: Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on
the State of the Union (Obama, January 2010)
At various points in the coding process, meta-memos were written to integrate the
analytic memos into a composite picture of the emerging concepts (Saldaña and Omasta,
2018). These meta-memos were used to synthesize the empirical data gathered in the
analytic memos (Saldaña and Omasta, 2018) and bridge the analysis to the larger
theoretical connections through an iterative process that informed the understanding and
interpretation of the codes. They essentially facilitated bringing the various pieces of the
empirical puzzle into clearer theoretical focus through a “deliberate weaving” (Saldaña
and Omasta, 2018, p. 256) of topics, relationship of concepts, and connection of
underlying themes. The meta-memos were instrumental in connecting the findings to
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existing theory by exploring the relationship between Obama’s administrative actions and
rhetoric and the typology of presidential views on governance and the bureaucracy
derived from Ketttl’s (2000) framework. This approach of connecting the research to
existing theory and allowing it to inform the interpretation of the data is consistent with
Charmaz’s (2006) observation that researchers rarely approach research as a “blank
slate.” On the contrary, researchers bring their knowledge and prior experience with the
subject matter to their research. Recognizing existing frameworks and incorporating them
into the research therefore allows for emergent findings to be juxtaposed against preexisting views to test how such views compare with the newly derived information.
Sensitizing concepts to facilitate weaving the theoretical connection together were
developed using Kettl’s framework, as described in Figure 5.1, and the data were also
analyzed from an etic, or externally derived, understanding to assess how Obama’s
presidential statements related to the typology.
Limitations to the Study Approach
All forms of social inquiry require the researcher to make choices regarding
methodology and data. Such choices are driven by numerous constraints, including,
among other things, time, cost, availability and quality of data, suitability of data for a
given methodological choice, the skill of the researcher, and the research question being
asked. Accordingly, all research is subject to certain limitations, this dissertation being no
exception. One of the strengths of this research approach (i.e., its hybrid nature) is also a
limitation. Because the research design incorporates both grounded theory and rhetorical
analysis, it does not fit precisely within the margins of either.
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For example, grounded theory as applied in this dissertation addresses the what
and how of President Obama’s rhetorical construction of the EPA but stops short of
general theorizing about presidential rhetoric that “transcend[s] situated action”
(Charmaz, 2014, p. 228). In other words, although the findings of the analysis explicate
Obama’s rhetorical and administrative actions, additional analysis is needed to begin
making generalizations about non-situational presidential rationalizations of executive
action. However, focusing on the what and how of the research is common in grounded
theory studies and provides a beginning for future analyses that may lead toward
developing a generalizable and predictive theory (Charmaz, 2014). In addition, the
research incorporates rhetorical analysis, as discussed above, as a system of investigation
rather than as a specific methodology. The analysis thus explicates Obama’s reasoning,
arguments, and evidence for how he rhetorically constructed the role of the EPA.
However, the analysis does not seek to derive answers about reception, such as how
audiences may have been impacted, that typically would be part of a rhetorical analysis
approach.
Disciplinarians in both rhetoric and qualitative social science are likely to be
surprised by the hybrid approach used in this dissertation. Since rhetoricians typically use
more interpretive methods in their research, they may be surprised by using a coding
approach to analyze speeches. Qualitative social scientists, on the other hand, may be
surprised by the way the analysis applies codes to existing source material (existing
speeches in this case), rather than to interview data, for example. There is a risk then that
neither group will be fully satisfied with the research. In addition, it would have been
interesting to compare President Obama’s rhetoric with that of his predecessor, George
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W. Bush, or even with President Trump, which was considered early on. Given the way
Trump has used executive authority to specifically counter Obama’s own use of
executive authority, such a comparison would have been rich in data and captured a
dynamic that appears likely to only increase over time. However, comparing one
president to another using the methods in this dissertation would have greatly expanded
the data analyzed and time involved. Trump’s rhetoric also posed a problem because its
often chaotic and unconventional nature makes comparisons to other presidents more
challenging. Nevertheless, these types of comparisons would be fertile ground for future
study.
In the end, the methodological choices in this dissertation function well together
and facilitate answering the research question. Importantly, Obama did not simply act
administratively to implement climate policy. If he had, the analysis would likely take on
a different form, whereby climate policy could be examined in context with other
administrative actions that would lend itself to a different methodology. Nor did Obama
only act rhetorically, which would make his rhetoric well suited for a full methodological
application of rhetorical analysis. Instead, Obama used both the administrative and
rhetorical presidencies to address the wicked problem of climate change, and it is this
interaction in which this dissertation is interested. Using grounded theory allows for the
explication and emergence of Obama’s rhetorical construction of the role of the EPA and
provides important connections to how he used the administrative presidency to
implement climate policy. Adding rhetorical analysis as a system of investigation
functions to reveal how Obama’s rhetoric was used as a constitutive force in making his
policy aspirations an administrative reality. As a result, the hybrid approach set forth
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above provides a way to better understand and contextualize Obama’s rhetorical
presidency as a complementary, if not co-productive, tool of his administrative
presidency.
Conclusion
As discussed in the next chapter, a number of intriguing codes emerged from this
process, which were then synthesized within two broad streams of rhetorical theory:
strategic ambiguity and locus of the irreparable. The data reveal Obama’s evolving and
fluid use of rhetorical approaches to defend international and domestic action on climate
change, promote the Waxman-Markey Bill, and rationalize his use of executive action
when the bill was derailed in the Senate during the summer of 2010. Notably, Obama’s
rhetoric took a dramatic turn away from a collaborative and, at times, conciliatory tone of
unification around a common cause, which characterized his pre-Waxman-Markey
addresses, to one of urgency and increasing stridency as he signaled his “going-it-alone”
approach to policymaking.44 Obama’s rhetoric not only coincided with his shifting
strategic emphasis—first deliberative, then unilateral—but publicly made the case for
how and why he employed each strategy. As will be argued, such an approach places
Obama within the Wilsonian tradition of governance, which includes both Wilson’s
views on the relationship between politics and administration and his championing of the
Progressive Era’s goal of expanding political, social, and economic opportunities to a
more diverse representation of American citizens by bridging “the gap between the

Other scholars have made similar observations about Obama’s earlier speeches, which they connected
to the themes of community centered on American exceptionalism and the American dream. See, for
example, Ceaser (2012); Gilmore, Sheets, and Rowling (2016); Riehl (2008); and Atwater (2007).
44
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promise of American ideals and the performance of American political institutions”
(Ruiz, 1989, p. 159).
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CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
This study began by asking how President Obama rhetorically constructed the
role of the EPA, effectively weaponizing45 it to implement federal climate change
regulations that failed to advance in Congress. A key basis for the research question was
to better understand how presidents rationalize their use of the administrative presidency
in order to gain new insights about how the use of a weaponized bureaucracy might affect
democratic principles, in particular the ability of Congress to deliberate and arrive at
representative solutions. In order to answer the question, as discussed in Chapter 5, the
study used a modified grounded theory approach to analyze Obama’s presidential
statements. The presidential statements included speeches, addresses, remarks,
interviews, news conferences, and debates, which specifically referenced greenhouse
gases, climate change, clean energy, or the Clean Power Plan, as well as related topics
such as energy policy and climate agreements, when relevant, from 2009 through 2015.
This time period was chosen because it captures Obama’s efforts to implement measures
to address climate change during his two terms in office. Specifically, the time period
includes the lead up to the passage of the Waxman-Markey bill in the House in 2009, the
bill’s subsequent failure to move in the Senate in 2010, and Obama’s eventual pivot away
from legislation and toward administrative action through the Environmental Protection
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As noted in Chapter 1, the term “weaponized,” including its cognates, is intended to be politically
neutral, as would “tool” or other similarly descriptive term. “Weaponized” is a particularly apt description
considering a similar use of the EPA by President Trump to address the same policy issue but in the
opposite direction.
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Agency (EPA), which issued a draft version of its Clean Power Plan rule in 2014 and a
final rule in 2015.
Throughout this legislative and administrative saga, Obama employed multiple
forms of rhetoric to promote his energy and climate policies, which is indicative of
Obama’s impressive and diverse command of rhetoric throughout his presidency. Given
the seven-year time period, 147 speeches analyzed, and the breadth of Obama’s rhetorical
repertoire, it is unsurprising that multiple rhetorical approaches would emerge from the
data. But the findings below identify two rhetorical approaches that predominate, and
which also map onto Obama’s administrative efforts: the use of “polysemy” and
reference to the “locus of the irreparable.” As Obama moves from polysemic rhetoric to
a focus on the irreparable aspects of climate change—and the need for urgent action—so
too do we see the focus shift from legislative action to administrative action. The case of
climate policy under Obama, therefore, offers an ideal example of how the rhetorical and
administrative presidencies co-produce one another.
As will be discussed in more detail below, when climate legislation was still a
possibility early in his first term, Obama made extensive use of polysemy in order to
garner as much support as possible for legislative action. In fact, Obama was careful to
avoid making climate change a wedge issue in his speeches prior to 2011. Instead,
Obama focused on common ground, reconciling reducing carbon emissions with growing
a clean energy economy, and existing areas of agreement to build as broad of a consensus
as possible on the benefits of an economy-wide transformation to clean energy. Then, in
2011, when the possibility of legislation began to fade, Obama began using “locus of the
irreparable” to urge congressional action and raise support for measures to address
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climate change among the populace. As Obama entered his second term in 2013, and a
deeply divided, polarized Congress effectively erased the possibility of legislation,
Obama’s references to the “locus of the irreparable” began to dominate his speeches as he
made the case to the American public for executive action on climate change measures.
During this period, Obama de-emphasized the benefits of transitioning to a clean energy
economy as the basis for action, although such a transformation remained a pillar in his
overall policy platform. Instead, Obama began emphasizing catastrophic climate change
as a clear and present danger to current and future generations that required urgent action,
while there was still time to make a difference. The urgency and severity of the threat
then became the basis for his administrative action.
What eventually emerged from the analysis of the data was Obama’s full
rationalization for using the EPA to implement climate policy. Continuing his rhetorical
strategy of locus of the irreparable, Obama first argued that climate change is a clear,
present, and scientifically verified danger for which time is running out to prevent its
most harmful impacts. Obama next argued that American leadership is a necessary
precondition for international cooperation and action, without which the isolated actions
of any nation would be insufficient. Therefore, because Republican opposition was
preventing congress from acting, Obama had to act administratively to avoid condemning
future generations to the catastrophic effects of irreversible climate damage. As such,
Obama rhetorically constructed EPA as a weapon46 of last resort, but one that Obama
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Later in this chapter, President Obama is quoted using the phrase “assault against climate change” to
describe what the Clean Power Plan, among other United States climate initiatives, means for
international climate actions. Given Obama’s use of the phrase, the term “weapon” fits well within the
framing of an act of last resort to repel an imminent threat. Having said that, there are limitations to the
metaphor, especially in that it can take on a deeply partisan tone. For example, “war on coal” and “war on

131
would freely and fully wield to implement policy he believed would further national—
and intergenerational—interests. Importantly, these arguments were made to a greater or
lesser extent in virtually every speech in this study. Perhaps most significantly, they are
animated by Obama’s view of the American Dream—that is, an America that is
motivated by decency, communal responsibility, and perseverance, so that everyone has
an opportunity to realize their own American Dream (Atwater, 2007). Ultimately,
Obama’s full rationalization of his administrative action reveals his Progressive Era
ideals and connects him to Wilsonian views of governance.
With the foregoing as a preface, the plan for this chapter begins with an overview
of polysemy in rhetorical theory and then progresses to an analysis of Obama’s use of
polysemy (principally through strategic ambiguity) in promoting his climate policies. As
previously noted, this portion of the findings primarily covers the years from 2009 to
2011. The analysis and findings then move to an overview of Obama’s uses of the “locus
of the irreparable,” demonstrating how Obama employs the irreparable to rationalize
bypassing Congress and “going it alone” through executive action. Throughout the
analysis, the emergent codes are contextualized alongside specific quotations that capture
the sense in which they are used and discussed in relation to how they connect to
rhetorical theory. The connection to theory is important for understanding how Obama
inhabits the rhetorical presidency, using it to animate and rationalize his use of the
administrative presidency. In the end, the analysis forms a picture of how President

the middle class” have both been used in partisan ways that may help rhetorically create a we-they siege
mentality that may inhibit effective dialogue about important policy questions. Such is not the intent in
this dissertation, but the metaphor does highlight the powerful role rhetoric can play in framing policy
problems for partisan ends.
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Obama rhetorically constructs the role of the EPA, effectively weaponizing it to
implement federal climate change regulations. The picture that emerges is a fusion of the
administrative and rhetorical presidencies that places Obama squarely within a Wilsonian
view of governance. It also places Obama among all of his predecessors who have used
the bureaucracy to expand executive reach when their policies fail to move through a
more deliberative legislative process. As discussed in the final chapter, such actions lead
to a type of “executive centered partisanship” (Milkis and Jacobs, 2017, p. 585) that
aggrandizes the presidency and marginalizes Congress, which has implications for how
wicked and ordinary problems alike are addressed.

The Rhetorical Use of Polysemy
As with many of his speeches during the early years of his administration, Obama
engages in a variety of rhetorical strategies, varying them as audiences and political
exigencies shift (Ivie, 2011). These strategies help Obama navigate an energy and climate
minefield as he finesses arguments about clean energy and climate change. And his
calculated approach allows him to craft a more unifying message to avoid alienating his
opposition. Obama’s more circumscribed arguments at this time are intended to channel
attention away from divisive and polarized positions. Instead, he aims to shape
perceptions about energy policy through a careful framing of policy choices. To generate
the broadest appeal possible, Obama uses polysemy, and especially strategic ambiguity,
to create a message that resonates with disparate audiences holding vastly divergent
political views. Polysemy is the concept of attaching different fundamental
understandings to a single, unifying message (Ceccarelli, 1998; Condit, 1989). Thus, a
message that is strategically ambiguous appeals to multiple understandings originating
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from diverse points of view—dramatically so in the case of climate change—without
having to resolve, or even address, the inherent differences among them. In other words,
a polysemic message has a little something for everyone and does not require the various
interests to give up firmly held beliefs.
Obama’s use of polysemy demonstrates a sensitivity to how deeply America is
divided on the wicked problem of climate change. It also demonstrates a politically astute
realization that if that polarized divide is to be overcome, disparate American interests
would have to become united under a common cause. Not surprisingly then, much of
Obama’s rhetoric prior to the Waxman Markey bill’s failure in Congress focuses on
articulating a vision for America intended to unite the various interests under a common
understanding of American ideals, as explained below, and economic prosperity.
Notably, Obama does not sidestep the deeply polarizing issue of climate change in
America. Instead, he frequently recognizes the various differences and firmly held values
in a non-polarizing way. He then attempts to create a common ground around a noregrets policy aimed at building a “clean energy economy,” as he recalls times in the past
when America faced adversity and rose to the challenge. For Obama, this is the
quintessential American spirit that will allow the nation to address its energy and climate
challenges, while ensuring equal opportunity for all its citizens. In many ways, then,
Obama’s rhetoric is as much about America itself as it is about energy and climate policy.
As described in the following sections, Obama’s polysemic rhetoric in this regard
generally falls under the three broad themes of “United We Stand,” “Clean Energy
Utopia,” and “Social Solidarity” (see Table 6.1). The “United We Stand” theme
expresses Obama’s efforts to set aside political and ideological differences to focus on
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solutions. The theme carries a strong undercurrent of economic rationality and realism,
which frames measures addressing climate change as pragmatic solutions that benefit the
economy and overall social welfare. Obama also uses the “United We Stand” theme to
argue that the similarities that bind Americans are greater than the differences that divide.
Table 6.1

Codes Related to Polysemy

Code

Description

United We Stand

Ideological and political differences are set aside to focus
on issues that matter to all Americans, such as energy and
climate change. Effectively addressing the challenges
America faces will lead to both economic and social
benefits.

Clean Energy Utopia

This is an economic argument as much as a utopian vision.
A clean energy transformation will be the engine that
powers America into economic dominance and solves the
climate problem. It is a path that heals the economy and the
planet.

Social Solidarity

Conveys Obama’s version of the American Dream. It is a
vision for America that is communitarian. An America that
is characterized by decency, responsibility, and concern for
the “least of these.” It is an America that strives for
prosperity for all.

The next theme, “Clean Energy Utopia,” is a manifestation of the economic and
social benefits derived from uniting the various interests around a clean energy economy.
As such, a “Clean Energy Utopia” is as much of an economic argument as it is a utopian
vision. In other words, a transformation to a clean energy economy will be the engine that
powers America into economic dominance and also solves the climate problem. In short,
it heals the economy and the planet. Last, the “Social Solidarity” theme conveys Obama’s
version of the American Dream, as discussed above. It is a vision for an America that is
communitarian in its focus and seeks to lift up all citizens in a way that elevates the
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whole community, including future generations. Social solidarity thus becomes a larger
statement about what America means as an idea and what it can mean when its citizens
unite under a common cause. Importantly, these are not discrete themes, but instead
overlap and interact. As such, they form the core of Obama’s polysemic messages and
ultimately help build toward a national realization of Obama’s version of the American
Dream.
United We Stand
In the years leading up to the Waxman-Markey legislative failure, Obama’s
strategic ambiguity can be seen in his appeals to both those advocating swift and
significant action against climate change as well as those concerned with the harmful
economic impacts of abandoning fossil fuels. For example, in remarks to a manufacturing
plant in Newton, Iowa, Obama (March 31, 2010) reasons that “the answer [to America’s
energy policy] is not drilling everywhere all the time” nor is the answer “to ignore the
fact that we are going to need vital energy sources to maintain our economic growth and
our security.” Rather than playing one interest off the other, Obama’s message here is one
that creates a pathway for both sides to unite under a clean energy economy. Taking a
broader view, Obama (January 27, 2010) argues for a deeper level of unification during
his 2010 State of the Union Address by proclaiming that the values of the American
people “aren't Republican values or Democratic values…, business values or labor
values, they're American values.” In other words, American differences are superficial
differences, and the values we all hold are what unites us to achieve great things. The
appeal to these disparate interests is then often paired with a claim emphasizing a shared
national identity articulated through American exceptionalism. Although the concept of
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American exceptionalism is debated (Ceaser, 2012), Obama’s appeal is to America being
in the unique position to both address and take advantage of the climate change
problem.47 In other words, America’s history, prosperity, ingenuity, and ideals combine
to make it uniquely well suited among all other nations to solve the climate problem.
Calling on America to fulfill this mission conjures images of past American feats
and provides a rallying cry to unify its citizens. For example, during the same State of the
Union Address, Obama (January 27, 2010) declares, “Even if you doubt the evidence,
providing incentives for energy efficiency and clean energy are the right thing to do for
our future, because the nation that leads the clean energy economy will be the nation that
leads the global economy. And America must be that nation.” Here, Obama is
recognizing both those who are skeptical of climate change occurring, and to those who
believe it is a threat (polysemy), and then uniting them around common interests to
motivate the United States to be a global leader in this regard. Obama’s message is a
unifying appeal to the nation that paints a vision where America sets aside its differences,
answers the call of a global crisis, and at the same time ushers in an era of economic
prosperity. In other words, a united America is one that is capable of leading a global
effort to solve the climate problem and reap the benefits of doing so.

47

Although President Obama arguably did not endorse a view of American exceptionalism as uniquely
privileged to lead the world (Ceaser, 2012), he at least adopted exceptionalist language as he made his
appeal for America to embrace a clean energy future and thereby fulfill its destiny of both saving the
planet and reaping the economic benefits of leading the effort. For example, during a press conference
Strasbourg, France, Obama was asked if he adhered “to the school of American exceptionalism that sees
America as uniquely qualified to lead the world.” (as quoted in Ceaser, 2012, p. 2). Obama responded by
stating, “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British
exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism” (as quoted in Ceaser, 2012, p. 2). As
Ceaser (2012) observes, “His words were a far cry from a ‘Lincolnian’ rhetoric depicting America as ‘the
last best hope of man on earth’” (p. 3).
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Obama (April 22, 2009) makes a similar appeal for American initiative at a
manufacturing plant in Newton, Iowa but explicitly calls out the “American spirit” that
drives its exceptionalism by declaring, “America must be that nation. And while we seek
new forms of fuel to power our homes and cars and businesses, we will rely on the same
ingenuity, the same American spirit, that has always been a part of our American story.”
Here, Obama recalls the American ingenuity and spirit that have driven innovation in the
past. The call to unite in this passage is implicit but the “American spirit” and “American
story” act as a rallying cry around pivotal historical events where America collectively
rose to and overcame the challenges facing it.
Notably, in these examples and throughout many of his speeches, Obama
embraces head-on the challenge of reconciling the need for carbon emission reductions to
address climate change with America’s need for fossil fuels to support economic growth.
Also worth mentioning during this time are the oil price shocks of 2007-2008,
geopolitical crises, and the economic upheaval from which American was still reeling
(Hamilton, 2011). These events underscore an unsettled period characterized by elusive
unity, in particular where climate and energy are concerned. With all the significant
challenges facing America, Obama crafts a message on oil drilling and climate mitigation
to appeal to the diverse interests and seemingly conflicting needs of the nation. In doing
so, at a speech delivered at Andrews Air force Base, Obama (March 31, 2010) makes use
of polysemy to unite the various conflicting interests and to demonstrate how they could
be reconciled, reasoning:
Now, there will be those who strongly disagree with [the decision to expand oil
drilling], including those who say we should not open any new areas to drilling.
But what I want to emphasize is that this announcement is part of a broader
strategy that will move us from an economy that runs on fossil fuels and foreign
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oil to one that relies more on homegrown fuels and clean energy. And the only
way this transition will succeed is if it strengthens our economy in the short term
and the long run. To fail to recognize this reality would be a mistake….
In this passage, Obama addresses those who desire a greater restriction on oil drilling and
fossil fuels. As he frequently does during this period, Obama addresses the issue in a nonpolarizing way by simply acknowledging “those who strongly disagree” with his policy
direction. However, he attempts to assure them that the policy is “part of a broader
strategy” to transform the economy away from fossil intensive resources in a way that
“strengthens our economy” over both the short and long term.
Similarly, Obama (March 31, 2010) goes on to address the flip side of the
argument by observing, “Now, on the other side, there are going to be some who argue
that we don’t go nearly far enough, who suggest we should open all our waters to energy
exploration without any restriction….” Again, Obama’s comments are non-polarizing
and instead focus on the policy argument of some “on the other side.” He goes on to
answer the argument by pointing out that America “has less than 2 percent of the world’s
oil reserves” and consumes “more than 20 percent of the world’s oil….And for the sake
of our planet and our energy independence, we need to begin the transition to cleaner
fuels now.” Rather than marginalizing the position of unrestricted energy exploration,
Obama reasons through America’s economically disruptive dependence on oil, both
foreign and domestic, and points toward a potentially unifying solution. Obama thus
offers an even-handed assessment of policies that are too narrowly focused on either side
of the debate and “fail to recognize the reality” of energy needs or ignore conditions that
must be addressed “for the sake of our planet and our energy independence.”
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By answering both arguments and highlighting a broader energy strategy that
attempts to accommodate both sides of the debate—environmental protection and energy
development—Obama also positions himself as a voice of reason. In that role and in an
effort to unite the disparate interests, Obama (March 31, 2010) concludes, “So moving
towards clean energy is about our security. It's also about our economy. And it's about the
future of our planet.” Consistent with his use of polysemy, Obama offers something for
everyone and highlights concerns that resonate with the various interests of all
Americans. He also offers a solution in clean energy that he uses as a bridge to unite
them.
For good measure, and if all else fails, Obama (January 27, 2010) frequently adds
a universal appeal that Americans need to act on behalf of their children and
grandchildren to provide them with a safe and secure future. Such statements about future
generations were coded as “Transgenerational Trust” and capture the sentiment of this
generation’s responsibility to act in ways that preserve, protect, and promote
opportunities for future generations. As will be discussed, Obama also uses
“Transgenerational Trust” in his locus of the irreparable rhetoric to underscore the
urgency of acting in order to avoid condemning future generations to not only a future
full of “unnatural” climate disaster but to one that is completely beyond our capacity to
repair (Obama, August 31, 2015). However, as “Transgenerational Trust” is used in
polysemy, Obama calls on all Americans to act on behalf of the children in a way that
preserves their future opportunity and prosperity. The following excerpt from his 2010
Andrews Airforce speech is an ideal example of how Obama (March 31, 2101) combines
trust with his vision of a clean energy future for America:
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And I'm confident that we can be and will be the benefactors of a brighter future
for our children and grandchildren. That can be our legacy, a legacy of vehicles
powered by clean renewable energy traveling past newly opened factories, of
industries employing millions of Americans in the work of protecting our planet,
of an economy exporting the energy of the future instead of importing the energy
of the past, of a nation once again leading the world to meet the challenges of our
time.
In addition to “Transgenerational Trust,” this passage captures a vision for America that
becomes a recurring theme of responsibility, community, hope, perseverance, and
prosperity in many of Obama’s speeches on energy and climate policy. An important
theme in the passage, one that will be revisited in the following section, is a vision for
America that takes on a utopian quality and in essence becomes a manifestation of
Obama’s version of the American Dream. As discussed above, that dream is one where
America is motivated by decency, communal responsibility, and perseverance in a way
that proactively provides an equal opportunity for everyone to realize his or her own
American Dream.
At this early juncture of Obama’s rhetoric it is important to understand that in
these statements, Obama was attempting to shape the attitude of American citizens in
anticipation of the policy actions that were soon to follow. As Ivie (2011) observes,
“[a]ttitude was embryonic action,” and Obama rhetorically shapes that attitude in order to
gain support for his energy and climate policies (p. 732). As he shapes attitudes, Obama
also recognizes that transforming America’s energy policy will be a long-term and
difficult task. With that in mind, his motif of a clean energy revolution is tempered with a
dose of realism as he observes, “Americans also understand that the problems we face
didn't happen overnight, and so we're not going to solve them all overnight either”
(Obama, October 24, 2011). Thus, Obama engages in a running discussion with America
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about its future and how a clean energy revolution plays a critical role in whether that
future is ultimately prosperous. As Obama goes on to argue, that future comes down to a
simple question not of the need to act but whether America has the will to act (Obama,
October 24, 2011). And as Obama’s speeches make clear, a rhetoric of polysemy that
projects a vision of prosperity made possible by American ideals is a key element in
shaping America’s will to act. Themes that were coded as “Clean Energy Utopia” and
“Social Solidarity” pull together the key elements of Obama’s vision and offer helpful
insights into how he made use of polysemy in his attempt to turn a virtuous American
attitude into a clean energy revolution.
A Clean Energy Utopia
An important element of Obama’s rhetoric was pointing the way to what America
could become by moving beyond the more acrimonious nature of its past policy disputes.
For Obama (December 19, 2009) that means creating a destination that ultimately leads to
American prosperity through a “clean energy transformation,” where all sides win and
the planet heals. These ideas are recurring themes throughout Obama’s first term and
indicate a strategic use of utopian rhetoric that can be thought of as a “clean energy
utopia.” The concept of a clean energy utopia captures Obama’s environmental,
economic, moral, nationalistic, and ultimately pragmatic argument for leading a clean
energy revolution. As the first, critical step in that revolution, Obama envisions a change
in political tone. As shown in the following remarks at a fundraiser for the Democratic
Senatorial and Congressional Campaign Committees, Obama (June 18, 2009) seeks to
move the discussion forward by underscoring the challenges facing the nation and calling
for political unity:
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We're living through extraordinary times. We didn't ask for the challenges that we
face, but we are determined to answer the call to meet them. We're going to cast
aside the old arguments and overcome the stubborn divisions and move forward
as one people and one nation.
In this statement, Obama conveys what can be thought of as a “political truce,” which
envisions the way Democrats and Republicans would come together to adopt climate and
energy legislation. As Obama argues, the “extraordinary times” of the moment require an
extraordinary level of unity and cooperation. In terms of climate policy, such an approach
means sidestepping as much as possible the wicked nature of climate change and framing
clean energy policies as economic growth and prosperity policies.
To that end, consistent with his circumscribed approach to strategic ambiguity,
Obama carefully avoids framing climate change as a wedge issue in his early speeches
and, in some respects, even treats it as an afterthought, as if it were a minor actor in the
“clean energy revolution.” For example, in his familiar, easy and controlled manner
(Gunn, 2010), Obama (December 19, 2009) observes, “...oh, and by the way, [being the
leader in clean energy] also solves the climate problem.” Obama’s casual “oh by the
way” reference here reveals a sensitivity to the deep ideological divide of climate change
views in the U.S. and an understanding that focusing on the divide makes agreement
more difficult (see, e.g., Markowitz et al., 2014). As such, Obama attempts to focus
attention on what Americans have in common in order to obviate the need to resolve
what Americans do not. Thus, prior to the Waxman-Markey Bill failing in the Senate,
Obama argues that actions to address climate change are not simply ideological or
climate catastrophism; they are instead pragmatic (Obama, December 19, 2009). They are
a path to broader economic prosperity and security that has universal appeal and also
“solves the climate problem” (Obama, December 19, 2009). In other words, such actions
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are “smart” for America’s future regardless of what anyone thinks about climate change
and help solidify the argument that a “clean energy economy” will satisfy economic,
environmental, social, and intergenerational obligations. Obama therefore uses the idea of
a clean energy utopia to bring together both the pragmatic and economic elements of a
clean energy transformation with the progressive elements of societal transformation. Of
course, by elevating expectations through utopian rhetoric, Obama runs the risk of
pleasing no one by trying to please everyone. So it is noteworthy, as discussed later, that
Obama’s use of utopian rhetoric fades as he justifies his eventual administrative pivot
with more urgent and apocalyptic rhetoric.
Also worthy of note is that during this early period of his presidency Obama’s
rhetoric reveals an even higher, international aim to his strategic ambiguity. For example,
Obama’s campaign motif of “hope and change” is present in his speech addressing the
outcome of the Copenhagen Climate Summit (Obama, December 19, 2009). By almost
all accounts the summit was a dismal failure because of its lack of substantive agreement
(see, e.g., BBC, 2009). However, Obama characterizes the outcome in more hopeful
terms by noting that it was the “first time in history that all of the . . . world’s major
economies have come together to accept their responsibility to take action to confront the
threat of climate change.” Referencing “extremely difficult and complex negotiations,”
Obama concludes that the summit would lay the “foundation for international action in
the years to come.” In these statements, Obama articulates a collective action ethos, a
theme he frequently revisits, to link U.S. action on climate change with broader
international action. In addition to reflecting an important ethos, collective action
represents an important reality, since the efforts of any individual nation would have no
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appreciable impact on global greenhouse gas emissions or resulting global temperatures
(Pachauri et al., 2014).
In the same speech, despite the commitment to international cooperation, Obama
(December 19, 2009) also echoes previous speeches and shifts to a message of
opportunity for America where developing a “clean energy economy” and leading the
clean energy revolution would potentially “create millions of new jobs [and] power new
industries.” Obama (February 2010) further reasons that “whoever builds a clean energy
economy, whoever is at the forefront of that, is going to own the twenty-first century
global economy.” The binary nature of collective international action and American
economic dominance creates an arguably tenuous balance but continues the rhetoric of
polysemy through strategic ambiguity where domestic and international collaboration and
fierce economic competitiveness coexist in the clean energy revolution. Given the thin
political margins in Congress, it is understandable that Obama would cast his political net
broadly enough to attract as many supporters from as many interests as possible.
However, as noted above, by arguing that every interest is represented in the “great
hall”48 of a clean energy economy, Obama’s rhetoric flirts with incoherence and runs the
risk of being received indifferently. As discussed later, Obama is eventually forced to
modify his message in an attempt to create a greater sense of urgency in acting on his
climate policies. He continues with themes of unity and economic benefits at that time,
but his message sounds a stern warning that such benefits may forever be elusive without
swift and decisive action.

48

“Great hall” is a reference to C.S. Lewis’s discussion in Mere Christianity that all denominations are like
separate doors leading from a single “great hall” of Christianity.
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Domestically, while climate legislation remained a distinct possibility, Obama’s
utopian vision of cooperation, collective action, owning the economic future, and healing
the planet became the cornerstone of his message to Congress and the American public.
Obama’s message becomes one of “utopian realism” as he attempts to appeal to as broad
of an energy cross-section as possible. One way to think about his message is how he
addresses the major frameworks that shape public perceptions about energy and climate
(Nisbet, 2014). Obama’s message of utopian realism is essentially one of smart, carefully
planned growth that is facilitated by technological innovation and market principles. Such
a strategy may be attractive to the political middle, which is clearly his aim, but likely
fails to appease “ecological activists” (Nisbet, 2014) on the left, while alarming skeptics
on the right. Even so, Obama (February 4, 2009) sets the tone for such themes in his first
joint address to Congress, which he carries forward into 2010, when he requests climate
legislation that would also reshuffle the United States energy portfolio:
But to truly transform our economy, to protect our security, and save our planet
from the ravages of climate change, we need to ultimately make clean, renewable
energy the profitable kind of energy. So I ask this Congress to send me legislation
that places a market-based cap on carbon pollution and drives the production of
more renewable energy in America. That's what we need.49
In this passage, Obama addresses the heart of his polysemic message by offering a plan
“to transform our economy, to protect our security, and save our planet from the ravages
of climate change.” He also is clearly focused on legislative action and specifically

49

Obama makes similar arguments in 2010 to build momentum for a tough Senate battle after the House
passed the Waxman-Markey bill in 2009. See, e.g., Obama (January 27, 2010). The same themes are also
carried over into a number of Obama’s late first-term and second-term speeches. See also, e.g., Obama
(September 21, 2011; April 3, 2013; June 19, 2013; December 12, 2015).
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requests that Congress send him “legislation that places a market-based cap on carbon
pollution and drives the production of more renewable energy in America.” Thus, in this
short passage, Obama reaches out to market-oriented and ecologically minded interests a
like.
With Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate, the 111th Congress
provided the best opportunity up to that point for passing climate legislation. But without
a strong majority in the Senate and a distinct possibility that not all Democrats would
vote for climate legislation, Obama needed to strike the right chord that would deliver the
necessary votes, especially from coal-state democrats. For Obama at this time, that meant
expanding the scope of his message. And in a similar 2010 address to a joint session of
Congress, Obama (January 27, 2010) adds to his clean energy utopia by offering a “big
tent” energy strategy:
But to create more of these clean energy jobs, we need more production, more
efficiency, more incentives. And that means building a new generation of safe,
clean nuclear power plants in this country. It means making tough decisions about
opening new offshore areas for oil and gas development. It means continued
investment in advanced biofuels and clean coal technologies. And yes, it means
passing a comprehensive energy and climate bill with incentives that will finally
make clean energy the profitable kind of energy in America…. [And even] if you
doubt the evidence, providing incentives for energy efficiency and clean energy
are the right thing to do for our future, because the nation that leads the clean
energy economy will be the nation that leads the global economy. And America
must be that nation.50
This excerpt encapsulates much of the full breadth of Obama’s pitch to gain the needed
votes in the Senate to pass the climate bill. And along with his utopian vision, Obama
offers a big tent energy policy that includes “clean nuclear power,” “opening new

50

See also Obama (October 27, 2009; January 29, 2010; January 25, 2011).
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offshore areas for [drilling],” and “advanced biofuels and clean coal technologies.” Such
policies clearly are intended as concessions to energy interests that hold key votes in the
Senate, and they represent an important cornerstone in his economically rational and
realist argument. Also worth noting is that each of these energy resources was aimed at
key Democratic swing votes from states that had either strong interests in the resource
(e.g., coal in Virginia and Pennsylvania, biofuels in Illinois and Iowa, nuclear in Virginia
and Florida, and oil in Alaska and Louisiana) or a strong interest in the politics (i.e.,
electoral swing states), or both.
Ultimately, the Waxman-Markey bill never made it to the Senate floor for a vote,
but Obama’s rhetoric invited a polysemous understanding of clean energy and a big tent
concept of a clean energy utopia. Later in the same speech, Obama adds an important and
recurring touch of strategic ambiguity through American Dream rhetoric by appealing to
America’s patriotic impulse “to form a more perfect Union” (U.S. Constitution, pmbl.).
As will be discussed next, the concept of the American Dream is deeply imbedded in
America’s psyche and, as Obama employs American Dream rhetoric, recalls a
Progressive Era ideal of America as a community, supporting one another to move
society forward (Rowland and Jones, 2011).
Toward Social Solidarity
In a broader context, the theme of Clean Energy Utopia weaves into and invokes
patriotic, American traditions linked to the founding of the nation where unity is
emphasized over diversity (Riehl, 2008). This emphasis is a continuation of Obama’s
campaign speeches where he de-emphasized the differences among Americans and
instead argued that their core identity is simply that of being an American (Riehl, 2008).
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Obama carried this idea forward into his presidency, where he projected a vision of
America as community, and where the strength of America lies in building up the citizens
of America and preserving their future. Such an emphasis on unity supports Obama’s
argument that there are many compelling economic, environmental, and social reasons to
adopt a clean energy economy where all interests are better off than the status quo. And
all of these elements play prominently in Obama’s use of polysemy to unite around his
energy and climate policies. As Obama (December 23, 2009) reasons during an interview
with Jim Lehrer on PBS’s The News Hour, there is much work to be done in the area of
climate policy, but adds, “my main responsibility here is to convince the American
people that it is smart economics and it is going to be the engine of our economic growth
for us to be a leader in clean energy.” These types of statements are consistent with
Obama’s practice of positioning himself as a voice of reason by recognizing the difficulty
of the task ahead, yet seeing clearly through the inherent complexity and conflict of
climate policy toward a rational solution that considers all the relevant information and
where everyone benefits. Obama is essentially standing above the fray pointing the way
to the “smart” and inevitable expansion of a clean energy economy.
Because Obama saw himself as a voice of reason, this rhetorical move occurs
naturally and at times spontaneously throughout his speeches. As Obama (June 19, 2015)
confirms in a 2015 interview with Marc Maron, “But the truth is…it is accurate to say
that I believe in reason. And I believe in looking at something and having a debate and an
argument, but trying to drive it towards some agreed upon set of assumptions about what
works and what doesn't.” Embracing reason is why Obama spends so much time laying
out arguments in his speeches and “driving...towards some agreed upon...assumptions”
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about energy and climate change. It also helps explains why he worked so hard at crafting
messages that had a little something for everyone. In this manner, Obama essentially is
talking to all Americans through a unifying message and letting them know that everyone
has something to gain and nothing to lose by supporting his policies. This is a key reason
why polysemy comes out so clearly at this point in Obama’s rhetoric. And, on a deeper
level, it also corresponds to the case Obama was making to the American public about
America itself.
In his first address before a joint session of Congress, Obama offered a vision of
America that would be hard for any American to reject, regardless of their political
affiliation. In the address, Obama (February 24, 2009) touches on the economic crisis,
including his plan to jump start the economy through a clean energy transformation, and
concludes with the following view of the American spirit:
They tell us that even in the most trying times, amid the most difficult
circumstances, there is a generosity, a resilience, a decency, and a determination
that perseveres, a willingness to take responsibility for our future and for
posterity. Their resolve must be our inspiration. Their concerns must be our cause.
And we must show them and all our people that we are equal to the task before us.
I know--look, I know that we haven't agreed on every issue thus far. [Laughter]
There are surely times in the future where we will part ways. But I also know that
every American who is sitting here tonight loves this country and wants it to
succeed. I know that. That must be the starting point for every debate we have in
the coming months and where we return after those debates are done. That is the
foundation on which the American people expect us to build common ground.
And if we do, if we come together and lift this Nation from the depths of this
crisis, if we put our people back to work and restart the engine of our prosperity,
if we confront without fear the challenges of our time and summon that enduring
spirit of an America that does not quit, then someday years from now our children
can tell their children that this was the time when we performed, in the words that
are carved into this very Chamber, "something worthy to be remembered.
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Of course, Obama touches on past American expressions of “a generosity, a decency, and
a determination that perseveres, a willingness to take responsibility for our future and for
posterity” that resonate with all Americans in some way. Obama addresses themes of
unity and how he knows “every American…loves this country and wants it to succeed.”
And he argues that, regardless of differences, love of country “must be a starting point for
every debate,” and it is the “foundation on which…to build common ground.” However,
more profoundly, Obama envisions how embodying such expressions anew will “lift the
Nation from the depths of…crisis” and “summon that enduring spirit” that will allow
America to press on in the face of adversity to address “the challenges of our time.” He
punctuates this part of his speech by recalling the aspirations of Congress as a
deliberative body to accomplish “something worthy to be remembered,” thereby making
it a rallying cry for unity and action. Again, this message reflects Obama’s careful use of
polysemy to draw polarized interests together and to connect the challenges at hand to
fulfilling the American Dream.
So, on the surface, Obama is charting a course for deliberating the energy and
climate legislation he would be asking Congress to deliver. But at a deeper level, he also
uses polysemy to construct a foundation on which to build his policies. That foundation
begins with unity and love of country, is held together by decency, advances through
perseverance, and ends in prosperity for all generations. It is a foundation that is large
enough to allow a diversity of interests to build their own ideas of a clean energy
economy upon it. Obama’s polysemic themes thus echo the “social solidarity” that
reflects his fundamental, communitarian view in an America that takes responsibility for
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taking care of the “least of these” and strives for prosperity for all (Rowland and Jones,
2011).
In a related way, Obama also articulates his version of the American Dream,
framed in this case by a clean energy revolution that emphasizes community over
individualism (Atwater, 2007).51 The communal responsibility is expressed by
governmental action to set in motion a clean energy economy that will help people,
including the children, realize their own American Dream (Atwater, 2007).52 And by
assuming his familiar position as a voice of reason, Obama makes a rational, yet
inspirational, appeal for the “smart choice” that will improve economic conditions,
protect the children, and solve the climate crisis. Such an approach has been
characterized as the process of “persuading through reason, and motivating through
emotion” (Riehl, 2008, p. 9). It is also, as noted above, embryonic action for achieving
the American Dream that Obama intends to translate into policy action with the help of
strategically ambiguous appeals to diverse interests.
Notably, these appeals also echo Obama’s view of the Constitution and
governance, which serve “as a roadmap [and vehicle] by which to marry passion and
reason, the ideal of individual freedom to the demands of the community” (Atwater,
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For a general discussion of Obama’s version of the American Dream, see Atwater (2007). In the case of
clean energy transitions to address climate change, Obama connects the American Dream to energy and
all the benefits to society of bringing a clean energy revolution to fruition. See also, Rowland and Jones
(2011).
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In describing Obama’s views of politics and governance, Atwater (2007) explains, “For him, the
Constitution envisions a road map by which we marry passion to reason, the ideal of individual freedom
to the demands of the community. His explanation for being a Democrat is simply this, ‘It is this idea that
our communal values, our sense of mutual responsibility and social solidarity should also be expressed
through our government’” (p. 127) It is this core understanding, predicated on community, of the
relationship between governance and the governed that Obama brings to his policies on energy and
climate change.
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2007, p. 127). As Obama (2006) himself expressed in his second book, The Audacity of
Hope, being a Democrat captures “the idea that our communal values, our sense of
mutual responsibility and social solidarity should also be expressed through our
government” (p. 63, as quoted in Atwater, 2007, p. 127). For Obama, then, the American
Dream is realized through the expression of government, which seeks to transform
society from what it is to what it can become. As will be discussed below, Obama’s view
of the government also connects him to a Wilsonian view of governance and animates his
use of the administrative presidency in pursuit of the American Dream. At this time,
though, Obama’s American Dream rhetoric provides a useful vehicle for his use of
polysemy to unite America around his energy and climate policies.
For example, Obama revisits his version of the American Dream in relation to the
clean energy revolution throughout his presidency, making it a central component of his
argument to the American people and, eventually, his rationalization for taking
administrative action through the EPA (see, e.g., Obama, October 24, 2011). Indeed,
Obama’s (January 27, 2010) perseverance in seeing his clean energy vision through to
fruition is echoed in his version of the American Dream at his 2010 State of the Union
Address:
In the end, it's our ideals, our values that built America, values that allowed us to
forge a nation made up of immigrants from every corner of the globe, values that
drive our citizens still. Every day, Americans meet their responsibilities to their
families and their employers. Time and again, they lend a hand to their neighbors
and give back to their country. They take pride in their labor and are generous in
spirit. These aren't Republican values or Democratic values that they're living by,
business values or labor values, they're American values.
The spirit that has sustained this Nation for more than two centuries lives on in
you, its people. We have finished a difficult year. We have come through a
difficult decade. But a new year has come. A new decade stretches before us. We
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don't quit. I don't quit. Let's seize this moment to start anew, to carry the dream
forward, and to strengthen our Union once more [emphasis added].53
In this passage, Obama’s message of social solidarity is punctuated by his references to
“our values that built America” and a “spirit that has sustained this nation...[and] lives on
in...its people.” These are sentiments that connect all Americans in some way to a
common cause. And for Obama, that common cause is a clean energy revolution. Obama
also clearly speaks to the “American values” that allow the nation to
“meet...responsibilities” and then calls for America to dig deep for those enduring
qualities “to carry the dream forward, and to strengthen our Union once more.” Once
again, Obama invites all Americans to attach their own meaning to the American Dream
and American values in a way that calls for unity, cooperation, and responsibility.
Later in his presidency, even after he held an increasingly critical view of his
opponents in Congress as the prospects of legislative climate action faded and ultimately
vanished, Obama frequently articulated his version of the American Dream as illustrated
in his second inaugural address. Seeking to set the tone for a concerted push for domestic
climate action, Obama (January 21, 2013) resolves:
We, the people, still believe that our obligations as Americans are not just to
ourselves, but to all posterity. We will respond to the threat of climate change,
knowing that the failure to do so would betray our children and future
generations. Some may still deny the overwhelming judgment of science, but
none can avoid the devastating impact of raging fires and crippling drought and
more powerful storms.
In this statement, Obama simultaneously emphasizes that his vision for American has not
changed, but the urgency with which to “respond to the threat of climate change” has.
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Notably, along with the increased urgency, Obama begins to expand social solidarity with
the belief that “our obligations as Americans are...to all posterity.” As such, part of a
message of American exceptionalism becomes America’s role in acting in a way that
does not “betray our children and future generations.” As discussed in the next section,
Obama’s articulation of America’s international obligations to address climate change
becomes an important predicate of his argument for America’s domestic actions.
Although Obama continues to articulate his clean energy utopia and economic
rationality arguments throughout his presidency, his 2013 Inaugural Address marks an
important shift to emphasizing the threat of climate change to future generations. Obama
(January 2013) does this by emphasizing the “overwhelming judgement of the science”
and introducing catastrophic imagery that raises the specter of a “climate apocalypse.” As
discussed in the following section, Obama began this shift to rhetoric of the irreparable as
the prospects of a climate bill waned, but it is this second inaugural address that signals a
full embrace of the rhetorical move. Obama also continues to set himself apart as a voice
of reason by observing that, although some still deny the science, the climate catastrophes
speak for themselves. In essence, Obama is saying, “So, if you don’t believe me, and you
won’t believe the scientists, then at least look at what’s happening and believe what you
see.”54 Obama continues to employ polysemy in his speeches throughout his presidency
but, as shown in the following section, introduces a more critical and sharper edge when
addressing his opponents after climate legislation completely fades from view. Not
coincidentally, Obama’s change in tone corresponds to his pivot to administrative action
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and an increasingly urgent and apocalyptic view of climate change. His administrative
action therefore is an extension of the rhetorical foundation he builds through the locus of
the irreparable, a topic to which this dissertation now turns.
The Rhetorical Use of Locus of the Irreparable
Obama’s shift in urgency and use of increasingly apocalyptic views of climate
change closely connects to a general rhetorical appeal to the “locus of the irreparable”
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971, pp. 91-92). The use of locus of the irreparable in
rhetoric seeks to motivate those less willing to act with requisite urgency, as well as to
convert those who are less committed to a no action alternative (Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca, 1971, p. 92). As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971) explain, just as there are
diverse views about climate policy, there are equally diverse views about how urgently
action should be taken on those policies. Of those interested in the policies, some will be
motivated to take immediate action, while others will be less committed. Of those less
committed, some will be interested but not quite ready to commit to action. Still others,
while not holding opposing views, will be more or less ambivalent. Taken together, this
large group of the public requires a compelling reason to get behind urgent action
(Perelman and Olbrecthts-Tyteca, 1971). As discussed below, Obama’s appeal in his “We
Can’t Wait” campaign (Lowande and Milkis, 2014) is directed at this large group, and the
locus of the irreparable is his rhetorical approach to winning them over. Of particular
note is that this is largely the same group that Obama’s polysemic rhetoric failed to
motivate. Important for Obama’s message to this segment of America is that locus of the
irreparable captures the idea that not acting now means foreclosing the opportunity to act
in the future (Cox, 1982, p. 232). In this case, Obama is arguing that the consequences of
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not acting now through a clean energy economy lead to a future where actions will no
longer be effective. It will be too late to secure a bright economic future for America and
safety for her children.
As alluded to above, Obama’s appeal to the locus of the irreparable emerges in his
rhetoric once the Waxman-Markey Bill stalls in the Senate during the summer of 2010.
At this point, Obama’s rhetoric takes a noticeable turn, which signals a pivot away from
legislation and toward administrative action. One gets an early glimpse of where Obama
is headed when, in a June 2010 statement on the Senate’s action, he offers support of the
Waxman-Markey Bill and the Senate’s rejection of Senator Murkowski’s amendment to
prohibit EPA from regulating CO2 as a pollutant, along with other greenhouse gases,
from stationary sources (Dickinson, 2010). The noteworthy aspect of Obama’s (June 10,
2010) statement is his emphasis on the distinction between progressing toward a “clean
energy economy,” a direction that will also protect the children, and regressing
“backward to the same failed policies that have left our Nation increasingly dependent on
foreign oil.” As a result, Obama’s message clearly highlights a choice between, on the
one hand, safety, security, and prosperity and, on the other hand, a society stuck in
reverse, clinging to its coal and oil. At this stage, the Waxman-Markey Bill was
floundering in the Senate, and Obama was being roundly criticized by the environmental
community for not taking a stronger position on climate change, with Rolling Stone even
accusing Obama of “lead[ing] from behind on climate change” (Dickinson, 2010).
In the spring of 2011, Obama begins to signal a new policy direction at a
Democratic National Convention fundraiser in San Francisco. In that address, Obama
(April 20, 2011) strikes a tone of increasing impatience and urgency, stating:
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There are climate change deniers in Congress, and when the economy gets tough,
sometimes environmental issues drop from people's radar screens. But I don't
think there's any doubt that unless we are able to move forward in a serious way
on clean energy that we're putting our children and our grandchildren at risk.
Up to this point, Obama had been much more conciliatory in his rhetoric, going to great
lengths to reconcile the diverse interests and conflicting values surrounding climate
change. But by using the term “deniers” in reference to his political opposition, Obama’s
message becomes much more pointed and critical. He also adds an intergenerational
appeal intended to underscore the high stakes of not acting—that is, putting “our children
and grandchildren at risk.”
By the time Obama addresses the United Nations General Assembly in September
2011, he has turned his attention from Congress to the international community and
unilateral executive action. For example, in his speech to the United Nations, Obama
(September 21, 2011) declares:
To preserve our planet, we must not put off action that climate change demands.
We have to tap the power of science to save those resources that are scarce. And
together, we must continue our work to build on the progress made in
Copenhagen and Cancun, so that all the major economies here today follow
through on the commitments that were made. Together, we must work to
transform the energy that powers our economies and support others as they move
down that path. That is what our commitment to the next generation demands.
In this short passage, Obama reiterates in summary fashion a number of prominent
rhetorical themes he began using in 2009, including the need to act urgently and
collectively to “preserve our planet,” leveraging technology in order to make the best use
of all sources of energy, and acting in trust of future generations.55 Taken together, these
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themes comprise a good portion of Obama’s early, polysemous message. However, it is
his statement that “[t]o preserve our planet, we must not put off action that climate
change demands” that is especially noteworthy here and signals a shift in Obama’s
rhetoric. As discussed in detail below, Obama expressing urgent action is aptly captured
in his “We Can’t Wait” campaign and emerges as an important theme in his rhetoric. For
now, it is sufficient to note that “We Can’t Wait” is quintessentially rhetoric of the
irreparable. It captures the sense that the time to act is now, and delay will bring the
world to a point of no return at which time a climate crisis is inevitable, irreversible, and
perilous to the planet and future generations.
Locus of the irreparable also captures the notion that what is lost cannot be
replaced (Cox, 1982, p. 229). Accordingly, it speaks to the uniqueness of what is lost and
demands exceptional action to ensure it persists (Cox, 1982). This, of course, echoes the
precautionary principle but in a more urgent way because it suggests that the outcome is
definite and promises that it cannot be reversed (Cox, 1982). The locus of the irreparable
also implies that a limit is fast approaching and highlights the precarious nature of the
situation, which demands immediate action (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971). Yet,
despite the urgency, there is hope that what is threatened need not be lost and can be
preserved by an “agent’s active intervention to ensure its continued existence” (Cox,
1982, p. 230). Finally, the locus of the irreparable frames the issue in such a way that it
focuses attention on the objects of shared agreement, rather than those of disagreement,

overwhelming judgment of science, accumulated and measured and reviewed over decades, has put that
question to rest. The question is whether we have the will to act before it's too late. For if we fail to
protect the world we leave not just to my children, but to your children and your children's children, we
will fail one of our primary reasons for being on this world in the first place. And that is to leave the world
a little bit better for the next generation.”
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and places society in a position of looking beyond itself at two future possibilities
separated by one fateful action (Cox, 1982). As shown above and in the following,
Obama’s pivot in word and deed is aptly captured in his rhetorical move to locus of the
irreparable, beginning with a call for immediate action.
As shown in Table 6.2, Obama’s use of locus of the irreparable manifests in three
important rhetorical themes that form the basis for his rationalization of acting
administratively through the EPA to implement climate policy. The first theme is “We
Can’t Wait” and expresses an in vivo code (i.e., pulled directly from Obama’s speeches)
that captures the idea that the need for action is so urgent that waiting is no longer an
option. In other words, waiting any longer means sealing the planet’s fate, and the fate of
our children, to a future of irreversible climate disaster. The second theme is one of a
“Climate Apocalypse” and is a direct manifestation of what will happen if action is
delayed. Delayed action means crossing a point of no return where the planet and all its
inhabitants are condemned to irreversible climate catastrophe that will wreak havoc on
society. The last theme, “Leading the Way,” captures the way Obama positions America
relative to the international community and expresses the means by which Obama intends
to garner international commitment to making meaningful carbon emission reductions.
Importantly, Obama uses the theme to bolster his use of the EPA to administratively fill
the gap left by the climate change stalemate in Congress. Ultimately, as discussed next,
Obama argues that there is a “clear and present danger” that demands action, the time to
act is now, and meaningful carbon reduction will not occur without American leadership.
In short, because Congress won’t act, he must.
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Table 6.2

Codes Related to Locus of the Irreparable

Code

Description

We Can’t Wait

Addressing urgency of action. The need for action is so urgent that
waiting is no longer an option. Delay will lead to inevitable and
catastrophic outcomes.

Climate Apocalypse

The need for action is so urgent that waiting is no longer an option.
Delay will lead to inevitable and catastrophic outcomes. In the
absence of action, a climate crisis is inevitable, irreversible, and
will have devasting consequences for the planet and future
generations.

Leading the Way

Retaking the initiative to not only lead with respect to climate
policy and climate action but also the clean energy revolution. This
code is juxtaposed to “Falling Behind.” Leading the Way also
captures leading by example so that other nations follow and taking
primary responsibility for climate actions as one of the largest
emitters of CO2.

We Can’t Wait
In 2010, Obama began employing locus of the irreparable rhetoric first in an
attempt to compel legislative action and subsequently, when that proved ineffective, to
signal a full pivot to administrative action in the face of an uncooperative Congress and
looming climate catastrophe. As noted above, Obama was growing increasingly
impatient, and he underscored the need for immediate action by calling out members of
Congress who either were actively undercutting climate legislation or no longer focused
on climate policy. Alluding to the current state of Congressional apathy, Obama (June 10,
2010) observes:
Today's vote is yet another reminder of the urgent need to pass legislation that
would help America transition to a 21st century clean energy economy that would
create jobs, strengthen our national security, and protect our environment for our
children.
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Although Obama’s tone would dramatically change in the ensuing months and years, this
statement begins connecting “the urgent need to pass [energy and climate] legislation”
with American prosperity. In particular, Obama points to domestic benefits of a “clean
energy economy” in the form of “jobs,” stronger “national security,” and protecting the
“environmental for our children.” As this passage illustrates, Obama was not completely
abandoning his use of polysemy, but he was shifting to a distinct message of urgency and
looming climate disaster.
Obama’s initial rhetorical efforts to compel action also were rooted in expressing
the sense that America was losing the international competition for clean energy
technology. With echoes of his rhetoric of realism combined with locus of the
irreparable, Obama warns of lost opportunities that may not be regained. Speaking to the
nation’s Governors, Obama (February 3, 2010) argues, “We can't afford to spin our
wheels while the rest of the world speeds ahead.” The idea expressed here of an America
hopelessly stuck and helplessly watching as “the rest of the world speeds ahead” captures
Obama’s attempt to create anxiety over a lost opportunity that will be impossible to
recapture. Later, Obama (March 3, 2011) is more direct about the high opportunity cost
of waiting too long when he urges, “And we've got to start now because... [we] owned
the clean energy economy in the eighties. [But we’ve] fallen behind on what is going to
be the key to our future.” Again, Obama is using rhetoric of the irreparable to motivate
those who are on the fence. In the same speech Obama (March 3, 2011) underscores the
cost of doing nothing by arguing:
We're already paying a price for our inaction. Every time we fill up at the pump,
every time we lose a job or a business to countries that are investing more than we
do in clean energy, when it comes to our air, our water, and the climate change
that threatens the planet that you will inherit, we're already paying a price. These
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are costs that we are already bearing. And if we do nothing, the price will only go
up.
In addition to tapping into fears of being left behind in the international competition for
the clean energy market, Obama raises the geopolitical stakes by specifically pointing out
that Germany, Japan, and China are the nations currently winning the competition, a
competition that America once “owned.”56 Obama also makes clear that this is not a far
off problem. America is paying the “price of inaction” right now “at the pump,” in lost
jobs and lost opportunities, and “the price will only go up” as America delays.
In the end, Obama’s urging would have no effect on a divided Congress. With the
window closing on the prospects of climate legislation, Obama began shifting his strategy
and rhetoric to focus on what he could accomplish administratively. It was at this point,
halfway through his third year in office, that Obama introduced his “We Can’t Wait”
campaign, where administrative action was re-prioritized above legislation (Lowande and
Milkis, 2014). In announcing the campaign, Obama (October 24, 2011) makes a stark
shift in both style and substance by proclaiming, “We can’t wait for an increasingly
dysfunctional Congress to do its job. Where they won’t act, I will.” In his speech, which
was focused on jobs and the economy but alluded to other policies as well, Obama
embraces a level of stridency in referencing an “increasingly dysfunctional” deliberative
body and commitment to unilateral action that were absent in earlier speeches when he
struck a more collaborative, even conciliatory, tone with Congress and the American
people.

56

See also Obama (January 8, 2010); Obama (March 30, 2011); and Obama (March 15, 2013).

163
Even so, Obama does not completely pull back from Congress, rather he offers an
alternative path that he is willing to pursue should Congress continue to ignore his
policies.57 However, Obama (October 24, 2011) is clear about his intent should Congress
not do what he calls “the right thing” when he proclaims:
But we can't wait for that action. I'm not going to wait for it. So I'm going to keep
on taking this message across the country. Where we don't have to wait for
Congress, we're just going to go ahead and act on our own. And we're going to
keep on putting pressure on Congress to do the right thing for families all across
the country.58
In addition to declaring that “we can’t wait” for congressional action, Obama vows that
he is “not going to wait for it” and he will “keep on taking this message across the
country.” Although he also vows to “keep on putting pressure on Congress to do the
right thing,” Obama clearly signals with these promises that he will be focusing on
administrative action as much as, if not more than, legislative action. Indeed, over the
course of the year following the announcement of his “We Can’t Wait” campaign, the
Obama administration produced no less than forty-five distinct executive actions, ranging
from executive orders and presidential memos to recess appointments and waivers
(Lowande and Milkis, 2014, p. 9). With respect to climate change, Obama had already
begun to work through the EPA to achieve the goals of the Waxman-Markey Bill and
emerging international climate agreements. While Obama’s plan for executive action on
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Obama (July 1, 2014) would go on to reiterate his call for executive action during a second-term cabinet
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show some real progress….So I want to make sure that we emphasize not what we can't do, but what we
can do, in the coming months.”
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climate change would not be revealed until June of 2013, the Obama administration was
already laying the groundwork for the release of “The President’s Climate Action Plan”
and a related presidential memo directing the EPA to regulate CO2 emissions from the
power sector (EPA Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, 2013).59 As discussed later,
the EPA would finalize its regulations to do so under the Clean Power Plan in 2015 (EPA
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 2015).
A Climate Apocalypse
A notable change in Obama’s rhetoric occurs after being elected to a second term
in the White House in 2012. Up to that point, as discussed earlier, Obama had focused on
economic arguments to make the pragmatic case that a clean energy economy would not
only save the planet, but it would pave the way for an American economic renaissance. In
fact, such themes so consistently emerge from the data that at times Obama appears to be
making more of an economic than environmental case for climate mitigation.60 The
theme of economic rationality remains a fixture of Obama’s (April 22, 2009) overall
message throughout his presidency, as he consistently stresses, “[The] choice we face is
not between saving our environment and saving our economy. The choice we face is
between prosperity and decline.” 61 However, beginning in 2013, that theme becomes
overshadowed by warnings of a looming climate crisis as Obama sought to amplify the
urgent need for immediate action. Thus, Obama’s clean energy utopia transforms into a
climate apocalypse” as he relies more heavily on locus of the irreparable rhetoric.
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Underscoring the seriousness of the threat as he reveals “The President’s
Climate Action Plan,” Obama (June 25, 2013) warns, “We will be judged—as a people,
as a society, and as a country—on where we go from here.” This statement has elements
of his social solidarity theme in the way it alludes to the American Dream, particularly
the way its foreboding tone brings America to the brink of whether the dream is still
achievable. It also includes an implied threat that if America fails to act at this critical
juncture, then that dream will be shattered by America’s own hand. Obama makes is clear
that Americans who have the opportunity to act but do not will be “judged” harshly for
their failure to do so.
However, acting as that locus of the irreparable “agent” on behalf of the American
people, Obama (June 25, 2013) offers a hopeful, albeit conditional, tone as well by
assuring:
The plan I have put forward to reduce carbon pollution and protect our country
from the effects of climate change is the path we need to take. And if we
remember what's at stake—the world we leave to our children—I'm convinced
that this is a challenge that we will meet.
Here, Obama places America at a crossroads and offers a way “forward” and a way to
“protect our country.” He also reminds America that “what’s at stake…is the world we
leave our children.” Although the choice Obama puts before America remains hopeful
and one he is “convinced…that we will meet,” there is no mistaking the gravity of not
rising to meet the challenge—the very fate of the planet and the future of the children.
Days later, in a subsequent question and answer session at a town hall meeting in
Johannesburg, South Africa, which immediately followed the announcement of his
climate action plan, Obama (June 29, 2013) explicitly addresses the gravity of the choice
America faces and intensifies the urgency of climate mitigation by referring to climate
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change as an “existential challenge” and warning that “we may be reaching a tipping
point in which if we do not solve this problem soon, it will spin out of control…in
[disastrous] ways we cannot anticipate.” By referring to a “tipping point” and the
possibility of climate change as an “existential challenge” spinning “out of control,”
Obama uses rhetoric of the irreparable to drive home the threat of failing to act.
Importantly, as Obama frames it, that threat is not simply a lost opportunity but a lost
planet.
Such motifs fit well within Obama’s “We Can’t Wait” campaign, with the
catastrophic projections buttressing his arguments for acting with or without Congress.
Such dire warnings convey a sense of a looming “climate apocalypse” that Obama would
repeat over the next two years.62 As he does during his 2015 remarks at the Global
Leadership in the Arctic: Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement and Resilience
(GLACIER) Conference in Anchorage, Alaska, when raising the specter of a “climate
apocalypse,” Obama (August 31, 2015) first sets the stage by detailing the scientific
evidence for anthropogenic climate change, reprising his “voice of reason” themes that
were a fixture in his early speeches, and concludes with pronouncements along the
following lines:
But if those trend lines continue the way they are, there's not going to be a nation
on this Earth that's not impacted negatively. People will suffer. Economies will
suffer. Entire nations will find themselves under severe, severe problems: more
drought, more floods, rising sea levels, greater migration, more refugees, more
scarcity, more conflict.
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If we were to abandon our course of action, if we stop trying to build a clean
energy economy and reduce carbon pollution, if we do nothing to keep the
glaciers from melting faster and oceans from rising faster and forests from
burning faster and storms from growing stronger, we will condemn our children
to a planet beyond their capacity to repair: submerged countries, abandoned cities,
fields no longer growing. Indigenous peoples who can't carry out traditions that
stretch back millennia. Entire industries of people who can't practice their
livelihoods. Desperate refugees seeking the sanctuary of nations not their own.
Political disruptions that could trigger multiple conflicts around the globe.
Importantly, Obama adds two elements to this passage, which otherwise depicts the
dominant motif of a looming “climate apocalypse.” First, Obama alludes to the effects of
climate change as being seen and felt now, not as some distant phenomenon, and thus as
“no longer some far-off problem. It is happening here. It is happening now.” 63 Obama’s
message is one of climate change being a “clear and present danger.” And he captures the
sense of urgency, as well as justification, for taking immediate action because “the enemy
is at the gates” (Craig, 2004) and may already be inside the city.64
Second, Obama equates inaction with condemning “our children to a planet
beyond their capacity to repair.” Not only does this statement speak to an
intergenerational trust responsibility and the grim consequence of not acting, but it
indirectly implicates the American Dream, or rather the loss of it. As such, the statement
serves to warn that America’s “social solidarity” is being threatened, and inaction will
mean failure to preserve the opportunity for future prosperity. Obama (September 23,
2104) perfectly captures the zeitgeist of this moment by bleakly warning, “As one of
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See also, Obama (May 9, 2014; May 20, 2015).
President Obama (July 24, 2014) makes a particularly pointed accusation against Republicans when he
states during remarks at Los Angeles Trade-Technical College in Los Angeles, California: “So I'm not going
to stop trying to work with Democrats and Republicans to make a difference in your lives. But I've got to
call things as they are. What's really going on is that Republicans in Congress are directly blocking policies
that would help millions of Americans. They are promoting policies that harm millions of Americans.”
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America's Governors has said, ‘We are the first generation to feel the impact of climate
change and the last generation that can do something about it.’” 65
Ultimately, by combining apocalyptic language with climate change as a “clear
and present danger” and a sense of “social solidarity” by way of an intergenerational trust
obligation, any efforts to delay or obstruct action would, at best, constitute acting
contrary to our national interests and, at worst, be tantamount to aiding and abetting the
enemy. Conversely, any action, unilateral or otherwise, would be sufficiently justified
because of the immediacy and severity of the threat. Locus of the irreparable thus
provides an ideal rhetorical move that simultaneously creates both the need for and
rationalization of Obama’s use of the administrative presidency to implement climate
policy through the EPA. As discussed in the next section, Obama’s call for America to
lead by example, which acts as an important catalyst for his eventual executive action.
Leading the Way
Up to this point the analysis has focused on the temporal aspects of Obama’s
locus of the irreparable rhetoric. In other words, by stressing the themes of “We Can’t
Wait” and “Climate Apocalypse,” Obama was calling attention to the urgency of acting
now, before it was too late—too late for a future of safety, security, and prosperity, and
too late to do anything about it if we failed to act. But, as Obama argued, all hope was not
lost, not yet anyway, and decisive action now would preserve a future perilously close to
being lost. Yet Congress, the one institution that had the power to enact a means by
which the future could be preserved, refused to act. More than that, Congress was
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The governor to whom Obama attributes the quote is Washington Governor, Jay Inslee (see Kolbert,
2014).
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actually getting in the way by promoting policies (oil drilling) that would make the
situation worse and hindering policies (clean energy incentives) that would help prevent
the crisis (see, for example, Cohen and Silverleib, 2012). In other words, Congress was
aligning itself with the problem. Therefore, in the absence of more helpful congressional
action, Obama would step in with whatever presidential power he had at his disposal. In
effect, Obama was acting as the “agent” who would provide the necessary “active
intervention” (Cox, 1982, p. 230) through administrative action. As Obama (February 12,
2015) argues, that agent should have been Congress, “[b]ut if Congress won’t act soon to
protect future generations, I will.”
Temporally, Obama is arguing for immediate action while time remains to act.
However, a spatial aspect to Obama’s locus of the irreparable rhetoric also emerges from
the data. In a major policy speech delivered at Georgetown University, Obama (June 25,
2013) informs his audience that a significant barrier to addressing climate change is the
absence of international leadership and accountability. Such an absence creates a spatial
problem because, without worldwide cooperation and commitment, there can be no
meaningful reduction in carbon emissions. As Obama (June 25, 2013) argues, “[N]o
nation can solve this challenge alone, not even one as powerful as ours. And that's why
the final part of our plan calls on America to lead: lead international efforts to combat a
changing climate.” This statement corresponds to Obama’s theme of “leading by
example” and captures a key element of his overall rationalization for administrative
action—that is, without American commitment to “lead international efforts” to cut
carbon emissions, other nations with an increasing and problematic appetite for coal-fired
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energy (i.e., China and India) would continue to be bystanders as well.66 Since Obama
was determined to reach an international climate accord during the 2015 Paris Climate
Conference, domestic action was absolutely critical to convincing China and India to join
the pact with meaningful and serious commitments.
Although Obama stressed the importance of American leadership on climate
change throughout the study period, his early speeches primarily emphasize the economic
benefit to America of winning the competition for a clean energy economy, as discussed
above. However, in 2013, Obama makes a subtle but important shift in emphasis. As
Obama (June 25, 2013) argues in his speech at Georgetown University:
And make no mistake, the world still looks to America to lead. When I spoke to
young people in Turkey a few years ago, the first question I got wasn't about the
challenges that part of the world faces, it was about the climate challenge that we
all face and America's role in addressing it. And it was a fair question because as
the world's largest economy and second largest carbon emitter, as a country with
unsurpassed ability to drive innovation and scientific breakthroughs, as the
country that people around the world continue to look to in times of crisis, we've
got a vital role to play. We can't stand on the sidelines. We've got a unique
responsibility. And the steps that I've outlined today prove that we're willing to
meet that responsibility.
In this passage, Obama offers an important reminder that “the world still looks to
America to lead,” and America therefore has a responsibility not for just acting on
climate change but leading international action as well. 67 As Obama reasons, America
has “a vital role to play” and “a unique responsibility” to act because of its “unsurpassed”
economic and technological position in the world, but also because of the magnitude of
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For additional similar remarks see Obama (March 1, 2012; June 2, 2013; June 25, 2014).
An avenue of inquiry that emerged from the data but is not pursued in this study is how Obama viewed
America’s responsibility to other nations. There is remarkable similarity between Obama’s version of the
American Dream, where America has a responsibility to ensure the prosperity of future generations, and
how he expresses America’s responsibility to other nations.
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its carbon contributions. However, time is running out. Time is running out to save the
planet from “unnatural” and “irreversible” climate disaster. Time is running out on
economic prosperity and future generations. And, without leadership from “the country
that people around the world continue to look to in times of crisis,” time is running out
even to act.
Therefore, in an effort to push American leadership to the forefront, Obama’s first
priority in leading by example was directing EPA to regulate carbon emissions from
powerplants, which at the time accounted for approximately 30% of the nation’s total
(U.S. DOE, 2016, p. 3). The focus on powerplants made sense as an initial effort because
it was the largest source of CO2 emissions at the time and regulating stationary sources
was far simpler than regulating mobile and downstream emissions. Plus, the template was
already in place with the Waxman-Markey Bill. However, Obama was interested in more
than efficient regulation. He was also interested in sending an international signal, as he
explains in announcing his domestic climate actions at the same Georgetown University
speech:
But [climate change] is a challenge that does not pause for partisan gridlock. It
demands our attention now. And this is my plan to meet it: a plan to cut carbon
pollution, a plan to protect our country from the impacts of climate change, and a
plan to lead the world in a coordinated assault on a changing climate. (Obama,
June 25, 2013)
In this passage, Obama clearly connects his administrative action with “partisan
gridlock.” As Obama puts it, climate change “is a challenge that does not pause for
partisan gridlock.” His message here is that climate change is not going away, but instead
“demands our attention now.” In addition, because Congress refuses to act on a problem
that is not going away, Obama is announcing his administrative “plan to lead the world in
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a coordinated assault” against it. Obama goes on to add that he is taking this
administrative action through the EPA “for the sake of our children and the health and
safety of all Americans.” Thus, in this short passage, Obama recounts his previous
reasons for addressing climate change and combines them with an effort to mobilizing a
coordinated international “assault on a changing climate.”
To put a finer point on his international aspirations, in that same Georgetown
speech, Obama (June 25, 2013) confidently observes that his actions, including his EPA
directive to regulate powerplant carbon emissions, “should send a strong signal to the
world that America intends to take bold action to reduce carbon pollution.” In effect,
Obama is announcing to the world that America is back in its rightful leadership role.
Then, in a statement that is addressed as much to international leaders as it is to American
citizens, Obama declares, “We will continue to lead by the power of our example,
because that's what the United States of America has always done.” Obama thus signals
to the world that America is no longer a bystander in the climate change fight. Not only
that, but Obama is clearly seeking to place the United States in a position to influence the
actions of other nations, especially China and India, as he looks forward to the 2015 Paris
Climate Conference.
In the meantime, during the runup to COP21 in Paris, EPA issued its final Clean
Power Plan rule in August 2015. In announcing the final rule, Obama reprises the major
themes of his locus of the irreparable rhetoric. In particular, Obama (August 3, 2015)
begins by grimly recounting the catastrophic effects of climate change and observing,
“Climate change is no longer just about the future that we're predicting for our children or
our grandchildren, it's about the reality that we're living with every day, right now.”

173
These themes of course echo his past messages about a “clear and present” danger of a
looming “climate apocalypse.” Obama (August 3, 2015) then borrows from Martin
Luther King and observes, “[I]f we don’t get it right, we may not be able to reverse [or
adapt to the effects of climate change]….There is such a thing as being too late
[emphasis added].” By recollecting Dr. King, this last statement places a moral undertone
on Obama’s rhetoric of the irreparable and, at least in a very subtle and nuanced way,
connects an important point in American history when civil liberties were on the brink
with America’s current plight as it stands on the brink of catastrophic and “irreversible
climate change.” Obama’s message here is clear: America could not wait any longer to
address civil liberties and “we can’t wait” now to address climate change.
Notwithstanding the international significance of the Paris Climate Agreement,
which the Obama administration would sign later that year, finalizing the Clean Power
Plan rule clearly marked the most significant climate achievement in Obama’s
presidency. It also arguably stands out as one of the more significant actions of his
administrative presidency. In any event, Obama (August 3, 2015) highlights the
moment’s import by calling the Clean Power Plan “the single most important step
America has ever taken in the fight against global climate change.” The statement is
reminiscent of the point of no return in locus of the irreparable rhetoric. In other words,
the Clean Power Plan is significant not just because it is the first major action to reduce
carbon emissions, but because it is the catalyst that pulls America and the world back
from the brink of climate devastation.
Indeed, Obama underscores the international implications of America “leading by
example” by revealing that “with America leading the way, countries representing 70
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percent of the carbon pollution from the world's energy sector have announced plans to
cut their greenhouse gas emissions.” To press the point further, Obama (August 3, 2015)
declares:
And if we don't do it, nobody will. The only reason that China is now looking at
getting serious about its emissions is because they saw that we were going to do it
too. When…the world faces its toughest challenges, America leads the way
forward; that's what this plan is about.
Here, Obama is reminding America why he took administrative action in the first place—
that is, to ensure that America would act because “if we don’t do it, nobody will.” It is
also interesting to note here that, as with his use of polysemy, Obama couches his
message in a form of American exceptionalism that says when “the world faces its
toughest challenges, America leads the way forward.” Thus, in a subtle way, Obama is
making a polysemic observation that many Americans would agree with and combining it
with his use of locus of the irreparable to justify his administrative actions. The
implication is that by his executive actions Obama has moved America more in line with
its better nature. Finally, as he brings the temporal and spatial aspects of locus of the
irreparable together, Obama optimistically looks into the near future and announces, “In
December, with America leading the way, we have a chance to put in place one of the
most ambitious international climate agreements in human history.” Having used the
locus of the irreparable to justify his administrative actions, Obama is now setting his
sights on “December”—a reference to the Paris Climate Conference—where he will
leverage the foundation of his domestic administrative action to negotiate “one of the
most ambitious…climate agreements in human history.” It is perhaps fitting, or simply a
sign of the political times in America, that this endeavor too would require Obama to act
unilaterally to reach an historic climate agreement on behalf of the United States.
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Toward Post-Deliberative Policymaking
What the analysis above makes clear is a marked transition from Obama’s first
term—where he used polysemy to try to call for bipartisan, legislative action—to his
second term, where he began using the locus of the irreparable to fully rationalize using
the EPA to implement climate policy. Continuing his rhetorical strategy of locus of the
irreparable, Obama first argued that climate change is a clear, present, and scientifically
verified danger for which time is running out to prevent its most harmful impacts. In fact,
so dire were the circumstances that not acting now would condemn future generations to
irreversible and devasting climate disaster. Obama next argued that American leadership
is a necessary precondition for international cooperation and action, without which the
isolated actions of any nation would be insufficient. Therefore, because Republican
opposition was preventing congress from acting, Obama had to act administratively as a
last resort to avoid condemning future generations to the catastrophic effects of
irreversible climate damage.
Also worthy of note is that with his rhetorical shift to locus of the irreparable,
Obama (October 29, 2011) was fully inhabiting the rhetorical presidency in what Tulis
(1987) describes as “speaking over the heads of Congress” to appeal directly to and
motivate the American people by reasoning during a 2011 Weekly Address, “And that's
why [we] need all of . . . [these major voices]. Tell Congress to stop playing politics and
start taking action....” Obama’s message is that the American people need to make
themselves heard in support of his policies so that Congress will “stop playing politics”
and act on them. Later, as he is rolling out his administrative climate actions, Obama
(June 25, 2013) makes a similar impassioned plea for citizen involvement, remarking,
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“What we need in this fight are citizens who will stand up and speak up and compel us to
do what this moment demands.” Obama then points out that the task at hand is “not just
for politicians” and encourages citizens to push for carbon reductions in all spheres of
their influence, even expanding those spheres where possible. Obama then concludes his
remarks with one last appeal:
And remind everyone who represents you at every level of government that
sheltering future generations against the ravages of climate change is a
prerequisite for your vote. Make yourself heard on this issue.
By calling on citizens to “stand up and speak up” and to “compel” Congress to act,
Obama is making “populist appeals” to the public to intervene in the policymaking
process. He also encourages the polis to make climate change a “prerequisite for your
vote.” Granted, the lines seem fairly standard for a president understandably frustrated by
a Congress disinclined to budge on gridlocked policies. However, his message becomes a
more populist overture when Obama sets up Congress as the foil for not doing “the right
thing” of passing legislation that would otherwise help the American people (see
generally Bonikowski and Gidron, 2015).68
As mentioned above, such an approach is consistent with the way in which Tulis
(1987) envisions the rhetorical presidency functioning when policies fail to gain traction
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For the purpose of their research, Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) define populism as “a discursive
strategy that juxtaposes the virtuous populace with a corrupt elite” (p. 1593) Moreover, populism
considers the virtuous populace to be the “sole legitimate source of political power” (p. 1593). The
authors point out that most prior research has treated populism as a stable attribute of political actors,
and their operationalization of populism allows them study how it is impacted by “contextual factors” (p.
1594). As argued by the authors, both Republicans and Democrats commonly employ populist rhetoric
but do so in relation to their political opponent. It is also noteworthy that Obama paints his congressional
opposition in derisive terms, at various times referring to them as “charter members of the Flat Earth
Society” (March 1, 2012), “deniers” (May 9, 2014), and obstructionists (March 6, 2013). As such, Obama
himself juxtaposes a virtuous populace against an unfit, if not altogether corrupt, elite.
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in Congress. Whether populist or not, Obama’s combined use of the rhetorical and
administrative presidency moved the executive branch closer to what has been described
as an “executive party system” (Lowande and Milkis, 2009, p. 24; see also Milkis et al.,
2012) that appeals to partisan support as it adopts partisan policies. Perhaps more
profoundly, in light of Trump’s actions to unravel the Clean Power Plan, the combination
advances a new paradigm where unilateral action becomes the “habitual solution to
partisan polarization” (Lowande and Milkis, 2009, p. 3). If this becomes America’s new
paradigm, then America will have entered into an era of post-deliberative policymaking
with potentially sweeping implications on democratic principles, a topic that will be
explored in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER 7: IMPLICATIONS
A government, by an unlimited power of construction, may stretch constitutions…, or
interpret them as synods do scriptures, according to the temporal interest of the
predominant sect.
—John Taylor of Caroline, Construction Construed
and Constitutions Vindicated, 182069

Although this research has focused on Barack Obama, it has important ties to how
presidents in general have sought to shape and influence policy outside the often
discordant confines of Congress. The reason is because all presidents, from the founding
era through today, have sought to expand their power and influence in well-worn and
novel directions alike. And as John Taylor warned 200 years ago, the constitutional
underpinnings of government are perpetually susceptible to being altered, regardless of
intent, by the ambitions, priorities, and expediencies of those in power (Skowronek,
2009). The Framers were particularly concerned about how such alterations might be
derived from the actions of presidents, especially if they were to become demagogues70 in
their pursuit of power and influence. The Framers’ concerns were indeed warranted as the
fusion of the rhetorical and administrative presidencies plays a key role in aggrandizing
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As quoted in Skowronek (2009).
As described by Jeffrey Tulis (1987), demagoguery is characterized by the behavior of popular leaders to
sway the passions of the populace through an “excess of passionate appeals” (p. 28). Tulis (1987) also
differentiates between “soft” and “hard” demagoguery, noting the Founders were particularly concerned
with the hard variety (p. 28). While soft demagoguery pertains to flattering one’s constituents, the hard type
refers to “attempts to create or encourage divisions among the people in order to build and maintain [a]
constituency” (Tulis, 1987, p. 29). Hard demagoguery typically involves “extremist rhetoric that ministers
to fear” (Tulis, 1987, p. 29).
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the presidency and marginalizing Congress to the point where presidential action risks
becoming completely unmoored from constitutional constraints. Unabated, the continual
expansion of executive power may do irreparable harm to American democracy.
The expansion of executive power is not, however, the work of a single
presidency, party, reform movement, or period in time. Throughout our nation’s history,
presidents of every era and every movement have without fail endeavored to sweep away
the constraints that confound their political and social ambitions. It is this cumulative
effort to elevate executive authority that makes understanding the potent force that is the
fusion of the rhetorical and administrative presidencies essential to understanding where
we are heading as a nation. This dissertation has endeavored to show that the combining
of the rhetorical and administrative presidencies is likely to lead to a rebalancing of
America’s system of government that heavily favors a strong executive, and in the
extreme may encourage demagoguery. I make that argument based on the following three
claims: (a) the current state of partisanship and polarization creates an ever-present cause
and opportunity to aggrandize the presidency; (b) the presidency has been subject to a
recurring assault on the constitutional constraints intended to keep executive ambition in
check; and therefore (c) the reflexive use of rhetorical and administrative action may
exacerbate polarization and encourage their combined use as a weapon of first resort in
the form of post-deliberative policymaking.
Aggrandizing the Presidency
The “wickedness” of the climate change problem underpins and motivates the
combining of the rhetorical and administrative presidency under Obama. Climate change
as a policy problem has been hotly contested since it first emerged on the U.S. national
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agenda. So intense has been the divisiveness over the nature of the problem that America
has remained sharply divided along ideological lines for over three decades.71 As a result,
forging a bipartisan legislative solution has remained an impossibly big lift for a deeply
partisan and polarized Congress. Yet as Obama entered office, the mounting evidence for
climate change as a clear and present danger became impossible for him to ignore. And
Obama initially focused his attention on the Waxman-Markey bill as a legislative solution
with a comfortable Democratic majority in the House and thin Democratic margins in the
Senate. The legislation passed in the House but failed even to reach the floor of the
Senate for a vote, largely over concerns about mid-term elections and not having the
votes to overcome a filibuster.
Once it became clear that climate change legislation was dead on arrival in
Congress, Obama pivoted to EPA action as an expedient way—the only way left to him,
in fact—to implement climate actions. As he articulated on a regular basis, Obama would
have preferred a legislative solution, but a hopelessly gridlocked Congress precluded any
possibility of finding one. In other words, Obama began to treat administrative action as
legislation by other means, and he used what he characterized as the looming,
catastrophic, and irreversible impacts of climate change and its accompanying economic
losses as justification for not only “speaking over the heads” of Congress, but for
bypassing it altogether.
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Recent polling indicates that attitudes may be shifting, with most Americans believing that climate
change is happening now, and a majority expressing “alarm” (See, e.g., Leiserowitz, et al., 2019). Most of
this movement comes from political independents, so it remains to be seen how such a transition translates
at the political level.
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What is also clear in the analysis is that when the road to a legislative solution
became blocked, Obama’s pivot to an administrative outlet was immediate and reflexive.
Such a reaction to gridlock is consistent with his contemporary peers. Indeed, a welldocumented consequence of congressional gridlock is that it forces the executive branch
down a path of administrative action (Milkis et al., 2012; Bullman-Pozen and Metzger,
2016), and contemporary presidencies are well suited to travel such a path (Howell,
2003). Obama’s deft and reflexive transition speaks to the commonplace practice of
recent presidents taking executive action on policies stuck in status quo by a gridlocked
Congress, although all presidents have used the practice to their advantage. However,
these moves made by Obama, under pressure to solve a wicked problem, may have
further opened the window for such moves to be made as a matter of course, and not just
on wicked problems. Therefore, not only will this practice not end anytime soon, but it
becomes increasingly likely given the hyper partisan and polarized nature of today’s
politics (Howell, 2003; Bullman-Pozen and Metzger, 2016; Milkis and Jacobs, 2017).
Combined with the precedent already set, it is therefore almost a foregone conclusion that
future presidents will seek to build on the foundation of an “executive centered
partisanship” (Milkis and Jacobs, 2017, p. 585) with reckless abandon.72
Not surprisingly, as highlighted by Obama’s administrative climate actions, a
political dynamic that confounds the congressional fulfillment of presidential ambition
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It is noteworthy that others outside of academia are paying attention to the ripple effects of an
aggrandized presidency. For example, Jason Pye is quoted in a January 2020 Washington Post article make
the following observations: “Every time a president leaves office, they leave office with more power the
next president in line can take and expand. You’re getting to the point where the legislative branch has lost
so much of its power...it almost does not matter. And that should concern every person in this country”
(Stein and Sullivan, 2020, n.p.).
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frequently serves as a mechanism to test the limits of constitutional constraints. As
Stephen Skowronek (2009) points out, “The American Constitution was designed to
render political change slow and difficult…” (p. 2071). Yet, the motivation for presidents
to deliver on policy goals and launch political reforms has continually operated to
expand, or sweep away, the limits of those constraints. Presidential ingenuity in this
regard has indeed been impressive since the founding, and perhaps no other innovation in
governance has been more consequential than all the tools and institutional methods
presidents have fashioned to extend their administrative reach (Skowronek, 2009). The
result is that many constraints that confound presidential ambition are often only
tenuously preserved and perpetually at risk of being reformed into irrelevance.
One of the constraints that is increasingly at risk of reform is Congress’s ability
keep presidential ambition in check. Of all the possible catalysts that expand
administrative reach, congressional partisanship and polarization offer perhaps the most
proximate cause for unilateral administrative action (Lowande and Milkis, 2014; Metger,
2015; Rudalevige, 2016). This was clearly the case with Obama’s energy and climate
policies, and is especially true for all wicked policy problems. As was the case with the
Waxman-Markey Bill, the partisan divide in Congress creates an ideological space, or
“gridlock interval” (Krehbiel, 1998, p. 44), where certain policies remain stuck in a type
of legislative limbo, or status quo, which impede a normal legislative progression
(Christenson and Kriner, 2014). In other words, the ideological space that constitutes the
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gridlock interval in Congress is where wicked problems go at least to languish, if not
die.73 And that is where presidential ambition takes over.
Ultimately, status quo problems will remain in legislative limbo until something
happens to reanimate them. That something could be a focusing event in the form of a
crisis or a significant power shift that aligns the executive and legislative branches
(Kingdon, 1984; Birkland, 1997, 1998). However, it is the unilateral action of the
administrative presidency that strains Congress’s ability to keep presidential ambition in
check. This certainly was the case as Obama pressed Congress to pass the WaxmanMarkey bill to no avail during the first two years of his presidency. Then, when the
prospects for climate legislation completely faded, Obama used the administrative
presidency to accomplish by administrative means what he could not through legislation.
It is also worth pointing out that in both his legislative and administrative initiatives,
Obama rhetorically leveraged climate change as a looming crisis first to catalyze
legislative action and then to justify his administrative pivot. Framing Obama’s actions in
this manner helps illustrate the potent force behind the fusion of the administrative and
rhetorical presidencies and why it is important to understand how this type of postdeliberative policymaking affects democratic decision making.
To put this in the context of the Post-Deliberative Policymaking Model described
in Chapter 3 (see Figure 7.1 below), the gridlock interval is analogous to the space
occupied by wicked problems. It is in this space where presidents bring to bear the full
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Of course, the actions of dedicated interests should not be overlooked in the dynamics of status quo
policies. A powerful opposition with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo has been able to keep
climate policies in check, despite the best efforts of proponents of climate action, who have marshaled an
abundance of scientific evidence to make their case (see, e.g., McCright and Dunlap 2000, 2010; Layzer,
2007; Lahsen, 2008; Oreskes and Conway, 2010).
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force of the rhetorical and administrative presidencies on specific policy problems. As the
gridlock interval grows, the scope of the administrative and rhetorical presidencies also
grows, becoming the default mode of governance for status quo policies such as climate
change. The impact on democratic principles74 in this scenario is that deliberation, which
helps ensure representative decision making, is not part of the process of arriving at an
ultimate policy solution. Instead, executives use the rhetorical presidency on any given
status quo (i.e., wicked) problem to set the agenda, define the problem, frame the
solution, and justify their use of the administrative presidency to unilaterally make policy.
What ensues then is a type of legislative death spiral that aggrandizes the presidency and
marginalizes Congress. The extent of the death spiral depends on how Congress and the
courts respond. As will be discussed later, both have the power to check post-deliberative
policymaking, but up to this point neither has consistently or seriously threatened the
practice. Until that changes, partisan politics and polarization will continue to provide
both the cause and opportunity to solve wicked problems through the rhetorical and
administrative presidencies.
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The exact definition of democratic principles remains contested in political science theory. It is beyond
the scope of this dissertation to wade into that political science debate. Therefore, for the purpose of the
Post-Deliberative Policymaking Model, democratic principles represent a broad view of governmental
decision making that is supported by fair and open deliberation so that the interests of all citizens are
represented in the process of arriving at a policy solution.

185

Figure 7.1

Post-Deliberative Policymaking Model

Of course, it makes sense that congressional gridlock would inspire executive
action. Presidents come into office with expectations that generally exceed their capacity
to meet them (Moe, 1985). To reiterate, almost from the moment they step into office,
they experience the headwinds of a system of government “designed to render political
change slow and difficult.” Obama faced such headwinds throughout his presidency, and
few were stronger than those he faced addressing climate change. Yet, despite
institutional checks and balances and their own limited capacity, presidents have virtually
unlimited motivation to find ways around the constraints that confound their ambitions,
not least of which is the preservation of their own legacy (Moe, 1985). As a result,
presidents have focused their efforts to maximize control over the bureaucracy in ways
that enhance their ability make policy independent of Congress (Moe, 1985; Vaughan,
2014; Hart, 1995). By doing so, presidents have been able to close the expectations gap
and expand their capacity to make political change less slow and less difficult
(Rudalevige, 2003).
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Rebalancing Constitutional Checks and Balances
In light of the above discussion, taking recourse in administrative strategies is
unquestionably a reaction to the partisanship and polarization presidents face in a
gridlocked Congress. However, presidents have not only habitually resisted constraints
against the exercise of their unilateral powers, they have preemptively sought to loosen or
sweep away such constraints as well (Skowronek, 2009). An equally important point to
consider therefore is that testing the limits of presidential constraints may not just be a
reaction to gridlock. On the contrary, the unilateral exercise of presidential power may
actually contribute to deeper and more persistent polarization, making policy deliberation
all the more difficult. A cycle of gridlock followed by executive action followed by
gridlock ensues. After all, “an unlimited power of construction” does not need a cause; it
simply needs a reason and a direction. It is the pursuit of that reason by any means
necessary that confounds constitutional constraints. This is the paradigm that makes postdeliberative policymaking complicit in the partisanship and polarization that aggrandizes
the presidency, confounds existing constraints, and marginalizes Congress.
Although the roots of this paradigm extend to periods that immediately followed
the founding, they became far more consequential in the Progressive Era (Skowronek,
2009). It was during this period when the rhetorical presidency emerged as a political
force in America (Tulis, 1987). And although the administrative presidency eventually
became the focus of scholars beginning in the 1970s, the reforms of the early 20th century
engendered a sustained and far-reaching expansion of presidential powers. In important
ways, it was this period that set American governance on a path of reform that would
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eventually lead to an era of contemporary politics antithetical to Progressive Era ideals.
As Skowronek (2009) observes,
Successive waves of progressive reform extending over the first two-thirds of the
twentieth century expanded the domain of national action, constructed an
extensive administrative apparatus for intervention at home and abroad, and
concentrated power in the presidency on a scale that dwarfs nineteenth-century
precedents. This concerted shift toward national, executive, and presidential
power marked a pivotal turn in American political development. (p. 2083)
The goal of the progressive movement’s “pivotal turn” was to clear the way for broad
societal reforms that would better reflect national interests. The mechanism for achieving
the goal was through an empowered presidency that was more open and responsive to the
public and less constrained by institutional dynamics (Tulis, 1987; Milkis and Tichenor,
1994). In such a regime, presidential power would be animated by the “fusion of public
opinion with ‘enlightened administration’75” (Skowronek, 2009, pp. 2084-2085; see also
Milkis, 2007). In other words, a fusion of the rhetorical and administrative presidencies
would provide the requisite force to spawn the political and social reforms of the early
20th century.
In light of the preceding, it is noteworthy that Obama is often connected by
scholars in at least a passing way to the political philosophy of Progressive Era reformers
(see, e.g., Smith, 2012; Milkis et al., 2012; Mettler, 2010; Rana, 2009; Finley and
Esposito, 2012). This dissertation suggests a similar connection. I argue that Obama’s
rhetorical and administrative climate actions do indeed reveal a discernable tie to
Progressive Era ideals that places him squarely within the Wilsonian tradition of
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The term “enlightened administration” comes from Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address
on Progressive Government at the Commonwealth Club (Sept. 23, 1932) (Rosenman and Hassett, 1950, p.
752).
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governance. It is an unexpected twist of historical irony, then, to also find President
Obama embroiled in the same kind of deeply partisan politics the Progressive Era was
attempting to remedy. In fact, the Progressive Era was in many respects a political
“insurgency” to overturn the partisanship and party-dominated politics of the Gilded Age
(Skowronek, 2009, p. 2083). It is even more ironic, therefore, that America now, under
the Trump administration, finds itself reverting to a similar Gilded Age dynamic. And it
is this dynamic, explored below, that both gives rise to and reinforces post-deliberative
policymaking.
It is important to underscore here that such an outcome is not the direct result of
President Obama’s actions, or a sign of wrongdoing on his part. It is not a result of any
one president’s actions, in fact. Obama, and now President Trump, are just the most
recent manifestations of an executive-centered presidency that has been taking shape
since the Progressive Era (Tulis, 1987; Skowronek, 2009). And the shape that ultimately
materializes is a policymaking process that is at least reminiscent of the polarized and
party-dominated politics of the Gilded Age (Cameron, 2002). Of course, there are
important historical differences between the politics of today and the Gilded Age, chief
among them being the sheer breadth of political patronage and machine politics of the era
(James, 2005). And while the Gilded Age led to the Progressive Age—a swinging of the
political pendulum toward progress—today we seem to be moving from a system
dominated by progressive values to a new gilded age. But there are important similarities
that deserve attention.
During the latter half of the 19th century, a stark dualism of social and political
ideologies dominated American politics (James, 2005). As a result, party loyalty took on
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a form of group identity, which was as divisive as the policy issues that polarized them
(Miller, 2002). The Gilded Age was thus marked by a period of political equilibrium
where no president won a majority of the popular vote between 1876 and 1892 (Miller,
2002). Trump won the 2016 presidential election in similar fashion. Likewise, George W.
Bush narrowly beat Al Gore in 2000 but lost the popular vote. Like today, there were also
persistent social, economic, and racial gaps that divided the electorate into bitterly
competitive factions. The “winner-take-all economy” (Hacker and Pierson, 2010, p. 152)
that has permeated much of the last two decades (Rahman, 2016) has contributed to a
level of economic inequality largely unsurpassed since the Great Depression (Lieberman,
2011). Such inequality at least suggests a political economy where the financial spoils go
to an increasing exclusive class of elites at the expense of increasingly exposed working
and middle classes, which bears a disproportionate share of the risk (Lieberman, 2011;
Rahman, 2016). Such a political and economic environment “breeds political
polarization, mistrust, and resentment between the haves and the have-nots and tends to
distort the workings of a democratic political system in which money increasingly
confers political voice and power” (Lieberman, 2011, p. 1). And even in the Obama era,
racial inequality remained a persistent problem, as racial resentment comingled with and
acute economic and political discontent that permeated American politics (Hacker and
Pierson, 2010).
Again, analogies between our own historical moment and the Gilded Age are
imperfect. Differences in technology, foreign relations, and the expansion of rights are
but a few stark differences between the America of today and the America of the late
1800s. But we are drawn to ask some of the same questions of our own political moment
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as were Progressives during their era. Progressives inherited a deeply partisan and
polarized system from the Gilded Age. They inherited massive social inequalities and
urgent problems demanding solutions, many brought on by the Industrial Revolution and
the massive changes to social, political, and economic systems that revolution brought.
The nature of policymaking now, as then, will have far reaching implications on our
political system in the years to come. President Trump’s executive actions, which come
on the heels of President Obama’s, offer a glimpse of what that future might portend if
we do indeed return to a Gilded Age. In the section below, I expand on how Obama’s
actions connect him historically to the values and systems of the Progressive Era and how
that connection influences his use of the rhetorical and administrative presidencies.
Partisanship, Populism, and the Rhetorical Presidency: A Tie to Administrative
Theory
In order to get a better sense of President Obama’s approach to governance, this
dissertation placed him within a typology of administrative ideas and political philosophy
that allows us to compare him to other presidents (see Figure 3.2). As discussed in
Chapter 3, the typology consists of Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Madisonian, and
Wilsonian types (Kettl, 2000). The Hamiltonian type represents a “strong-executive/topdown” construct, while the Jeffersonian type represents a “weak executive/bottom-up”
construct. It is important to note that a “weak executive” does not mean one without
power. In a Jeffersonian tradition, a weak executive is one who derives that power from
the bottom up rather than the top down. The Wilsonian and Madisonian types are
contrasted with one another and capture the way in which the bureaucracy is viewed
respectively as “hierarchy, authority, process, and structure” versus “political balance-of-
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power.” Engaging the typology was especially helpful in explicating Obama’s
administrative and rhetorical strategies.
As mentioned above, those strategies strongly suggest a Progressive Era
orientation that falls within the Wilsonian type. And it is noteworthy that partisan appeals
are entirely consistent with the Wilsonian view of governance, especially with respect to
how presidents view the role of the bureaucracy in implementing policy. Wilson’s
articulation of the politics-administration dichotomy was a reaction against partisan
politics implemented through political patronage, a view that is consistent with the
original meaning of the dichotomy advocated by the civil service reformers of the late
1800s (Rosenbloom, 2008). In this view, free from “politics” means free from partisan,
electoral politics, not the policies that are a natural outgrowth of democratic outcomes
(Rosenbloom, 2008). In other words, Wilson and the reformers envisioned a bureaucracy
free from the influence of “boss”-led, partisan politics operating from a posture of neutral
competence, while recognizing that genuine neutral competence means "loyalty that
argues back” (Tulis, 1987, p. 120).
Viewed in this light, the dichotomy never envisioned an administration devoid of
politics or policymaking (Rosenbloom, 2008). In fact, as expressed by Wilson (1887),
“Our own politics must be the touchstone for all theories. The principles on which to base
a science of administration for America must be principles which have democratic policy
very much at heart” (p. 220). Thus, a Wilsonian understanding of the politicsadministration dichotomy is one in which administrative agencies grapple with vexing
policy choices set forth by political leaders. Of course, this means that rather than
partisan “bosses” directing extra-constitutional institutions, such policy choices would
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instead be the priorities of an acting president, as principle, expressed through the actions
of administrative agencies, as agent (Meier and O’Toole, 2006). In announcing his “We
Can’t Wait” policy of administrative action, and motivated by a sense of urgency to act
on climate change’s wickedness, Obama was simply following a model of governance in
the Wilsonian tradition as he pivoted to administrative action via the EPA.
Obama also fits well within the Wilsonian tradition on a political level. As
discussed earlier in this study, Obama’s Progressive Era impulses led him to view the
government as a mechanism for social change—that is, society is improved when
government is mobilized through a nonpartisan bureaucracy to promote social welfare
(Milkis et al., 2012). Progressives, including Wilson, envisioned addressing societal
desires through a system of government that was explicitly engaged with the public and
attentive to its evolving concerns (Skowronek, 2009). In order to accomplish this,
government would be directed by a “‘living’ Constitution” that was less constraining and
allowed for flexibility and experimentation in responding to the public interest
(Skowronek, 2009, p. 2086). Notably, the key to responsiveness would be a president
possessing the requisite skill to discern and mobilize national opinion for the broader
public good (Neustadt, 1960). Such a president also would possess the ability to influence
Congress by discerning and convincingly articulating the public’s evolving concerns
(Wilson, 1908), as well as the wherewithal to expediently address them. Progressives
thus sought to construct a “presidential democracy” with the “chief executive as the
instrument around which to build their new national polity” (Skowronek, 2009, p. 2087,
emphasis in original), accompanied by a professional, non-partisan bureaucracy to carry
out the public’s work. As a result, a president acting in a Wilsonian tradition would
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organize a government with a strong executive at the center and clear hierarchical
authority to direct the bureaucracy to mobilize in a way that improves society
(Skowronek, 2002).
This view of government in action is frequently expressed in Obama’s rhetoric.
For example, during his first address before a joint session of Congress, Obama
(February 4, 2009) declares, “I reject the view that says our problems will simply take
care of themselves, that says Government has no role in laying the foundation for our
common prosperity.” Later, Obama (January 21, 2013) affirms, “We, the people, still
believe that our obligations as Americans are not just to ourselves, but to all posterity.”
Naturally, such obligations would extend to citizens and civil servants alike. Obama
(April 14, 2011) makes his view of governance even clearer as he reveals that “each and
every time [my administration] has had to make a decision, my guiding principle, that
north star, has been…I am my brother’s keeper. I am my sister’s keeper.”
In these passages, Obama clearly represents the progressive views of government
described above. In particular, Obama articulates a vision where the government plays a
foundational role in securing “common prosperity.” It is not the role of government to get
out of the way but rather to stand in the gap. Implicit in this vision is knowing the means
by which common prosperity must come. And relating back to Wilson, the only way to
know this is to discern the common national views and mobilize those views to effect
social change. Obama also takes a long and broad view of social change by referring to
America’s obligations to “all posterity.” Thus, the actions of today are intended to have a
lasting impact on future generations that extends beyond national borders. Of particular
note is the last passage, where Obama strikes a biblical chord in articulating a solemn and
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sacred role for government, his “north star,” in looking after one another.76 From a
governance standpoint, government agencies assume the responsibility for carrying out
these obligations. Of course, when Congress provides little clarity or no assistance,
presidents are more than up to the task to stand in the gap and set a course of action,
accompanied by all the rhetoric necessary to educate, inform, and mobilize public
support. With such a broad view of America’s obligations, it is little wonder that Obama
would mobilize the bureaucracy and engage the populace to overcome the gridlock he
faced in Congress.
In further support of this conclusion, Woodrow Wilson theorized as much about
presidential rhetoric as he did administrative action (Tulis, 1987, pp. 119-132). As
expressed by Wilson (1897), “Policy—where there is no absolute and arbitrary ruler to do
the choosing for a whole people—means massed opinion, and the forming of the mass is
the whole art and mastery of politics” (p. 340). In other words, rather than being the
handmaiden of public opinion, the rhetorical presidency was instead the mechanism by
which public opinion would be both formed and informed. Such an approach would
necessarily involve both fathoming the will of the people, which may only be vaguely
known to them, and in turn directing that opinion in order to inform public policy. For
Obama, that meant rhetorically constructing the role of EPA and rationalizing unilateral
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In this short passage, Obama reveals perhaps his deepest sense of motivation in subtly recalling the
biblical account of Cain and Abel (Genesis 4:8-9). In this account, Cain kills Abel out of jealousy and,
when the Lord asks Cain where his brother is, Cain dismissively responds, “Am I brother’s keeper”
(Genesis 4:9, English Standard Version). In saying his “north star” for tough decisions is “I am my
brother’s keeper. I am my sister’s keeper.” Obama is essentially drawing a sharp contrast between a role for
government that actively seeks to do good and one that does harm, whether actively or passively.
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executive action. The rhetorical president would then educate and persuade the populace
by connecting public desire with public policy (Tulis, 1987).
This is precisely the approach that Obama (October 24, 2011) takes in his October
2011 remarks in Las Vegas when he observes:
[M]ost Americans also understand that the problems we face didn't happen
overnight, and so we're not going to solve them all overnight either. What people
don't understand though is why some elected officials in Washington don't seem
to . . . share the same sense of urgency that people all around the country [share].
In this passage, Obama places himself among the populace and expresses a national view
that recognizes the challenges America faces but is frustrated by “elected officials in
Washington” who he depicts as out of touch and apparently little concerned. In doing so,
Obama engages in both shaping and discerning a massed opinion that demands a call to
action. Then, taking his discerned sense of public opinion and connecting it to both
executive action and public mobilization, Obama delivers that call to action as he
concludes:
But we can't wait for [congressional] action. I'm not going to wait for it. So I'm
going to keep on taking this message across the country. Where we don't have to
wait for Congress, we're just going to go ahead and act on our own. And we're
going to keep on putting pressure on Congress to do the right thing for families all
across the country. And I am confident that the American people want to see
action. We know what to do. The question is whether we're going to have the
political will to do it.
By declaring that “we can’t wait” for Congress to act, Obama is clearly setting the stage
for administrative action he intends to make throughout the remainder of his presidency.
The broader point Obama is making is not only are there actions government can and
should take to improve societal conditions, but governmental action is foundational to
achieving social solidarity. Obama continues by revealing that there are certain actions
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that “we don’t have to wait for Congress” to deliver. Instead, he and the rest of America
are “just going to go ahead and act on our own.” Obama is not just vocalizing a change in
approach here, although he does do that. He also is fully engaging the powerful leverage
he has with the rhetorical presidency to mobilize the public “to keep on putting pressure
on Congress.” In doing so, Obama is actively shaping and massing public opinion to
create a sense of urgency that will either compel Congress to act or justify his own
unilateral actions.
Thus, with the “We Can’t Wait” campaign, we see Obama in the Wilsonian
tradition educating, informing, and mobilizing the support of the populace by signaling
and rationalizing his administrative pivot. Acting in his chief executive capacity, Obama
also situates himself as the instrument that mobilizes the polity. This is the “presidential
democracy” progressives envisioned, but because of the deeply partisan divide, party
politics remained a conspicuous and powerful factor surrounding Obama’s pivot. As a
result, the force behind the fusion of rhetoric and policy is an executive party system that
readily moves forward when Congress stands pat. The effect is that governance is
determined—or primarily constrained—by party, especially where highly politicized,
even wicked, issues are concerned. This is not to say that such governance is
inappropriate or somehow exceeds the rightful authority of the chief executive. The postNew Deal application of the administrative state to make and interpret rules in lieu of
Congressional action has been widely supported by both scholars and the courts
(Sunstein, 2005).77 Indeed, practical considerations, such as time and expertise, require
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Presidential Control model.
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administrative agencies to promulgate rules that would ordinarily cripple Congress
(Bressman, 2003). Further, administrative action, while at times favoring narrow
interests, also serves national interests (Bressman and Vanderbergh, 2006).
However, it does mean increasingly partisan governance characterized by an
expanding gap between deliberation about national priorities and the adoption of rules
reflecting more partisan views about those policies (Milkis and Jacobs, 2017).
Meanwhile, that gap represents a hardening of political differences that becomes the
justification for executive action. In this case, rather than signaling new rounds of
negotiation, the breakdown in deliberation signaled legislation by other means—that is,
administrative action as the “habitual solution to partisan polarization” (Lowande and
Milkis, 2014, p. 3). Thus, the interaction of the policy captured by the pivot and the
corresponding political language rationalizing it combine to create a reciprocal
relationship that, according to Stuckey (1990), “is capable of reconstituting the reality in
which those things are embedded” (p. 4, as quoted in Riehl, 2008). And that reality has
become one in which presidents are justified in taking unilateral action when the partisan
divide is too wide for Congress to cross.
The Dawn of Post-Deliberative Policymaking
Presidents have clearly grown comfortable resorting to unilateral action when
facing an unyielding Congress. Yet, what if the fusion of rhetorical and administrative
action becomes irresistible to presidents as a first rather than last resort? In that case,
rather than habitually using them as a solution to partisan polarization, the rhetorical and
administrative presidencies would become the default mode of governing. This is
precisely the outcome the founders worried about if an executive were to become a
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demagogue and derive his powers “from the role of popular leader” (Tulis, 1987, p. 27).
Therefore, although Obama’s exercise of the rhetorical and administrative presidencies
falls within the norms, conventions, and precedent established by prior presidents, it is
one more step in the direction of presidential aggrandizement. And the collective
presidential steps in this direction amount to a veritable march toward institutionalizing
the reflexive and unmitigated use of presidential powers. As those powers become more
firmly embedded in the DNA of presidents, America moves closer to making postdeliberative policymaking, which looks a lot like demagoguery, the default means of
addressing wicked and ordinary policy problems alike.
Moreover, as a default method of governing, administrative action invites
reciprocal actions when control of the government transitions to the opposing party. As
this occurs, contested policies will move from merely being stuck in status quo to being
whipsawed between two opposing views and a near continuous state of regulatory and
policy uncertainty. This is exactly the dynamic taking place with administrative action on
climate change. Hence, weaponizing any particular administrative power in such a
political regime would necessarily lead to at least an equal and opposite reaction when
the executive office changes hands, the end result of which is a form of party-centered,
brute force politics where the president is aggrandized, Congress is marginalized, and the
judiciary is left to sort through the carnage. As discussed in the following, when taken to
its logical conclusion, this is what post-deliberative policymaking looks like, and our
current trajectory suggests we are well on our way to making it our default form of
governance. Indeed, this is exactly what is taking place now in the Trump administration,
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and promises to continue when he leaves office, barring unforeseen and dramatic changes
to our system.
When Donald Trump entered the Oval Office in January 2017, he flipped many
presidential norms and conventions on their collective head. Making full use of the
rhetorical and administrative presidencies was not one of them. In fact, the speed and
volume at which Trump utilized the administrative presidency is notable. In his first eight
months in office, President Trump signed 45 executive orders compared to the 39 that
were signed by President Obama (Woolley, 2020). On average, Trump has issued 47 per
year compared to Obama’s 39 per year. And while executive orders do not tell the
complete story about unilateral action, they do demonstrate a president’s commitment to
“going it alone.” The fact that many of Trump’s executive orders were a direct reversal of
Obama’s policies (Milkis and Jacobs, 2017)—in particular his order, on day one of his
presidency, directing the EPA to reconsider and revise the Clean Power Plan—also
indicates how reflexive administrative action has become.
In a sign that the habit of using the administrative presidency is as contagious as it
is irresistible, virtually all of the current Democratic presidential candidates are now
vowing to either reverse Trump’s policies or advance their own.78 Many of the executive
orders pertain to wicked problems such as gun control, immigration, and of course
climate change. However, in January 2020 Elizabeth Warren, who had introduced a $640
billion debt-relief bill for student loans in 2019, announced that on day one of her

The inspiration behind the phrase “vest old laws with new meanings” comes from Rudalevige (2016b)
and Derthic (2011). In discussing the propensity of modern presidents to reinterpret existing laws to fit their
policies, Derthic uses the phrase “…invest old ones with new meanings” (p. 56), while Rudalevige (2016b)
titles a journal article dealing with the same subject “Old Laws, New Meanings: Obama’s Brand of
Presidential ‘Imperialism.’”
78
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presidency she would instead sign an executive order to cancel the debt herself (Berman,
January 2020). Echoing Obama’s 2010 “We can’t wait” declaration, Warren (2020)
proclaims on her campaign website, “We can’t afford to wait for Congress” and proceeds
to lay out a plan to vest old laws with new meanings. Similarly, Bernie Sanders is
reportedly preparing to sign dozens of executive orders at the beginning of his presidency
on a familiar premise. That is, according to a Sanders campaign document, “We cannot
accept delays from Congress...” (Stein and Sullivan, January 2020). The document
reportedly contains the expected executive orders addressing climate change and
immigration, but also adds one addressing prescription drugs (Stein and Sullivan, January
2020).
The reciprocal nature of these executive orders is evidence of the whipsaw effect
discussed earlier, but it also is evidence that unilateral, policy consequential action may
in fact be the default mode of governance. Of course, the above designs on future
executive orders highlight important campaign issues that eventually become the basis
for administrative action and partisan leverage. But more fundamental to American
democracy, the reflexive use of administrative action underscores an important message:
presidents, including presidential hopefuls, have lost faith in Congress. This is clearly
true for wicked problems, but it also appears to be true for tough but ordinary problems
as well, such as student-loan debt and prescription drugs. As a result, rather than invest in
a deliberative process that is intended to be representative of American interests,
contemporary presidents have apparently lost patience with Congress and are
increasingly leveraging an expansive view of “administrative power for partisan
purposes” (Milkis and Jacobs, 2017, p. 609; see also Berman, 2020).
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As to the rhetorical presidency, it is important to at least point out the degree to
which Trump has used rhetoric to influence policy. Notably, as Tulis (2017) argues,
because of his reliance on rhetoric, especially via Twitter, Trump may very well be
America’s first elected demagogue. Although Trump’s use of the administrative
presidency falls largely in line with his predecessors (Potter et al., 2019), it his
administrative actions combined with his rhetoric that seems to draw the most attention,
and worry. Indeed, much of Trump’s administrative actions are inextricably linked to
Obama’s use of executive authority—that is, they are predominantly focused on
administratively reversing Obama’s administrative actions (Milkis and Jacobs, 2017).
And his rhetoric is less focused on a reasoned debate than an impassioned “call to arms”
(Bostdorff, 2017). From tweeting about ongoing court cases, foreign leaders,
controversial social issues, and members of Congress, not to mention the relatively more
mundane administrative and policy matters, Trump has taken the rhetorical presidency
into uncharted territory.
In fact, Twitter uniquely provides a platform for Trump to control his message
and directly tap into his supporters, giving him an enhanced sense of power and
persuasion (Tulis, 2017). As Bostdorff (2017) argues, such an evolution in presidential
rhetoric is troubling, since it invites “the possibility that social media and its frequent
companion, counterfactual advocacy, may simply be promoting a persistent condition of
conflict and fluctuation that prevents thoughtful, collaborative, well-informed change
from taking place” (p. 704). If that is the case, then it is highly likely that social media
alone will reinforce post-deliberative policymaking. Such an observation also makes
Tulis’s (2017) pronouncement on Trump particularly worrisome, since Trump has been
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able to use it so effectively. A nightmare scenario, therefore, would be that whatever
success Trump experiences using rhetoric to influence policy would pave the way for a
succession of demagogues.
From the founding to Trump and beyond, the partisan use of executive powers
clearly demonstrates the degree to which the rhetorical and administrative presidencies
are now embedded in the DNA of today’s presidents and presidential candidates.
Importantly, the exercise of these executive powers may not simply be a reaction to
partisanship and polarization but a cause that reinforces existing ideological divides. If
that is the case, then the fusion of the rhetorical and administrative presidencies will
normalize post-deliberative policymaking to the point where administrative action
becomes a weapon of first rather than last resort. As Milkis and Jacobs (2017) observe,
this type of “administrative aggrandizement...marks the continuation of...an executive
centered partisanship, which relies on presidential candidates and presidents to pronounce
party doctrine, raise campaign funds, campaign on behalf of their partisan brethren,
mobilize grass roots support, and advance party programs” (p.585). If this is not Gilded
Age politics, then it is something very close to it. And the irony of what is at least
reminiscent of the Gilded Age today may very well become the reality of a second Gilded
Age tomorrow.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION
History and practice have shown that the entrepreneurial skills of presidents
frequently prevail in conflicts over the constitutional limits of their powers. In continually
testing the limits that would confound their ambitions, presidents have attained a
seemingly inexorable expansion of their power and authority. The result is that all
presidential constraints are quite possibly rendered temporary by the continual
unchecking of their authority. In virtually all cases, research in this regard has focused
either on presidential rhetoric or presidential action, unilaterally or through the
bureaucracy (Watts, 2012). The attention to these two branches of scholarship has
contributed valuable insights about presidential power, but by treating them separately we
have a more limited understanding about how the fusion of the two may influence or
shape that power. Gaps have remained, therefore, in our understanding of presidential
power.
This dissertation has endeavored to bring these two scholarly conversations
together in order to draw some larger conclusions about their implications on democratic
decision-making and to begin filling those gaps. Analyzing Obama’s use of the rhetorical
and administrative presidencies to address the wicked problem of climate change has
indeed offered a revealing window through which to better understand federal
policymaking in America. To be sure, Obama’s use of rhetoric and administrative action
fit well within the precedent established by previous administrations. In this regard,
Obama certainly is not unique. When his focus on shepherding climate change legislation
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through Congress remained stuck in status quo, Obama pivoted to the EPA as an
expedient way—the only way left to him, in fact—to implement climate actions. As he
articulated on a regular basis, Obama would have preferred a legislative solution, but a
hopelessly gridlocked Congress precluded any possibility of finding one. In other words,
administrative action to Obama can be seen as legislation by other means, and he used
what he characterized as the looming, catastrophic, and irreversible impacts of climate
change and economic loss as justification for not only “speaking over the heads” of
Congress but for bypassing it altogether.
By pivoting to executive action Obama was continuing the well-preserved
presidential tradition of implementing policy by any means necessary. Yet it is not
enough to note that he continued this tradition; we must also pay attention to how he
continued it. Indeed, Obama’s approach draws fascinating parallels with Woodrow
Wilson’s progressive philosophy. Wilson saw the office of the president as a unifying
force—both the leader of the nation and the leader of his party (Dimock, 1957). As such,
Wilson not only saw his role as leading the nation, but also as shaping national views to
reflect his own (Dimock, 1957). Obama assumed a similar view of his role as president
and attempted to shape national views on climate policy while Congress deliberated the
Waxman-Markey bill. However, as a reformer in the Wilsonian tradition, Obama readily
adapted to a gridlocked Congress, and a largely unmotivated public, by addressing an
urgent problem on his own that was predictably interpreted as an indirect attack on the
customs and conventions of democratic principles. And we now see the “counterattack”
as President Trump undoes administrative action by administrative action.
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The swing of this political pendulum confirms what others have observed as a
system of policy formulation and adoption achieved through an executive party system
(Lowande and Milkis, 2009; Milkis et al., 2012). If all policy is now partisan policy, then
deliberation becomes something that should be attempted but not favored. Instead,
administrative action becomes a default mode of governance in a new paradigm of postdeliberative policymaking. Accordingly, unilateral action is justified whenever Congress
ignores, ineffectively addresses, or altogether opposes presidential overtures.
It is in this space where the interaction of the administrative presidency and the
rhetorical presidency become particularly profound. That is, when administrative action
becomes the default means by which policy is formulated, adopted, implemented, and
defended, then when combined with a president’s rhetoric, the fusion of the two may
serve to harden the divide rather than unify the populace. Thus, unlike the progressive era
ideals, populist appeals are in reality partisan appeals, while rhetoric is weaponized,
along with the bureaucracy, to gain and exploit any advantage to keep and wield power.
This is the demagoguery our Founding Fathers were concerned about, and it is the
demagoguery we may now face as the administrative presidency and rhetorical
presidency become business as usual. At this juncture, Congress has the means but not
the will to address the very manifestation of what the Founding Fathers feared. The result
is ultimately that wicked policy problems will remain unsettled and national interests will
suffer from the absence of robust deliberation. Worse still, ordinary policy problems may
go the way of wicked problems as the presidency is aggrandized, Congress is
marginalized, and the courts sort through the carnage. This is the essence of what postdeliberative policymaking looks like.
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Ultimately, how Congress, the courts, and the public respond to post-deliberative
policymaking can either check or enable its expansion. As a result, the two branches of
government provide an important feedback mechanism to presidents and have much to
say about how much they will tolerate a recasting of their institutional bond with the
president. The public also will have cyclical opportunities to decide whether the recasting
of our political system that favors a strong executive should proceed unabated. If
Congress and the courts do not check presidential power, then a post-deliberative
policymaking process may become normalized, which will in turn aggrandize the
presidency at the expense of deliberation and a disempowered Congress (Bulman-Pozen
and Metzger, 2016). Such an outcome is bound to encourage presidents to bypass
Congress and reinforce the use, if not the expansion, of unilateral action (Bulman-Pozen
and Metzger, 2016; Milkis et al., 2014; Milkis and Jacobs, 2017). If that is the case, then
U.S. policymaking almost certainly will experience the whipsaw effects of diametrical
approaches to unsettled policies with each new presidential administration. As a result,
America will be plagued by systemic instability that perpetually taxes our politics, our
institutions, and our citizens.
As it stands now, presidential action risks becoming completely unmoored from
constitutional constraints. Unless checks are restored to constrain presidential power,
American democracy will continue to transform in harmful ways that may eventually
validate Lord Macaulay’s (1860) foreboding prediction that the U.S. Constitution is “all
sail and no anchor” (n.p.). Yet, the die is not fully cast and historical developments
surrounding the presidency unite to suggest that post-deliberative policymaking is not
inevitable, or at least not unchangeable. Taking a panoramic view of the presidency, as
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this dissertation has done, reveals a fluid institution that can and does transform over
time. The rhetorical and administrative presidencies are tools that presidents have
wielded to great effect, but correctives are possible. And just as one era has yielded to the
innovations of the next, this current era may yet yield to one that reflects a far more
deliberative and representative nature.
In the meantime, the solution of wicked problems at the national level will remain
unsettled, if our policymaking process remains as described in this dissertation. America
is currently facing a number of “wicked” challenges, of which climate change is only
one. Immigration, gun violence, terrorism, and social inequality, among many others, are
all serious problems that deserve dedicated and deliberative consideration. If a postdeliberative policymaking process continues to dominate American politics, then we will
be missing a key ingredient to developing efficient and effective policy solutions—which
is of course the value of a deliberative and representative decision making process. And
our ability to actually resolve vexing problems will be seriously undermined, meaning
subjecting America on a cyclical basis to whipsawed policies. Put another way, if a
President, or special interest acting through the president, can derail our deliberative
legislative process, then America itself may be held hostage to increasingly extreme,
divisive, and polarizing views of policy solutions. In such a world, Americans will
remain polarized on its most pressing issues as presidents “out administrate” each other
in an endless cycle of unilateral executive actions. Policy will thus be reduced to brute
force politics driven by ideology, demagoguery, and simple majorities. This was the
future the Founding Fathers were concerned about, and it remains a pressing concern
today.
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Viewing the policymaking process through the Post-Deliberative Policymaking
Model, as this dissertation has done, adds a dimension to policy and presidential studies
that has been understudied. The Post-Deliberative Policymaking Model also expands how
scholars in multiple academic fields can view presidents and U.S. policymaking. From an
administrative presidency perspective, the model helps visualize how polarization not
only prompts but also is exacerbated by unilateral executive actions. Deeper studies in
this area are likely to improve our understanding about status quo policies and their
influence on our political system. In particular, more studies in this area may help reveal
whether, and to what extent, executive centered partisanship is a dysfunctional and
increasingly problematic evolution of our political system, or just an expected
manifestation of a political system working as designed. In terms of the rhetorical
presidency, viewing it in the context of the administrative presidency opens the way
scholars can understand its influence on politics. We know it is a potent force on its own,
but this dissertation has shown that when combined with the administrative presidency it
may have the power to reshape, or at least expand, the way we view the presidency. The
Post-Deliberative Policymaking Model thus helps explore different dimensions to the
presidency, including how it may influence polarization, to better understand where we
may be headed as a nation.
Finally, it would have been interesting to compare President Obama’s rhetoric
with that of his predecessor, George W. Bush, or even with President Trump, which was
considered early on. Given the way Trump has used executive authority to specifically
counter Obama’s own use of executive authority, such a comparison would have been
rich in data and captured a dynamic that appears likely to only increase over time.
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However, comparing one president to another using the methods in this dissertation
would have greatly expanded the data analyzed and time involved. Trump’s rhetoric also
posed a problem because its often chaotic and unconventional nature makes comparisons
to other presidents more challenging. Nevertheless, these types of comparisons would be
fertile ground for future study. By taking the methods and Post-Deliberative
Policymaking Model developed in this dissertation and expanding them into additional
areas of research, scholars can explore new ways of understanding the familiar themes
addressed in this dissertation.
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Code Book
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Table A.1

Code Book

Climate Apocalypse

Referencing protecting the planet against climate change
events, etc. In the absence of action, climate catastrophism is
inevitable.
Exemplar:
“…so that you're not seeing more drought and famine that
creates more conflict…”
In this case, the text suggests that climate change is currently
causing “drought and famine” and, in the absence of action,
there will be more socially and politically destabilizing
climatic episodes. Provides the ultimate rational for action.

Collective Action

Multi-lateral international cooperation. Individual nations must
take responsibility and accept the obligation of taking action to
prevent more harmful climate change events. Collective Action
capture the notion that no single entity or subset of entities can
reverse the trend of climate change.
Exemplars:
“For the first time in history, all of the major—the world's
major economies have come together to accept their
responsibility to take action to confront the threat of climate
change. After extremely difficult and complex negotiations,
this important breakthrough lays the foundation for
international action in the years to come.”
“So that -- that was an important principle, that everybody's got
to do something in order to solve this problem. But I make no
claims…”
“And together, we must continue our work to build on the
progress made in Copenhagen and Cancun, so that all the
major economies here today follow through on the
commitments that were made. Together, we must work to
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transform the energy that powers our economies and support
others as they move down that path.”
Managing/Tempering This is a reminder about the enormity of the problem and the
Expectations
work ahead. Change will not occur overnight, and it will not
come easily. It is a call for patience, perseverance, and
steadfastness in the face of the significant challenge ahead.
Exemplars:
“Americans also understand that the problems we face didn't
happen overnight, and so we're not going to solve them all
overnight either.”
“Now, this progress did not come easily, and we know that
progress on this particular aspect of climate change
negotiations is not enough. And going forward, we're going to
have to build on the momentum that we established in
Copenhagen to ensure that international action to significantly
reduce emissions is sustained and sufficient over time.”
Clean Energy
Utopia/Clean Energy
Revolution

This is an economic argument as much as a utopian vision. A
clean energy transformation will be the engine that powers
America into economic dominance and solves the climate
problem. It is a path that heals the economy and the planet.
Exemplars:
“At home that means continuing our efforts to build a clean
energy economy that has the potential to create millions of new
jobs and new industries…”
“…that produces jobs that can't be exported; it reduces our
dependence on foreign oil; it is good economics; it will
increase our exports -- oh, and by the way, it also solves the
climate problem.”
“…because if America leads in developing clean energy, we
will lead in growing our economy and putting our people back
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to work and leaving a stronger and more secure country to our
children.”
Leading the Way:

Retaking the initiative to not only lead with respect to climate
policy but also the clean energy revolution that is inevitable.
This code is juxtaposed to “Falling Behind.”
Exemplars:
“I don't want the technology that will transform the way we use
energy to be invented abroad. I want the United States of
America to be what it has always been, and that is a leader--the
leader--when it comes to a clean energy future.”

Transgenerational
Trust

For the children. Regardless of any other motivation, everyone
should want to act on behalf of the children and grandchildren.
So if no argument for action is convincing, then at least act in
the interest of the children so they can have a better future. It is
an appeal to an intergenerational responsibility to secure a
future that protects the children and gives them a chance to
pursue their dreams.
Exemplars:
“…and protect our environment for our children.”
“…and leaving a stronger and more secure country to our
children.”
“And it is how we will combat the threat of climate change and
leave our children a planet that's safer than the one we
inherited.”

Voice of Reason

Cooler heads will prevail, and the logic of the policies is really
very rational and simple. Common sense and reason drives the
policy not ideology or passion.
Exemplars:
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“what did happen was cooler heads prevailed.”
“I know that there is some concern about how energy fits
together with climate change. I happen to believe that climate
change is one of the reasons why we've got to pursue a clean
energy agenda, but it's not the only reason.”
“I want to be clear that my administration is following a
nonideological approach to this issue. We believe in a strategy
of more production, more efficiency, and more incentives for
clean energy.”
We Can’t Wait

Addressing urgency of action. The need for action is so urgent
that waiting is no longer an option.
Exemplars:
“we can't wait for an increasingly dysfunctional Congress to do
its job. Where they won't act, I will.”
“…we're willing not to defer tough decisions around health
care or energy or education, so that somebody else deals with
them…”

Dangerous
Dependence

Reliance on foreign oil and concomitant harmful impacts on
national security and economic prosperity.
Exemplar:
“But it's also how we will reduce our dangerous dependence on
foreign oil, a dependence that endangers our economy and our
security.”

Falling Behind

Losing what is rightfully America’s. This is America’s clean
energy Sputnik moment. This code is juxtaposed to “Leading
the Way.” It captures the idea that America is losing the race
and will continue to do so without a change in policy. It also
captures the idea that America has been lax in addressing
important policy issues in general.
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Exemplars:
“We can't afford to spin our wheels while the rest of the world
speeds ahead.”
“And unfortunately, right now the United States, the Nation
that pioneered the use of clean energy, is being outpaced by
nations around the world. It's China that has launched the
largest effort in history to make their economy energy efficient.
We spearheaded the development of solar technology, but
we've fallen behind countries like Germany and Japan in
producing it.”
“…countries like China are moving even faster. And they're
very aggressive about wanting to make sure that these clean
energy jobs are in their countries.”
In It to Win It

We’re going to lead and we’re going to win and we’ll reap the
benefits of that effort. The reward of winning is worth the
struggle. Missing out on such rewards is unthinkable,
especially when you consider other nations enjoying what
could have been America’s
Exemplars:
“I am convinced that whoever builds a clean energy economy,
whoever is at the forefront of that, is going to own the 21stcentury global economy.”
“But I don't want America to lose that competition. I don't want
the industries that yield the jobs of tomorrow to be built
overseas. I don't want the technology that will transform the
way we use energy to be invented abroad. I want the United
States of America to be what it has always been, and that is a
leader--the leader--when it comes to a clean energy future.”

Closing the Gap

Related to “Falling Behind” and “In It To Win It.” Pointing to
the fact that America can make up the lost ground. It’s not too
late to make a difference.
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Exemplar:
“…if we can tap the talents of our workers and our innovators
and our entrepreneurs, if we can gain the lead in clean energy
worldwide, then we'll forge a future where a better life is
possible in our country over the long run. That's a future we're
now closer to building because of the steps that we're taking
today.”
Big Tent Energy

Creating a diverse energy portfolio...as long as it’s not
traditional coal burning. America still needs all of its resources
and abandoning fossil fuels is not part of the agenda.
Exemplars:
“But to create more of these clean energy jobs, we need more
production, more efficiency, more incentives. And that means
building a new generation of safe, clean nuclear power plants
in this country. It means making tough decisions about opening
new offshore areas for oil and gas development. It means
continued investment in advanced biofuels and clean coal
technologies.”
“One of the things that we're going to be talking about today is
investing in the kind of technology that will allow us to use
coal, our most bountiful natural resource here in the United
States, without polluting our planet.”
“And I also think it's important for us to understand that in
order for us to move forward with a robust energy policy,
we've got to have not an either-or philosophy, but a both-and
philosophy…”

United We Stand

Ideological and political differences are set aside to focus on
issues that matter to all Americans.
Exemplar:
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“These aren't Republican values or Democratic values that
they're living by, business values or labor values, they're
American values.”
Difference Don’t
Matter

Related to MCC above. The similarities that bind us are greater
than the differences that divide us. This may be the same codes
as MCC and will continue to be evaluated to see if it needs
modification.
Exemplar:
“Now, there's no reason that we shouldn't be able to work
together in a bipartisan way to get this done.”
“We have to focus not so much on those narrow areas where
we disagree, but on the broad areas where we agree.”

Coming Together:

Related to MCC and DDM above. This may just be another
positive expression of Making Common Cause and will be
evaluated going forward to determine whether the codes should
be combined or hierarchically ordered in a single code.
Exemplar:
“…because of our diversity of race and faith and religion, that
there was something special when we come together and that
we can somehow combine a fierce individualism and a sense of
entrepreneurship and risk-taking and self-reliance and
responsibility with also a sense of community, a sense of
mutual obligation, a sense that our lives are better if we're
looking out for one another.”

Remaining Resolute

As Tom Petty sang, “I won’t back down...you can drag me
down to the gates of hell, but I won’t back down.” The
outcome is too important to give up. The struggle is worth it.
Honoring those who refused to quit by refusing to quit
ourselves.
Exemplars:
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“The only reason we are here is because generations of
Americans were unafraid to do what was hard, to do what was
needed even when success was uncertain, to do what it took to
keep the dream of this Nation alive for their children and their
grandchildren.”
“A new decade stretches before us. We don't quit. I don't quit.
Let's seize this moment to start anew, to carry the dream
forward, and to strengthen our Union once more.”
Same Failed Policies

It’s time to leave old ideas behind. It’s time to get with the
times and move into the new energy era where a clean energy
economy will usher in jobs, wealth, prosperity, safety, and
security. Those who argue with such an approach are
unreasonable, anti-progress, backward thinking Luddites who
support technology that is passing them by from an economic
and environmental standpoint.
Exemplar:
“Today the Senate chose to move America forward towards
that clean energy economy, not backward to the same failed
policies that have left our Nation increasingly dependent on
foreign oil.”

Out of Touch
Politicians

This code essentially makes politicians (i.e., predominantly
Republicans standing in the way of Obama’s policies) a foil to
Obama’s “We Can’t Wait” speech. This is a populist message
that the elite are out of touch with the needs of ordinary
Americans who need them to act but they continue to refuse to
do so.
Exemplar:
“What people don't understand though is why some elected
officials in Washington don't seem to…share the same sense of
urgency that people all around the country are.”
“People out here don't have a lot of time or a lot of patience for
some of that nonsense that's been going on in Washington.”
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Waiting on Congress

Congress can help...and we need them to. We’re giving them
the opportunity and waiting for the take it so they can make a
positive contribution. There is a sense of urgency and scope
that’s important—that is, unilateral action is helpful, but it
won’t make the same difference that congressional action will.
Exemplar:
“These Members of Congress who aren't doing the right thing
right now, they still have a chance to take meaningful action…’
“We still need Congress to pass the jobs bill. We still need
them to move forward on Project Rebuild so we can have more
homes like this and wonderful families having opportunity to
live out the American Dream.”

Going It Alone

If Congress won’t act, I will. Complete commitment to acting
unilaterally to advance policies that are obstructed in Congress.
Exemplars:
“I've told my administration to keep looking every single day
for actions we can take without Congress…”
“…I also said that I intend to do everything in my power to act
on behalf of the American people, with or without Congress.”
“Until they act, until they do what they need to do, we're going
to act on our own, because we can't wait for Congress to help
our families and our economy.”

Social Solidarity

Conveys Obama’s version of the American Dream. It is a
vision for America that is communitarian. An America that is
characterized by decency, responsibility, and concern for the
“least of these.” It is an America that strives for prosperity for
all.
Exemplars:
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“And if we do, if we come together and lift this Nation from
the depths of this crisis, if we put our people back to work and
restart the engine of our prosperity, if we confront without fear
the challenges of our time and summon that enduring spirit of
an America that does not quit, then someday years from now
our children can tell their children that this was the time when
we performed, in the words that are carved into this very
Chamber, ‘something worthy to be remembered.’”
Clear and Present
Danger

Climate change is real and happening right now.
Overwhelming scientific evidence pointing to irreversible
climate catastrophe, unless America takes action now. As a real
threat happening right now, climate change demands urgent
action. “The enemy is at the gates.”
Exemplars:
“But if those trend lines continue the way they are, there's not
going to be a nation on this Earth that's not impacted
negatively. People will suffer. Economies will suffer. Entire
nations will find themselves under severe, severe problems:
more drought, more floods, rising sea levels, greater migration,
more refugees, more scarcity, more conflict.”
“[Climate Change] is no longer some far-off problem. It is
happening here. It is happening now.”

